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CHICKAMAUGA.

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John B. Turchin,
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NOTED BATTLES FOR THE UNION

DURING THE CIVIL WAR

IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1861–5.

CHICKAMAUGA

BY

JOHN B. TURCHIN,

LATE BRIGADIER-GENERAL UNITED-STATES VOLUNTEERS;

FORMERLY COLONEL OF THE GENERAL STAFF

(ETAT-MAJOR) IN THE IMPERIAL

GUARDS OF RUSSIA.

ILLUSTRATED WITH EIGHT MAPS.

CHICAGO:

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1888.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Nov. 14, 1888.

FERGUS PRINTING COMPANY, Chicago,

Dear Sirs:—The officers,* invited by Capt. S. C. Kellogg, U.S.A., to meet at Chattanooga on Nov. 10, 1888, and to assist him in locating the positions of our troops on the old battlefield of Chickamauga, with a view of correcting the official War-Department maps of that battle, have finished their work. During our visits to the battlefield on Nov. 11, 12, and 13, there were found slight discrepancies between the positions as located by the gentlemen present and the corresponding positions as designated on our maps, accompanying the narrative of the "Battle of Chickamauga." They are as follows:

(1) Gen. Wilder, who commanded our mounted-infantry brigade (1st brig., 4th div., 14th A.C.) in that battle, asserted that after his withdrawal from Alexander's bridge, where his brigade was posted during Sept. 18, 1863, he took position on the heights east of Vineyard's farm, where he remained until next morning. Toward evening of the same day, the confederate troops of B. R. Johnson's division, with one brigade of Hood's division, after crossing Chickamauga River on Reed's bridge, advanced toward the same Vineyard's farm, and went into bivouac several hundred yards from the field of that farm, lying on the east side of the main Chattanooga-and-Lafayette road; so that apparently the troops of Wilder were facing the above-mentioned confederate troops during the night of Sept. 18–19.

On our map No. 5 we have placed Wilder's brigade east and a little north of Widow Glenn's house, as Gen. Thomas, in his report, mentions that while advancing with two of his divisions

* Those present at Chattanooga were: Capt. S. C. Kellogg, U.S.A., in charge of the correction of the official maps; Gen. Absalom Baird, who commanded 1st division, 14th A. C.; Gen. Ferdinand Vanderveer, who commanded 3d brigade, 3d division, 14th A. C.; Gen. H. V. Boynton, who commanded 35th Ohio Inf.; Gen. John B. Turchin, who commanded 3d brigade, 4th division, 14th A.C.; Gen. J. S. Fullerton and Capt. J. D. Taylor were on the staff of Gen. Granger, commanding reserve corps; Gen. John T. Wilder, who commanded the mounted-infantry brigade; Lieut.-Col. Chesley D. Bailey of the 9th Kentucky Inf., of VanCleve's division; and Col. S. B. Moe, adjutant-general of Steedman's division.

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toward Kelley's house, early in the morning of Sept. 19, Col. Wilder reported to him that his brigade was in position on the heights east of Widow Glenn's house.

Gen. Wilder thus explains: that as Glenn's and Vineyard's houses are on an almost due east-and-west line, consequently his report to Gen. Thomas of his position was correct.*

In our description of the action of our troops around and on Vineyard's farm on Sept. 19, we locate Wilder's brigade forming on the left of Davis' division. Its position on our map No. 6 is shown at the time when Davis' troops were driven by the enemy across the field, and when Col. Wilder's command checked the enemy's pursuit.

The discrepancy thus exists only in the location of the bivouac of Wilder's brigade on the night of Sept. 18 and 19, and as there was no action at the time, it is unimportant.

(2) Gen. Vanderveer was colonel commanding third brigade of Brannan's division, and Gen. Boynton, as lieutenant-colonel, commanded the 35th Ohio Infantry, under Vanderveer, during the Chickamauga battle. They have located the position occupied by their brigade in the forenoon of Sept. 20, in which they met and checked the enemy advancing in the rear of our left wing, and then by a charge drove him beyond our extreme left. This position is located by them on *the east* side of and close to the main Chattanooga-and-Lafayette road, in Kelley's field, while on our map No. 7 it is designated on *the west* side of that road; a discrepancy which does not invalidate the general features of the actions in the rear of our left wing during the forenoon of September 20, 1863, as designated on our map.

The above are the only discrepancies noticed between the positions of our troops as located by the parties investigating the battlefield and the positions designated for those troops on our maps.

Yours truly,

JOHN B. TURCHIN.

* We have erased, with a cross, Wilder's position near Glenn's house, in map No. 5, and inserted his bivouac position on Sept. 18–19, as claimed by him, in front of the rebel troops under Gen. B. R. Johnson.—PUBS.

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TO THE

BRAVE AND PATRIOTIC SOLDIERS

OF THE

ELEVENTH, THIRTY-SIXTH, EIGHTY-NINTH, AND NINETY-SECOND OHIO

AND THE

EIGHTEENTH KENTUCKY REGIMENTS OF INFANTRY,

WHO FORMED, DURING THE

CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA,

THE THIRD BRIGADE

OF THE

FOURTH DIVISION OF THE FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

OF THE

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,

THIS SIMPLE NARRATIVE IS DEDICATED

BY THEIR OLD COMRADE AND BRIGADE COMMANDER,

JOHN B. TURCHIN.

PREFACE.

THE ground work for a description of campaigns and battles are the official reports of the various commanders of the contending armies, made directly after the action in the field. These unerring landmarks enable the narrator to discern the plans of the commanders-in-chief and their methods of carrying them out. When diligently sifted and brightened by the critical considerations, founded on the acknowledged principles of the art of war, they become military history. Personal reminiscences of military men, who have participated in the operations narrated, may enhance the general interest of the events or explain some details of the transactions, but, however plausible or interesting, they can not shake the official records. This narrative is founded principally on the official records of the officers of both the United-States and rebel forces, interspersed with some details not found in the records from the reminiscences of veracious persons and from personal observations of the writer. For copies of the official records the writer feels under obligations to the late Col. Robert N. Scott, who was so long at the head of the office of military records and proved to be so efficient in mastering and systematizing for publication an immense mass of both Union and rebel documents, a laborious and important task, requiring particular talent and adaptability which he fully possessed. That this narrative may prove instructive to the students of military art as well as interesting to the general public is the sincere wish of

JOHN B. TURCHIN.

July 30, 1887.

PUBLISHER'S PREFACE.

JOHN BASIL TURCHIN—*Ivan Vasilevitch Turchininoff*, the author of this narrative, was born January 30, 1822, in the Province of Don, Russia; after receiving a collegiate education, entered the cadet-school at St. Petersburg, graduating into the horse-artillery service, and when lieutenant entered the military academy for the general staff; graduating with high honors, was admitted into the staff-service of the Imperial Guards as sub-captain, and was promoted successively captain and colonel; made the campaigns with the Imperial Guards during the Hungarian war in 1848–9, and of the Crimean war of 1854–6.

In this country the record of Gen. Turchin is one of the most remarkable. His regiment, the 19th Illinois Infantry, was acknowledged to be the best-drilled regiment in the Army of the Cumberland; the brigades he commanded always distinguished themselves conspicuously in those battles in which they were led by their intrepid commander. The capture of Huntsville, Ala., early in 1862; the last charge of Turchin's brigade at Chickamauga; the scaling of Missionary Ridge, at the extreme left of the storming line of the Army of the Cumberland, when nine guns were captured and the enemy driven north before help came from other brigades of the same division, are deeds worthy of a hero.

His method of treating rebel property, including slaves, at the commencement of his military career in this country was

that of an experienced soldier, and was the people's key-note for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, for which he was court-martialed by the pro-slavery Gen. Don Carlos Buell, and relieved of his command. President Lincoln, instead of approving the sentence, promoted him to a brigadier-general.

These facts are stated to show that Gen. Turchin is one of the most thoroughly-educated soldiers in our country, and that his description of one of the most remarkable and important battles of our late war should command the attention of not only military students but of all enlightened men.

CHICKAMAUGA.

PART ONE.
THE CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER I.
PRELIMINARY.

THE year 1863 may be considered as a turning-point in the struggle between the North and the South. The left wing of the Union forces, represented by the Army of the Potomac, after suffering a defeat in the beginning of May in the battle of Chancellorsville, was soon obliged to fall back beyond even Washington, as the enemy's Army of Virginia, under Gen. Lee, was gradually moving north, and, crossing the Potomac, had invaded Pennsylvania.

The object of the invasion having been more political than military, it had the virtue of stimulating our government to exert its utmost efforts, resulting in the bloody battle of Gettysburg, where the rebel forces were stopped and beaten back. The array of military forces at Gettysburg, by both contestants, was unsurpassed either before or afterward, and the determination and stubbornness of the fighting on both sides was unexampled. Our efforts at Gettysburg on July 2 and 3 showed clearly to the enemy that their attempts to invade the North were futile; and that the losses and exhaustion, which they suffered in this campaign and battle, if repeated, would end the Rebellion.

While our left wing was thus occupied, our right wing, represented by the Army of the Tennessee, penetrated by the Mississippi River far into the enemy's country, having vainly endeavored during the winter and early spring, in the bayous and swamps, to change the current of that mighty river and thus pass the ramparts of Vicksburg with the fleet. In the meantime, the army moved along the western shore of the river, the

fleet successfully ran the gauntlet of the enemy's stronghold, and, after crossing the Mississippi and manœuvring east of Black River, captured Jackson, the capital of the State of Mississippi, and, defeating the enemy's army under Pemberton, compelled it to retreat to Vicksburg. It then invested that fort, which was—on July 4, the next day after the end of the battle of Gettysburg—surrendered to the Union army.

The Gettysburg and Vicksburg victories thus almost simultaneously achieved, was a stunning blow to the Rebellion, from the effect of which the rebels never recovered. They reduced the enemy's army by over 50,000 men, and destroyed an immense amount of property and material at Vicksburg, including almost the whole of their Mississippi fleet.

Not less important were our operations during the same time in our centre, represented by the Army of the Cumberland, and conducted on our central theatre of war through Kentucky, Tennessee, Northern Georgia and Alabama. Our army under Gen. Rosecrans started, June 24, from Murfreesboro, Tenn., and, by a series of skilful movements in a nine-day campaign, obliged the enemy's army under Gen. Bragg to evacuate its fortified positions at Shelbyville and Tullahooma, and to move south to the Tennessee River, and, successively, beyond it to Chattanooga. So that at that time all the country between the Ohio and Tennessee rivers, which during the preceding summer and fall had been evacuated by the Army of the Ohio, under Gen. Buell, was again triumphantly reoccupied by the same army, now called the Army of the Cumberland. Thus, while the guns of the Army of the Potomac mowed down the enemy at Gettysburg, and the cannon of the Army of the Tennessee battered down the rebel works at Vicksburg, the guns of the Army of the Cumberland were reverberating through the cañons of the Cumberland mountains, and the Union flags were triumphantly waving on their peaks and along the beautiful Tennessee River. This territory reoccupied by the Army of the Cumberland was considered by them Union ground, as, for nearly two years previous, it had been marched over in its length and breadth by the Union armies, and was never afterward retaken by the enemy.

The year 1863 was also remarkable for the radical change

of policy in prosecuting the war. In 1861–2, the so-called "guarding-potato-patches" policy was prominently used, particularly in the West; the greatest military absurdity that was ever practised in the prosecution of war. The idea sprang from that epoch of humiliating compromises which so degraded our political leaders and mainly led to the Rebellion. Their tendency to compromise with the South, and to coax the rebels to remain in the Union in the beginning of the war, culminated in the "guarding-potato-patches" policy, which consisted in gently fighting the rebels in the field, and at the same time preserving their property from the uses of the army. In other words, it compelled our armies to subsist on our own supplies, and to guard the patches of truck and grain, orchards, smoke-houses, corn-cribs, and even the water-wells of the rebel citizens from the use of, or spoliation by our soldiers. No Southern beef or pork should be tasted by the Northern soldiers.

Only entire ignorance of the history of wars and the want of common-sense could create such a policy in the brains of our leaders; and not until after many courts-martial of our officers, the continued sufferings of the rank and file, and the humiliating reverses in the field, did the people of the country realize its absurdity, and through their President put an end to it. Marauding and plunder should not be allowed; there should be always enough of our own rations on hand for an emergency; but the legitimate foraging and cantonment on the citizens of the enemy's country are the first requisites for moving armies through an invaded territory; otherwise, with the lengthening of distance from our basis of supplies, the army would be tied up to its trains, and boldness and rapidity would be impossible. Gen. Buell was one of the strongest and most persistent representatives of that famous policy, and to his cost realized its absurdity, when he was compelled to run a race with Gen. Bragg, in 1862, from Huntsville, Ala., back to Louisville, Ky.

Another measure that was an additional blow to the Rebellion, in 1863, was the Emancipation Proclamation, issued Jan. 1, by President Lincoln; and, as if in defiance of that proclamation, and with the hope that such a measure would cause a revolt of all the Southern sympathizers throughout the North, the rebels strained themselves to their utmost, while their

aggressive movements in the East were baffled by our brave and determined soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, and their losses at Vicksburg were immense. The emancipation of the blacks led to the formation of negro regiments and to the general demoralization and stampede of the slaves through the enemy's country. Toward the end of the war, nearly 150,000 negro troops were fighting under the Union flag, and, having learned to shoot as well as the white soldiers, in some battles displayed wonderful pluck and bravery.

These last two measures materially assisted the Army of the Cumberland in wrestling with the enemy. Its principal basis of supplies was at Louisville, and the secondary basis at Nashville; but after Bragg was compelled to retreat with his army to Chattanooga, the line of operations was extended down to the Tennessee River, on which, at Stevenson, our depot of supplies had to be established in case our army should cross the river; and as the next campaign was to be made for the possession of Chattanooga, the repairing of the Nashville-and-Chattanooga Railroad, and the establishment of the depot at Stevenson, became of paramount importance and a matter of urgent necessity.

Gen. Rosecrans, after the defeat of the enemy at Tullahoma, halted his army in order to put his long communications in shape and to establish new depots of supplies; and during that time, in order to accumulate the supplies as quickly as possible at the points chosen, the Army of the Cumberland, and particularly the cavalry, was drawing supplies to a great extent from the country occupied. The cavalry was ordered to scatter along the wide track extending north of the Tennessee River for no other purpose than to clean out that country of all serviceable horses and mules and able-bodied negroes, a measure which, a year before, would have horrified Gen. Buell and his confrères, while he was court-martialing a number of brigade and regimental commanders of Gen. Mitchell's division, presumptively for disorders committed by their troops, but really for the great offence, as it was then considered, of feeding some of those troops upon the resources of the enemy's country.

The Army of the Cumberland consisted of three army corps: the 14th, of four divisions, under Gen. Geo. H. Thomas; the

20th, of three divisions, under Gen. Alexander McDowell McCook; and the 21st, of three divisions, under Gen. T. L. Crittenden. The first two corps were concentrated around Winchester, Tenn., with one division advanced to Stevenson; and Crittenden's corps was stationed around McMinnville. The reserve troops, under command of Gen. Gordon Granger, were scattered at different points along the communications of the army, and a portion of them, consisting of two brigades of Steedman's and one brigade of Morgan's divisions, was chosen to follow the army when ordered. The cavalry consisted of two divisions, under Gen. D. S. Stanley, but on account of his absence, was commanded by Gen. R. B. Mitchell. Altogether about 56,000 men and 200 guns were available for the campaign.

Let us look at the situation. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, after his Siege of Corinth the year previous, had been elevated, for that wretched campaign, to the position of the chief commander of all the armies, and made a sort of a military adviser to President Lincoln. Gen. McClellan at that time was floundering in the swamps of the Chickahominy, a region utterly unfit for the manœuvring of a great army, and, by his undecisive and vacillating operations, ruining his reputation as a military chieftain. There was no prominent general at that time on whom the hopes of the Nation and of the government could concentrate, and who could supersede McClellan as commander-in-chief of our armies, except Halleck; so on Halleck fell the mantle of the highest military authority in the country. And never before in the history of wars has such military mediocrity, with only a semblance of success, but without one redeeming feature of distinction, been elevated to the supreme command of the great armies of a great country. The government had to select some one for the place; circumstances favored Halleck, and he was appointed. Apparently he had some claim to a military reputation; he passed West-Point Academy with honor; studied the French strategist, Gen. Jomini, and translated, or rather compiled, some of his works; and stood high as a military scientist among the regular-army officers. The war came upon the country unexpectedly; the magnitude of the operations required a corresponding amount of military forces;

and as the number of the army officers was rather limited, the government had no choice but to select at random army commanders from those who before commanded only companies and battalions.

Halleck was chosen for the place, because from those officers of high rank, or who had distinguished themselves already at the time, no man as yet was successful enough to give confidence to the government. McClellan did not realize the government's expectations, and his unpopularity reflected unfavorably even on the bravest of his subordinates; Frémont was under a cloud; Grant had not yet recovered from his defeat at Shiloh; Pope was yet an unknown quantity; while Halleck had apparent success at Corinth, where he commanded as great an army as that which was under McClellan on the peninsula. No one dared to criticise or inquire whether the campaign of Halleck was deserving the name of a great achievement; there was an appearance of success, Corinth was abandoned and the enemy retreated south, which was sufficient to make his reputation, and he became the commander of our armies.

Before his elevation, Halleck was arbitrary enough in his behavior toward the officers of rank, but after his elevation he became intolerable. He pretended to be a genius, yet his actions belied his pretensions. That the country should be strategically subdivided into several departments was a matter of necessity; but to make those departments independent of each other in a military point of view—as if they were so many foreign countries, in which the commander of one had nothing to do with the commander of another—unless ordered by Halleck, was the essence of military absurdity. Yet it was done. Grant on the Mississippi had nothing to do with Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee, and Burnside in East Tennessee had nothing to do with either Rosecrans or Grant; while Middle Tennessee and East Tennessee lay in the same theatre of war. To perceive this does not require any particular knowledge, for, by looking at the map, any one may see that the armies operating against Chattanooga and Knoxville should coöperate with each other and should be under the command of one man. Yet, because it pleased Halleck to establish a department in East Tennessee, he made Burnside independent of Rosecrans.

No wonder then that the department commanders acted "like a balky team," as Gen. Grant expressed himself in one of his reports.

The objective point for the coming campaign of the Army of the Cumberland was the possession of Chattanooga, the gate by which the army, retaining possession of the railroad, could enter Georgia. Once Chattanooga was in our possession, it would have been fortified and made a new basis of operations for the next campaign to Atlanta. But it would extend our communications, and the distribution of the army over several wild, precipitous mountains, separating Northern Georgia and Alabama from the Middle Tennessee, would necessitate, in order to insure success, the reënforcement of the army, particularly our cavalry, which in numbers was far inferior to that of the enemy. On this subject, Gen. Rosecrans made several reasonable representations and requests to Gen. Halleck, all of which were treated cavalierly, showing that Halleck knew better what forces were needed to go through the coming campaign successfully than Rosecrans, although Halleck was a thousand miles from the theatre of operations. Finally, on August 5, Gen. Rosecrans received the following despatch: "The orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be reported daily, are peremptory. H. W. Halleck."

This reminds one rather of a brutal teacher lifting his rod over a school-boy than of a high military dignitary addressing a distinguished commander of a great army. And after all, was he right under the circumstances? Was it because successes had been obtained at Gettysburg and Vicksburg that the successes would necessarily follow beyond the Tennessee River? And would not those successes have been obtained more surely and easily if Rosecrans had been made stronger than he was? And could not Halleck at that time strengthen the Army of the Cumberland beyond any possibility of defeat, by largely increasing its numbers?

At the time of the surrender of Vicksburg, Gen. Grant's army was 80,000 strong; the job had been thoroughly done, and 30,000 men could have been spared from it without any detriment to the service, because there remained but a handful of the enemy to be taken care of, under Gen. Johnston, in the

neighborhood of Jackson, Miss. It seems strange that such a scientist as Halleck could not have seen the propriety, immediately after the surrender of Vicksburg, of ordering a strong army corps to be transferred by boats and cars to the Army of the Cumberland, and then to order Rosecrans, thus reënforced, to go ahead. Halleck not only neglected that splendid opportunity to insure success to the Union arms in Tennessee, but did still worse. Gen. Burnside, with a force of 20,000, organized at Camp Nelson, was ready to start on his expedition to East Tennessee at the time Rosecrans was urged to move on Chattanooga. By simply looking at the map any body could see that the two armies, one of which was to operate against Chattanooga and the other against Knoxville, ought to have been under one commander; and that if the enemy's forces occupying East Tennessee should, on the invasion of Burnside, retreat toward Chattanooga to unite with their forces concentrated there, the forces of Burnside should join and coöperate with the forces of Rosecrans. Not so with Halleck, he gave *carte-blanche* to Burnside to act in the East Tennessee as he pleased, without caring what became of Rosecrans.

Gen. Burnside with his command, the principal part of which was mounted, and with the most necessary portion of their munitions and stores packed on mules, after concentrating at Crab Orchard, Ky., pushed vigorously through to Mount Vernon, London, and Williamsburg, then, resting for two days at the foot of the Cumberland Mountains, made a two-day's march over the mountains, reaching Montgomery or Morgan Court-House, and thence on, arriving at Kingston, at the junction of Clinch and Tennessee rivers, on Sept. 1, where his pickets communicated with the cavalry pickets of the Army of the Cumberland, in the valley on the right bank of the Tennessee River. Thence, he moved rapidly to Loudon, in a vain effort to be in time to save the railroad bridge at that place; and then moved to Knoxville, where, on Sept. 3, he was received with open arms by the intensely loyal population, who for two long years had been terribly persecuted by the rebels, and who now thought that the day of their deliverance had finally arrived, and that Burnside and his army had come to stay and protect them from their heartless oppressors.

There were many touching and deeply-affecting scenes that would have melted even a stouter heart than that of Gen. Burnside, yet, as a commander of an army, he should have looked into the state of affairs more carefully than he did. When he saw that the enemy withdrew at his approach, without firing a single shot, he should have known, at least approximately, that their strength amounted to a corps of two divisions. He knew that they were retreating toward Chattanooga, and it did not need great genius to know that their purpose was to reënforce the army of Gen. Bragg, there concentrated. Another general would have subordinated his tender affection for the unfortunate people of that loyal region to the dictates of his military duty toward the whole country. Burnside was general enough to know, that his easy possession of the East Tennessee, without the success of Rosecrans, was but ephemeral; that should Rosecrans be defeated and obliged to recross the river, the enemy would return to East Tennessee and drive him and his forces beyond the Cumberland Mountains, and make the condition of the people, temporarily alleviated, ten-fold more miserable. His business was to look to the future, and to show his generalship and sagacity by proposing to Rosecrans to coöperate with him, and after joining him with at least one-half of his force, leave the other half, which at that time would have been sufficient, to take care of East Tennessee.

It is to be regretted that Burnside did not exhibit at this juncture either intelligent patriotism or military talent. While he was receiving ovations at Knoxville, Rosecrans was anxiously hurrying his army across the Tennessee River, obeying the peremptory orders of an obdurate and untalented chief, giving up all hope of receiving succor from Burnside or from any other source. For the successive sufferings of the Army of the Cumberland, Halleck should be justly held to condemnation as the principal, and Burnside as his accessory, and no documents can be dug out of the archives to palliate the mischief occasioned by their omission and commission.

The prospective campaign of September, 1863, that was to be consummated by the Army of the Cumberland was a difficult task, even if it were not aggravated by the strategical and tactical faults which, as it afterward transpired, were committed

on our side. It presents many features, the study of which, to a military man, is highly interesting and instructive. It was one of the most diversified and complicated campaigns known. There was a large river to be crossed in the face of the enemy; there were several lofty ranges of mountains, 2000 feet in height, to be crossed on roads as rugged and precipitous as can be imagined, principally through an exceedingly wild and sparsely populated country, deficient in forage and water; there was a demonstration on a large scale to be made, which would be sufficiently threatening upon the enemy's communications to compel his army to evacuate Chattanooga; there was an unavoidable scattering of our forces and an imminent danger of their being destroyed in detail, without any possibility of their supporting each other if attacked; there was an anxious moment, even after the final concentration of the army, when an effort was made to extricate it from the false position in which it was placed during its concentration; there was a fierce attack made by the enemy before it could be formed in a proper position; there was an unpremeditated battle, which continued for almost a whole day, in which the army, not being in position, was obliged to fight by piecemeal—without any prearranged plan—but simply for its existence; there was another battle fought during the next day, when the army was in a faulty position, that gave great advantage to the enemy's attacks; there was a complete rout of the entire half of that army, resulting in broken and shapeless lines and tremendous losses; and, finally, there was a wonderful courage and unsurpassed heroism displayed by the rank and file, which stood all that bloody ordeal and returned all the blows of the enemy with fearful interest, then deliberately withdrew from the field of slaughter three miles to the rear, as if only to pick up its stragglers, and in the morning again presented a defiant front to the enemy, who dared not then or afterward attack it.

It is only the lack of analysis and proper presentation of the battle of Chickamauga before the public that has prevented our people from justly appreciating that gigantic struggle, in which, notwithstanding the most fearful odds that were against the Army of the Cumberland, its soldiers, as the fighting representatives of the people of the North, developed in the highest

degree those staying qualities of character which dangers can not quail nor reverses subdue. In that battle, the Northern soldier showed conspicuously what a heroic defender of the institutions and freedom of this Republic the people had in him. He proved on that battlefield, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that in a dark hour the country could implicitly rely on him.

Since we have all the records before us, we will endeavor to decipher the campaign and the battle of Chickamauga, being confident that our own participation in them will, to a great extent, assist us in the explanation of its various phases in the light of military science.

From a perusal of contemporaneous reports of eye-witnesses and of successive accounts made by various members of the armies engaged, who detail their reminiscences, one may glean some interesting incidents connected with a campaign, engagement, or battle; but they utterly fail to furnish any data whereby the military skill of the commanding generals can be adequately estimated. As a criterion of that quality we consult the official reports and despatches made by the highest, as well as by the subordinate, commanders of both contending forces. Only from such reports, written immediately after the campaign, can a discriminating narrator glean the plans and their execution; ascertain the correct or incorrect estimates of the movements of the enemy; or can perceive that intuitive, almost instinctive, sense of a talented general which enables him to execute those sudden and decisive strokes which terminate in brilliant successes, but which are inconceivable to a mediocre commander. These reports are unerring guides to obtain the truth, and are surer than any other source of information. Occasionally in the reports of the defeated contestant there may be vagueness, or cloudiness for a purpose; but to the initiated there is no difficuity in deciphering the proper sense between the lines and explaining its meaning. On these reports and despatches we base our narrative.

Macauley, in his essay on "History," in one place says: "No past event has any intrinsic importance. The knowledge of it is valuable only as it leads us to form just calculations with respect to the future." And again: "Facts are the mere dross of history. It is from the abstract truth which interpenetrates

them, and lies latent among them, like gold in the ore, that the mass derives its whole value; and the precious particles are generally combined with the baser in such a manner that the separation is a task of the utmost difficulty."

As the above is true in general history, so is it true in military history. That there has been a difficult campaign and a bloody battle is not in itself so important, unless from the mass of evidence the real and actual features are extracted, critically considered and so perspicuously arranged that the present and future generations of military students may extract from them instructive lessons for operations in future wars, according to the immutable principles of the art of war.

CHAPTER II.

THE MOVEMENTS.

THE general course of the Tennessee River from Kingston, Tenn., down to Guntersville, opposite and north of Warrenton, Ala., is very nearly from northeast to southwest, excepting several sharp coils that the river makes just below Chattanooga, endeavoring to force its waters between the high and precipitous mountains that compress it on both sides. Commencing in the vicinity of Huntsville, Ala., the Cumberland Mountain range stretches along the western shore of the Tennessee to a gap, where, at Cowan, the Nashville-and-Chattanooga Railroad passes through a tunnel. Thence the range rises to a lofty height varying from 1000 to 2000 feet and gradually widens at its summit, forming a large undulating plateau, chiefly covered with timber, having light soil, on which short, sparse grass grows, fit only for pasture. About eight miles above Bridgeport, where the railroad crosses the Tennessee River on a bridge, is the mouth of the Sequatchie River. That river, starting on the plateau of the Cumberland, traverses that mass of rocks through a narrow and precipitous valley in an almost parallel direction to the Tennessee River, and forms Walden's Ridge. This is a narrow, rough, and rocky ridge with very precipitous sides toward the river, and extending north as far as, and beyond, Kingston; its lower points, above the mouth of the Sequatchie, abut against the Tennessee River, narrowing its valley toward Chattanooga to a few hundred steps, and then recedes from the river for several miles above Chattanooga, filling the valley with innumerable foot-hills.

On the east side of the Tennessee River, and parallel thereto, is Sand Mountain, similar in formation to the Cumberland Range, but lacking the width of the latter; it closely fringes the river and abuts against it immediately opposite the points of Walden's Ridge. This abutment narrows the valley to inconsiderable dimensions and fills it with a detached rocky mass called Racoon Mountain. East of this range, comprehending

Sand and Racoon mountains, and separated therefrom by a narrow valley drained by Lookout Creek, Lookout Mountain rises abruptly like an immense wall; its northern point, 2400 feet above the sea, stands lofty and severe, rocky and precipitous, immediately on the Tennessee River, leaving barely sufficient space for the railroad to pass between its perpendicular base-cliff, 60 feet in height, and the precipitous bank of the river, two miles below Chattanooga.

The summit of Lookout, at its northern part, is narrow, but farther south it widens to from two to five miles; its sides, however, are very steep and abrupt. About 45 miles south of Chattanooga, on its east side, Lookout throws out a spur consisting of a low range of hills called Pigeon Mountains, which extend northeast, but in a diverging line from Lookout, forming with it a valley called McLamore's Cove. This cove is drained by the west branch of the Chickamauga River, which, after its junction with the middle and east branches, form the Chickamauga River emptying into the Tennessee, four and a-half miles above Chattanooga. Farther east of Pigeon Mountain, and running parallel to it, is Taylor's Ridge, through the gaps of which, formed by the east branch of the Chickamauga, passes the Chattanooga-and-Atlanta Railroad at Ringgold.

In McLamore's Cove starts another range of hills, which, farther north, forms a continuous ridge called Missionary Ridge, and which, opposite Chattanooga, rises in places to an elevation of 350 and 400 feet, and abuts against the Chickamauga River about one mile and a-half from its mouth. It forms, with the Lookout Range, the Chattanooga Valley, drained by Chattanooga Creek, which empties into the Tennessee between Chattanooga and the nose of Lookout Mountain.

From the above topographical description it is evident that, on account of our base of supplies being located at Stevenson, —on the Memphis-and-Charleston Railroad, ten miles west of Bridgeport, and three miles from the Tennessee River—the crossing of the army had to be made below Chattanooga. The gorge formed by the mountain ranges between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, through which the river flows, is about twenty-eight miles long and narrows itself gradually toward its eastern end until it is closed by Lookout Mountain on the south side of

the river and along the railroad; while the town of Chattanooga, fortified at that time, was situated two miles beyond that point. The country south and southeast of Chattanooga, although intersected by low ridges, becomes more open and fit for military operations. Hence Chattanooga might have been properly considered as the gate for us to enter into Georgia, or as the gate for the enemy to enter Middle Tennessee, or to draw supplies therefrom. It was out of the question for us to operate against Chattanoaga through that gorge, because, if at its end there were but two divisions and several batteries of the enemy properly posted on the nose of Lookout, they could defy an army of 60,000. But, however strong the position at Chattanooga was, in case an army might try to operate against it through that gorge along the river, it became untenable and fell to the ground as soon as that army crossed the river and the ranges of the Sand and Lookout Mountains below it, or crossed the river above it. In either case the enemy's army occupying Chattanooga would have to evacuate the town and take a position outside, for fear of losing its communication with the South, and, finally, of being shut up and beleaguered in Chattanooga. It would be possible for us, if blockaded in Chattanooga, to retain possession of it, having the gorge and the communications behind us, as it was afterward proven; but for the enemy to be shut up in Chattanooga would have amounted to the loss of his army.

As before mentioned, the base of our supplies being at Stevenson, that fact determined where our crossing must be. To attempt to cross the river above Chattanooga would have been undesirable, as the region on the Cumberland Range east of the Nashville-and-Chattanooga Railroad and the country contiguous to it, being wild and little settled, would of itself be very disadvantageous for an army to enter before reaching the Tennessee River above Chattanooga; again, a great distance would separate the army from its line of supplies, and that distance filled up with rough mountains and roads that were hardly passable for heavy teams, even in the best season of the year. But to make such a demonstration above Chattanooga as would show to the enemy that we possibly could cross the river there, was perfectly proper, as it might distract his attention and thereby facilitate our crossing below the city.

At the time of starting the army, it was known that Gen. Bragg, commanding the rebel army, had two army corps under Gens. Polk and D. H. Hill at Chattanooga, and that an infantry corps of two divisions and a division of cavalry under Gen. Buckner, were occupying East Tennessee; and as Gen. Burnside with a Union force was soon going to enter East Tennessee, it was expected that Buckner would have to fight Burnside and be unable to join Bragg at Chattanooga, at least for some time.

Col. Inness, with his regiment of Michigan Engineers, was busy in repairing the Nashville-and-Chattanooga Railroad between Murfreesboro and Bridgeport, which, on July 13, was ready for use to the Elk-River bridge, and this bridge and the railroad between it and Bridgeport were put in order by July 25. But there was a short branch from Cowan Station leading east to Tracy City, which it was desirable to repair also, so that some supplies could be collected at Tracy City, and that occupied until August 13, by which time the corn commences to ripen in that country and would afford forage for the animals.

On August 16, the army moved. The left, consisting of Crittenden's corps and a brigade of cavalry under Col. Minty, moved in the following manner: Wood's division from Hillsboro, by Pelham, to Thurman, in the Sequatchie Valley; Palmer's division, from Manchester to Dunlap; VanCleve's division, leaving a brigade at McMinnville, to Pikeville at the head of the Sequatchie Valley; Minty's cavalry by Sparta to drive a rebel cavalry force from there toward Kingston, and to cover the left of Crittenden.

The divisions of Thomas' corps, constituting the centre, moved thus: Reynolds', from the University Place, across the Cumberland into Steven's Cove, and by way of Battle Creek to Jasper; Brannan's to follow it; Negley's, by Tantalon, to halt on Crow Creek between Anderson and Stevenson; Baird's to follow and halt at Anderson.

The divisions of McCook's corps thus: Johnson's, by Salem and Larkin's to Bellefont; Davis' by Mount Top and Crow Creek to near Stevenson; Sheridan's to remain at Stevenson and Bridgeport. Three brigades of cavalry, under Gen. Mitchel, by Fayetteville and Athens, covering the right of the army. Gen. Crittenden was ordered to send a brigade to reconnoitre

the Tennessee River above Chattanooga, near Harrison's Landing, and take post at Poe's Cross-roads. Minty to reconnoitre from Washington down and take post at Smith's Cross-roads; and Wilder with his mounted-infantry brigade, supported by a brigade of infantry to reconnoitre from Harrison's Landing to opposite Chattanooga.

All these movements were completed by August 20, and preparations commenced for the crossing of the river by the army. Hazen's brigade was detached by Gen. Crittenden to Poe's Cross-roads on that reconnoitring expedition. Gen. Hazen, being the senior officer, assumed command of the whole force in the valley opposite to and above Chattanooga, consisting of his own brigade, Minty's cavalry, Wilder's mounted infantry, and Gen. Wagner's brigade, in all between 6000 and 7000 men. He was to manage the demonstration to cross the Tennessee above Chattanooga. His instructions were: to watch all the movements of the enemy at all crossings of the river; make such dispositions as would lead the enemy to believe the valley was occupied by a large force; and to show that we wanted to cross the river with the intention of occupying Chattanooga. Hazen made such arangements as answered the purpose, and ordered the construction of pontoons on North Chickamauga Creek, which empties into the Tennessee about two miles above the mouth of the Chickamauga River, as if we wanted those pontoons when ready, to float down and use them for a bridge across the Tennessee, near the mouth of that creek. Troops were made to appear at three or four diffierent crossings at one time, and by ingeniously arranging their campfires and beating their calls, also by the dexterous use of the artillery, the rebels were made to believe that there were divisions where there were only companies. Two regiments of infantry with a battery of artillery were placed opposite Chattanooga to annoy the enemy.

All this activity of Gen. Hazen was not without desirable results. Gen. Bragg, who commanded the rebel army, in his detailed report of the operations before and during the battle of Chickamauga, dated at Warm Springs, Ga., December 28, 1863, says: "Immediately after crossing the mountains to the Tennessee the enemy threw a corps by way of Sequatchie Valley

to strike the rear of Gen. Buckner's command, while Burnside occupied him in front. One division already ordered to his assistance proving insufficient to meet the force concentrating on him, Buckner was directed to withdraw to the Hiwassee with his infantry, artillery, and supplies, and to hold his cavalry in front to check the enemy's advance. As soon as this change was made the corps threatening his rear was withdrawn, and the enemy commenced a movement in force against our left and rear." This shows that, although Bragg did not believe in the crossing above Chattanooga of our whole army, but knowing that Crittenden's corps was in the upper part of the Sequatchie Valley, and hearing of the demonstrations of Hazen at various crossings of the river, he evidently thought that it might be possible that Crittenden would cross the Tennessee somewhere above the mouth of the Hiwassee River and strike at Buckner's flank or rear. Cleburne's division of D. H. Hill's corps was distributed at various fords and crossings between the mouths of Chickamauga and Hiwassee, putting up some intrenchments, and Stovall's brigade of Breckenridge's division was posted at Sivley's Ford. These troops were afterward reënforced by Hindman's division. It is evident, then, that our demonstration busied many of the rebel troops, and hence its object was fully attained.

In the meantime our army was busy in preparing the means for crossing. Reynolds captured some boats at Shellmount, Brannan was building several rafts, Sheridan commenced to construct trestles to repair the railroad bridge at Bridgeport, partially destroyed by the enemy, Davis was building pontoons for the bridge to be thrown over at Caperton's Ferry opposite Stevenson. The orders were for Thomas to cross Negley's division by Caperton's bridge; Baird's by Bridgeport bridge; Brannan on rafts at Battle Creek; Reynolds on boats at Shellmount, then to climb by several rough roads Sand Mountain and go over into the Lookout Valley in the neighborhood of Trenton, from which to send an advance force to seize Cooper's and Steven's gaps, leading into McLamore's Cove from Lookout, toward Lafayette. For McCook: to cross Johnson's and Davis' divisions by Caperton's bridge, then cross Sand Mountain into Lookout Valley, concentrating near Valley Head, and send

an advance for seizing Winston's Gap, leading into Broomtown Valley from Lookout toward Alpine. For Crittenden: to follow Thomas by Shellmount, Battle Creek, and Bridgeport, take the Valley road to Chattanooga, take post before reaching the Lookout Valley on the Murphy's-Hollow road, and push one brigade to reconnoitre the enemy at the base of Lookout, taking post at Wauhatchie. For three brigades of cavalry to cross at Caperton and by a ford near Island Creek, go over Sand Mountain to Rawlingsville, in the Lookout or Will's Valley, and to reconnoitre boldly toward Alpine and Rome.

The crossing of the army commenced on August 29, the last detachments and trains being over the river on September 4. Thomas' and McCook's corps crossed over the mountains and were in the neighborhood of Trenton and Valley Head in the Lookout Valley on September 6. Now it was found that the enemy was holding firmly the point of Lookout, while it was reported from over the river that the rebel forces of Buckner were moving from East Tennessee to Chattanooga. On the 6th, Negley's division, of Thomas' corps, reached Johnson's Crook, where the road from Trenton to Lafayette leads up Lookout Mountain. Gen. Beatty sent one regiment half-way up the mountain which met the enemy's pickets and drove them some distance, but night prevented further action. The next day—the 7th—Negley's whole division climbed the mountain. On the 8th it took possession of the forks of the road, the right branch leading to Stevens' and the left to Cooper's Gap, through which these roads descend into McLamore's Cove, and after crossing it, pass over Pigeon Mountain, the first through Dug Gap and the second through Catlett's Gap, both leading direct to Lafayette. Baird's division reached Johnson's Crook, while Brannan's and Reynolds' remained in camp near Trenton. After reaching the fork of the roads, Negley sent one regiment to Stevens' Gap and two regiments to Cooper's Gap to occupy both. Stevens' Gap was found heavily obstructed with fallen trees.

During the time that Thomas was securing the passes of Lookout Mountain on the roads leading to Lafayette, McCook was pushing the advance of his corps and cavalry toward Alpine. Davis' division, on September 4, seized Winston's

Pass, at the foot of Lookout, forty-two miles distant from Chattanooga. On the 5th, his other divisions were marching toward the same gap. On the 6th, Sheridan was twelve miles from Winston. On September 8, Johnson marched to Long's Spring, on the Trenton road, and two brigades of Davis' descended into Broomtown Valley to support the cavalry. Such was the situation on September 8, when, during the night of the 9th, Gen. Rosecrans at Trenton, received a dispatch from Gen. Wagner, who was with his brigade opposite Chattanooga on the north side of the river, stating that Chattanooga was evacuated by the rebels, and that he would occupy it in the morning.

Now came one of those weighty moments when the decision taken by the general commanding the army determines the fate of the campaign. When the decision is correct the issue of the campaign will be successful, at least not disastrous; when the decision is wrong, the campaign will be stormy and difficult, if not altogether ruinous. Gen. Rosecrans in his report, says: "the weight of evidence gathered from all sources, was that *Bragg was moving on Rome.*" It is apparent that, debating the question in his own mind, Rosecrans could not clearly see the purpose of this movement; he could not divine what that purpose could have been, and, notwithstanding the information that Bragg was moving on Rome, he could hardly credit it. The proper line of retreat for Bragg was by Ringgold and Dalton; to move the bulk of his army by Lafayette to Rome would be to give up the railroad and the strong position in front of Dalton at Buzzard's Roost, almost without a shot. He came to the conclusion that the bulk of the rebel army certainly retreated along the railroad, and only a part of it went by Lafayette toward Rome.

Once becoming satisfied as to the route taken by the retreating enemy, he promptly issued orders to pursue him, and these orders clearly show that he located the bulk of the enemy's army as retreating along the Chattanooga-and-Atlanta Railroad, and only a part of it as retreating by Layfayette. In his report he says: "Gen. Crittenden was therefore directed to hold Chattanooga with one brigade, calling all the forces on the north side of the Tennessee across, and to follow the enemy's

retreat vigorously, *anticipating that the main body had retired by Ringgold and Dalton.*" In the communication to Gen. Thomas written at Trenton on September 9, the day of the receipt of the communication giving information of the evacuation of Chattanooga by the enemy, dated 10 a.m. and signed by Gen. Garfield, is said: "The general commanding directs you to move your command as rapidly as possible to Lafayette and *make every exertion to strike the enemy in flank, and if possible cut off his escape.*" If Rosecrans did not mean that Thomas in Lafayette, would find only a part of the rebel army, he never would have issued such an order. McCook, in his report, says that on September 9, at 6.45 p.m., he "received information that Chattanooga is evacuated, and the enemy retreating southward, and the order to move rapidly on Alpine and Summerville, Ga., in pursuit, or to intercept his line of retreat and attack him in flank." It certainly could not mean to intercept the whole rebel army, but meant some portion of it.

Strange to say, all this was a grievous mistake, and yet the movement of the rebel army was the simplest and the plainest in the world, provided the hypothesis to reason about it were correct, and the premises should have been these: that, supposing the enemy never thought of retreating before our army, what would his movement then be? Once admitting that, and knowing that our army was lying in the Lookout Valley and actually beginning to cross Lookout, it would be easily seen that Bragg had to evacuate Chattanooga if he cared to preserve his communications. On the other hand, by leaving Chattanooga and proposing to fight his enemy, there was but one sensible thing for him to do, and that, to take his army toward Lafayette and concentrate it before the center of our fron which he actually did.

In his complete report, dated at Warm Springs, Ga., December 28, 1863, Gen. Bragg says: "Closely watched by our cavalry which had been brought forward, it was soon ascertained that the enemy's general movement was toward our left and rear, in the direction of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain between us. The nature of the country and the want of supplies in it, with the pressure of Burnside's force on our right, rendered a movement on the enemy's rear with our inferior

force extremely hazardous, if not impracticable. It was therefore determined to meet him in front whenever he should emerge from the mountain gorges. To do this and hold Chattanooga was impossible without such a division of our small force as to endanger both parts. Accordingly, our troops were put in motion on September 7 and 8, and took position from Lee-and-Gordon's mill to Lafayette, on the road leading south from Chattanooga and fronting the east slope of Lookout Mountain." And further: "Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in reality we had concentrated opposite his center, and deceived by the information from deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to intercept us and thus exposed himself in detail."

Gen. Rosecrans, speaking in his report of the time when his army got into Lookout Valley and the reconnoissance made against the nose of Lookout developed the enemy in strong force there, says: "To dislodge him from that place (meaning Chattanooga) it was necessary to carry Lookout Mountain, or so to move as to compel him to quit his position by endangering his line of communication. The latter plan was chosen." It was perfectly correct, and the plan of which he speaks was virtually carried out when the advancing forces of McCook's and Thomas' corps climbed over Lookout and occupied the only gaps on its eastern slope through which the roads lead into the open country and upon the enemy's communications. The plan also, was eminently successful, because the object of compelling the enemy to quit Chattanooga was, September 8, attained. Bragg, with his army, withdrew, and a part of our forces took possession of Chattanooga early on the 9th. Hence the campaign for the possession of Chattanooga was virtually over.

To the bold plan, then, of the demonstrations upon the communications of the enemy, should have succeeded a plan of concentration. The army front was then attenuated over forty-two miles. After boldness should have come prudence. Then the advanced forces from the eastern gaps of Lookout might have been withdrawn, and Thomas and McCook might have marched to Chattanooga, screened from the enemy by Lookout

Mountain. One corps could have been thrown out to guard against the enemy, Chattanooga fortified, the exact strength and plans of the enemy discovered, and the decision reached what was best to do next. Unfortunately, not knowing what reënforcements Bragg received, and how much more he expected, laboring under a misconception of the enemy's purposes and being apparently convinced that it was Bragg's intention to evade the battle, Gen. Rosecrans, on September 9, issued orders to Crittenden to pursue the enemy by Ringgold toward Dalton, to Thomas to move as fast as possible to Lafayette, and to McCook to move to Alpine and Summerville, throwing his cavalry toward Resaca, with the object of breaking the railroad between that point and Dalton, thus lengthening the front of the army to a dangerous degree, and entirely isolating its several army corps from each other.

The roads over Sand Mountain were rough, rocky, and precipitous, frequently requiring large details to bring them into passable condition by dint of hard work, and often needing the teams of artillery and wagons to be doubled up in order to ascend its steep slopes. The work of climbing Lookout Mountain with artillery and trains was exhausting. In Thomas' corps two full days were required by each division to get its artillery and trains over the mountain, and this was achieved at the expense of the unremitting manual labor of the troops. It may justly be considered a feat of itself: the crossing of those rugged and inaccessible ranges of Sand and Lookout mountains, so expeditiously and so successfully by the Army of the Cumberland, with its artillery and trains.

CHAPTER III.

THE ISOLATION OF THE ARMY CORPS, AND BRAGG'S ATTEMPTS TO DEFEAT THEM.

PURSUANT to orders, on September 9, Gen. Negley with his division, descended through Stevens' Gap into McLamore's Cove, and took position at the foot of the mountain. He then made a reconnoissance and drove the rebel cavalry three and one-half miles, capturing a few of them. On the 10th, he moved in the direction of Lafayette, sending out skirmishing parties from Bailey's Cross-roads. He kept up the march until the gorge leading to Dug Gap was reached, and there the troops were halted until the position of the enemy in the gap could be ascertained. There Negley learned, from a Union cititizen, that a large infantry and artillery force of the enemy—presumably Buckner's corps—was moving toward his left from the direction of Catlett's Gap, whither a regiment was sent to reconnoitre. At sundown, a strong demonstration was made by our forces, whereby the enemy's skirmishers were driven back on their reserves, after which a position was selected and occupied for the night. From the enemy's movements, and from information gained from scouts, Negley felt confident that the enemy proposed to attack him with a superior force in the morning. He also learned from a prisoner, and from Union citizens, that he was confronted by Hill's corps, comprising twelve brigades; that Buckner's corps—eight brigades—and a division of cavalry were three miles to his left, and that Polk's and Breckenridge's commands were within supporting distance. He sent a communication to Gen. Baird asking him to move forward and support him in the morning, and who, toward evening of that day, with his division, arrived at the foot of Stevens' Gap.

About 8 o'clock on the 11th, Baird, with Starkweather's—three regiments—and Scribner's—four regiments—brigades and the First Michigan battery of artillery, joined Negley at Davis' Cross-roads. Our position, forming a curve, intersected the Dug-

CAMPAIGN FOR CHATTANOOGA, 1863.

The moves of the enemy to defeat the army corps of Gen. Thomas in detail.

MAP No. 2.

To face page 32.



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Gap road on the right and the Chattanooga road on the left. Our skirmishers in front of our right in the woods, were attacked by the rebels and driven back, taking shelter behind a fence. The enemy then appeared in heavy force on the right, and a battery opened on the left. Negley decided to withdraw. Baird relieved Negley's troops, which withdrew with some loss beyond Chickamauga Creek. During this engagement the Nineteenth Illinois, of Stanley's division, posted behind a stone wall, severely punished the enemy pressing our right, and helped Negley's artillery to withdraw. Trains were started and Beatty's and Scribner's brigades were ordered to protect them against rebel cavalry on the road to and at Bailey's Cross-roads, when arrived there. Starkweather's brigade was withdrawn beyond Chickamauga Creek, and, checking the advancing rebels, relieved Stanley's brigade from pressure, and then the forces withdrew to Bailey's Cross-roads without being pursued by the enemy beyond Chickamauga Creek, where they took a strong position on the ridge, near and in front of Stevens' Gap.

Although but little was known of the design of the enemy in attacking Negley, and as the seasonable and prudent withdrawal of our troops toward the monntain did not give the rebels time enough to display their forces and intention in full, yet it was a strong reminder to us to be careful. Gen. Thomas received a dispatch from Gen. McCook dated: Headquarters 20th A. C., at foot of mountain, Sept. 11, 8.30 p.m. "General, my corps is concentrated here. I have heard nothing from you. I sent Col. Harrison to open communication with you. [Supposing Thomas to be at that time at Lafayette.] He met the enemy's cavalry between here and Lafayette and drove them to a point within nine miles of this place. A prisoner from the army and citizens report that none of your troops are there, but that the place is occupied by the enemy with cavalry and infantry."

The encounter of Negley with the enemy at Dug Gap, and the information gathered from the prisoners and civilians, pointed strongly to a large rebel force concentrated around Lafayette, and the despatch of McCook confirming the same added that no rebel forces were south of Lafayette except some

cavalry. Notwithstanding all the evidence, Gen. Rosecrans could hardly believe that the whole rebel army was concentrated at Lafayette, because, after receiving the information, in his despatch to Gen. Thomas from Chattanooga on September 12, 11.15 a.m., and signed by C. Goddard, A. A. G., he said: "Your despatches of 10.30 last night and 11 this morning have been received. After maturely weighing the notes, the general commanding is induced to think that Gen. Negley withdrew *more through prudence than compulsion.* He trusts that our loss is not serious and that there will be no difficulty in holding the gap." He evidently had commenced to think that his original decision in regard to the movements of Bragg might have been erroneous. Further, in the same despatch, is said: "He [the general commanding] despatched you last night to communicate with Gen. McCook, and call him up if you thought necessary. He trusts this has been done; *if not, no time should be lost.*" Here, then, was a positive order to Gen. Thomas to call up McCook at once.

Seldom, in the annals of warfare, has such a magnificent opportunity been presented to completely defeat the opposing force in detail as that which was now offered to the rebel general Bragg. In his report, Bragg says, that at this juncture his effective force, including reënforcements from Mississippi, and without counting his cavalry, consisted of 35,000 men, all concentrated north and northeast of Lafayette; while of our army, Thomas' stood opposite him, McCook's was twenty-five miles to the right of Thomas in a bee line, but by the roads which he had to take to join Thomas the distance amounted to over forty miles, with a very wild tract of country stretched between them, and Crittenden was at Ringgold, twenty-five miles to the left of Thomas. Gen. Bragg appreciated the situation, and tried to profit by it.

As soon as Negley debouched with his division into McLamore's Cove, on the evening of the 9th, Bragg—at 11.45 p.m. that evening—issued an order to Gen. Hindman, stationed with his division near Lee-and-Gordon's mill, where the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road crosses Chickamauga Creek, to move immediately to Davis' Cross-roads in McLamore's Cove, and there join the column of Gen. Hill, also ordered to move there,

and "if in command, you will move upon the enemy, reported to be 4000 or 5000 strong, encamped at the foot of Lookout Mountain at Stevens' Gap." At the same time, enclosing his order to Gen. Hindman, Bragg also sent an order to Gen. Hill to send or take Cleburne's division to Davis' Cross-roads next morning, to unite with Hindman. That the column must be accompanied with a cavalry force, to open communication with Hindman before the junction is made, and to move upon the enemy encamped at the foot of Stevens' Gap. These orders were sent by Bragg from his headquarters near Lee-and-Gordon's mill.

Hill, who was at Lafayette, received his order about daylight the next morning and immediately replied, informing Bragg of the late hour the order had been received, that Gen. Cleburne was sick abed the whole day, and that two regiments of Cleburne had not yet returned from above Harrison Landing on the Tennessee, that one brigade of his division was picketing the gaps, that the gaps were heavily obstructed by the cavalry, that some hours would be required to clear them up, and as Cleburne had nearly, if not quite, as long a march as Hindman. Hill believed the intended junction was impossible, and no surprise could be effected. Whereupon Bragg issued orders, on the 10th, at 8 a.m., to Gen. Buckner, then at Anderson's, four miles south of Lee-and-Gordon's mill, inclosing his orders to Hindman and Hill, informing him that "Gen. Hill has found it impossible to carry out the part assigned Cleburne's division," and that he desires that he (Buckner) would execute without delay the orders issued to Gen. Hill.

According to these orders, Hindman, between 1 and 2 a.m. on the 10th, moved his division by Anderson's house and through Worthens' Gap of Pigeon Mountain toward Davis' Cross-roads, and, hearing nothing from Hill, halted for water at Morgan's, within five miles of Davis', shortly after sunrise. He then threw out pickets and sent out scouting parties, afterward he moved one mile farther to Conley's house near Catlett's Gap, where there was a good spring of water, and beyond which, until Davis' was reached, no water could be obtained. Late in the afternoon, Hindman received from army headquarters a copy of a communication from Gen. Wood of Hill's corps, dated,

Dug Gap, 12.20 p.m., stating that the enemy with infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was three-quarters of a mile in his front advancing. With this was a copy of a note from Gen. Hill, dated, 1.30 p.m., stating that he had *ordered Cleburne's division to Dug Gap*, and that if the enemy was attacking there it would be a good time for Hindman to attack in rear. At 4.45 p.m., Buckner's corps joined Hindman. A dispatch from army headquarters dated 6 p.m., received after 8 p.m., informed him that Crittenden's corps of the Union army had marched southward from Chattanooga that morning, and that it was highly important to finish the operations in the cove as rapidly as possible.

By this time, Hindman had received all the orders and information he needed, and it was his duty to move early next morning and attack the Union force at Davis' Cross-roads, knowing that Cleburne's division would be there to coöperate with him. Instead of that, he called a council of general officers to determine what was best to be done, which came to a very absurd conclusion, which, as Hindman states in his own report, was that "they ought not to advance without more definite information as to the Union force at Stevens' Gap, nor until assured that Gen. Hill could move through Dug Gap and *force* a junction with their forces at Davis' Cross-roads; and if Gen. Hill could not do this, or if the enemy at our flank proved to be so strong that an advance would be hazardous, our best course would be to turn upon Crittenden, Cheatham coöperating, and Hill if possible, and thus crush that corps of the enemy."

Here the subordinate officers decide to virtually disobey the orders already given by their commanding general, and submit to him a new plan of action, and Hindman sends a communication to that effect to Bragg with Maj. J. W. Nocquet of Gen. Buckner's staff. Gen. Bragg's answer in words if not in writing to Nocquet amounted to this: that Gen. Hindman's information (in regard to Crittenden) amounted to nothing, and he should carry out the order given to him. Until now, Bragg acted correctly; but soon he astonished Hindman and the members of his council of war by the following extraordinary communication, received at 4.20 a.m. on the 11th:

"Lafayette, Sept. 10, 1863, 12 p.m., General: Headquarters

are here, and following is the information: Crittenden is advancing on us from Chattanooga; a large force from the south has advanced within seven miles of this. Polk is left at Anderson's to cover your rear. Gen. Bragg orders you to *attack and force your way through the enemy to this point at the earliest hour that you can see him in the morning.* Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard. I am, etc., Geo. W. Brent, A. A. G."

Hindman construed this despatch in this way: that Bragg considered his position perilous, that he did not expect him to capture the enemy, but wanted him to prevent his own capture, by forcing his way through to Lafayette, and thus save his command and enabling Bragg to resist the forces that seemed about to envelope him. He delayed the order to march, and sent more scouts toward the enemy, but Maj. Nocquet, upon his arrival, reported to Hindman that Gen. Hill expected him to make an attack and would coöperate. After this report at 7 a.m., the movement finally commenced. The whole distance to pass was only four miles, yet at 11.10 a.m. the column was only half-way from Davis' house. Union skirmishers were met and driven in. Buckner's two divisions deployed with the left to the spurs of Pigeon Mountain, Gen. Anderson, now commanding Hindman's division, deployed behind the right of Buckner, and the whole line advanced, when a new surprise came from the headquarters at Dug Gap in the following despatch: "Gen. Hindman: the enemy, estimated 12,000 or 15,000, is forming line in front. Nothing heard, etc., W. W. Mackall, Chief of Staff."

This information staggered Hindman. He now thought that this was an additional force to that which was already at Davis' Cross-roads. He stopped the forward movement, ordered a more careful reconnoisance than had yet been made, and, calling up Buckner and Anderson, had a consultation with them. They concurred with Hindman that it would be imprudent to advance further. Finally the order was given to retire through Catlett's Gap, but before the movement commenced the reports of scouts satisfied Hindman that the enemy was retiring toward Stevens' Gap. Then he ordered his lines to advance as rapidly as possible, with Anderson's division on the right of Buckner's and make every effort to intercept the retreating column.

Gen. Hill, in his report, says: "On the morning of the 11th, Cleburne's division, followed by Walker's [reserve corps of two divisions], marched to Dug Gap. It was understood that Hindman and Buckner would attack at daylight, and these other divisions were to coöperate with them. The attack, however, did not begin at the hour designated, and so imperfect was the communication with Hindman that it was noon before he could be heard from. I was then directed to move with the divisions of Cleburne and Walker and make a front attack upon the Yankees. The sharpshooters of Wood's brigade, under the gallant Maj. [A. T.] Hawkins, advanced in handsome style, driving in the Yankee pickets and skirmishers, and Cleburne's whole force was advancing on their line of battle, when I was halted by an order from Gen. Bragg. The object was, as supposed, to wait until Hindman got in the Yankees' rear. About an hour before sundown, I was ordered once more to advance; but the Yankees now rapidly retired. Their rear was gallantly attacked by a company of our cavalry, but made a stand on the other side of Chickamauga Creek, under cover of a battery of artillery. Semple's magnificent battery was ordered up, and in a short time silenced the Yankee fire with heavy loss, and the Yankee *rout* was complete. I had in the meantime communicated with Gen. Buckner in person, and by an aide with Gen. Hindman, and had arranged to connect my line of skirmishers and battle with theirs, so as to sweep everything before us. The prompt flight of the Yankees and the approaching darkness saved them from destruction. This force proved to be the advance of Thomas' corps, the main body being opposite Stevens' Gap, in Lookout Mountain."

That skilfully-managed retreat of Gens. Negley and Baird, which Hill calls complete rout, has been before described. It was only because of the industrious collection of information by Gen. Negley of the numbers of the enemy in his front, and his judicious withdrawal, that our two divisions succeeded so well in slipping out of that nest of rebel hornets, and escaping destruction.

The incident of the concentration of the enemy's forces against Gen. Thomas, with the object of destroying us, is instructive; showing that it is one thing to conceive plans,

and another thing to successfully carry them out. In his early campaigns in Italy, Napoleon twice defeated the Austrian army by throwing the bulk of his force against isolated columns of his enemy, and defeating them in detail. Gen. Bragg had the best possible chances to imitate Napoleon in this case, but he lacked his strategical skill and ability to handle troops; his almost dogged determination, after once conceiving a plan, to carry it out to the farthest limits; and his deliberate and mathematical coolness that no alarming reports could disturb while he was absorbed in solving a problem.

Bragg wished to destroy Thomas' corps, and yet at the first appearance of only one of its divisions in McLamore's Cove, he was hurriedly issuing orders, late in the evening, to two of his divisions, located at the opposite flanks of his front, to unite in front of a gap, which was entirely blockaded, and from there to move to Stevens' Gap and attack our division. Even if successful, such an expedition could not seriously damage Thomas' corps. After he saw that his first order could not be executed, he increased the force of his detail, and entrusted the leadership of the principal attack upon the enemy, then at Davis' Cross-roads, to a man who, he should have known, was totally unfit for a bold, independent action of that sort. Then again, instead of giving only positive orders to Hindman to attack, he was sending him communication after communication of such an alarming character that Hindman finally gave orders to his three divisions to withdraw through Catlett's Gap; and if it were not for his able scouts, who succeeded in persuading him of the retreat of the Union forces, Hindman never would have reached Davis' Cross-roads.

During the pursuit, Bragg knew that there were two divisions of the Union army in front of him; at sunset, he stopped his forces on Chickamauga Creek. At Davis' Cross-roads, the Union force, being in a hurry to get away, could not certainly learn about the number of his troops, as they did not see but a small portion of them. He had six divisions with him. Why not go into bivouac on Chickamauga Creek, and in the morning at daylight attack the Union forces? To help those two divisions out, the balance of Thomas' corps would necessarily have descended from the mountain, and there Bragg

would have a chance to destroy the whole corps. And there were no troops to help that corps on the morning of September 12, as at that time, two divisions of Crittenden's were still at Ringgold, twenty-five miles away from Stevens' Gap, and McCook's corps was near Alpine, forty miles away.

To us, it is very gratifying to know that the rebels failed in their attempt; but looking at the matter from a military standpoint, it must be acknowledged that it was a wretched fiasco, in which Hindman bore the most prominent part. It showed also, that it was not enough to originate a plan; it required the capacity to execute it, and of that there was a lamentable deficiency.

At this phase of the war-like panorama, the rebel troops were withdrawn behind Pigeon Mountain, and Bragg was preparing to strike Crittenden. On Sept. 9, Gen. Crittenden moved his corps, with its artillery and train, over the nose of Lookout to Chattanooga. Wood's division was retained in Chattanooga, while Palmer's and VanCleve's passed on to Rossville. During the day, Crittenden received orders that, after leaving one brigade at Chattanooga, he should pursue the enemy with the utmost vigor by Ringgold and toward Dalton. On September 10, the two divisions moved toward Ringgold, and halted on Pea-Vine Creek, five miles from Ringgold, waiting for provisions. Gen. Wood, leaving Wagner's brigade in Chattanooga, moved with his other brigades following those divisions.

The advance guard of Palmer was continuously skirmishing with rebel cavalry, which appeared to be numerous, and once in a dash upon four companies of the First Kentucky made by the Sixth Georgia rebel cavalry, two officers and fifty-six men were captured. Much information was gleaned, showing that the rebel army was concentrated north of Lafayette. After passing Rossville, Gen. Wood reported to his corps-commander that he was informed that a considerable rebel force was on his right, and toward evening, meeting some negro teamsters on the road, was told by them that they were doing some hauling for the rebels and that Massa Bragg was just below the Lee-and-Gordon's mill with his army. Wood, deeming the information important, reported it to Gen. Rosecrans, who ordered him to at once despatch a brigade to the mill.

The order was received early on the morning of the 11th, and Harker's brigade was appointed for that duty. While it was going out, Gen. Crittenden came to Wood's camp and ordered him to move two miles further and wait for orders. Soon Gen. Wood received an order direct from Gen. Rosecrans to move by the shortest route with his other brigade to the mill and support Harker, which was accomplished by 8.30 p.m. Col. Harker had heavy skirmishing between Rossville and Lee-and-Gordon's mill with the last squads of the rear guard of the rebel army. Meantime during the day, Col. Wilder, with his brigade of mounted infantry, supported by VanCleve's division ran the rebel cavalry out of Ringgold, Wilder pursuing it farther toward Tunnel Hill, while VanCleve and Palmer stopped at Ringgold. There Crittenden received instructions to move to Lee-and-Gordon's mill.

In his report, Gen. Rosecrans says: "Additional information on the 10th [September] rendered certain that the main body of the enemy retired by the Lafayette road." But the idea that Bragg would make a stand, or assume the offensive, seemed to be untenable to him at that time, as he further says: "But uncertain whether he had gone far." It was only on the next day, the 11th, that Rosecrans first began to feel sure that Bragg was with the bulk of his army between Lee-and-Gordon's mill and Lafayette, east of Pigeon Mountain; and consequently issued his (Rosecrans') orders for the concentration of the army: to Crittenden, to move from Ringgold to Lee-and-Gordon's mill, and to Thomas, to call up McCook to join him.

On September 12, Gen. Crittenden called up Col. Wilder, from the vicinity of Tunnel Hill, and ordered him to protect his left on the march to Lee-and-Gordon's mill. Palmer and VanCleve moved by way of Judge Gilbert's house, on the Graysville-and-Lafayette road, beyond which they found the bridge over Pea-Vine Creek cut down, and the ford blockaded by the rebel cavalry, which retreated before them in the direction of Lafayette. Beyond Pea-Vine Creek, at the junction of the Lafayette road and the road to the mill, Gen. Palmer halted his division, to cover the crossing of the Pea-Vine Valley lower down by VanCleve, who was in charge of the trains. But few

of the enemy's troops were then watching their movements. At 10 a.m., some firing was heard in the direction of the mill, and Hazen's brigade received orders from Palmer to move there. At 2 p.m., two regiments and a section of artillery were sent toward Pea-Vine church to clear the flank of the enemy, which was done. About dark, both divisions bivouacked at Lee-and-Gordon's mill.

But the movement of Wilder's mounted infantry was not so easily accomplished. He was marching from Ringgold by the old Alabama road, and in the direction of Leet's tan-yard. On the previous day, while on the way to Tunnel Hill, he had had a fight with the rebel cavalry under Scott; and on this day he had quite a tussle with two regiments of cavalry under Gen. Pegram at Leet's tan-yard, killing and wounding fifty of the enemy, and losing thirty of his own men.

The next day, September 13, Gen. Crittenden, after placing his divisions in position, ordered Gen. VanCleve, with Dick's brigade supported by Sam Beatty's, to make a reconnoissance beyond the mill on the Lafayette road; while Col. Wilder with his mounted infantry, supported by Cruft's brigade of Palmer's division, received orders to reconnoitre to the left, through Pea-Vine Valley. At that time, the Fourth U.-S. Cavalry, 650 strong, came down from Chattanooga, and reported for duty to Crittenden, and he sent them to reconnoitre the road leading up McLamore's Cove. VanCleve moved out and skirmished with some rebel cavalry which, as it appeared to him, had some artillery. He advanced almost three miles, then halted, and, after resting his troops, returned. He never imagined that one mile south of where he rested his force, the greater part of the enemy's army was in position. Likewise were both Wilder and Cruft ignorant of the fact that one mile beyond the Pea-Vine church, which they reached, they would have struck the right wing of that army. Yet it was the case.

After the failure at Dug Gap, Bragg withdrew his forces to Lafayette, but immediately moved Hindman's division and Walker's corps in the direction of Lee-and-Gordon's mill. On September 12, forenoon, Bragg ordered Gen. Polk to proceed at once with Cheatham's division and take position at Rock Spring, and to forward the rest of his corps as soon as practi-

CAMPAIGN FOR CHATTANOOGA, 1863.

The moves of the enemy to defeat the army corps of Gen. Crittenden in detail.

MAP No. 3.

To face page 42.



A Thomas.
B Crittenden.

A Confederate line of Walker, Hindman, and Cheatham.
B Buckner on the march to join them.
C Cleburne.

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cable. The same day, Bragg sent to Polk the following communication:

"Headquarters Army of Tennessee, Lafayette, Ga., Sept. 12 [1863], 6 p.m. Lieut.-Gen. Polk.—General: I enclose you a despatch from Gen. Pegram. This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight tomorrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. [Gen. Pegram apparently informed Bragg that from Ringgold only one Union division was coming down]. We can then turn again on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success. Very truly yours, Braxton Bragg."

Cheatham took position before noon, Walker came in in the evening, and Hindman before daylight on the 13th. The line was formed, with Cheatham resting near Dr. Anderson's, Hindman on the right of Cheatham, Walker on the right of Hindman the line covering three roads: the Chattanooga-and-Lafayette, Graysville-and-Lafayette, and the Ringgold-and-Lafayette.

On the evening of the 12th, at 8 p.m., Polk informed Bragg that he found that the whole of Crittenden's corps and Wilder's cavalry brigade was immediately before him; that VanCleve was on the Gordon's-mill road, with his advance encamping one and one-half miles in his front; Palmer on the Pea-Vine or Graysville road, with his advance about the same distance, and Wood on the Lafayette-and-Ringgold road, with his advance on a line with the other two. "It will thus be perceived," Polk says, "I have the whole of Crittenden's corps with Wilder's cavalry brigade confronting me and moving in line of battle. How much more of the enemy's force is behind this line as a reserve, there is no means of determining; but there is reason to believe that he has received a considerable accession of force at Chattanooga, and it is not to be believed that he will omit to send them forward. I am therefore clearly of the opinion that you should send to me additional force, so as to make failure impossible, and *great success here would be of incalculable benefit to our cause.* I think I should have, so as to make success sure, the force under Gen. S. B. Buckner. That will leave Gen. Hill's corps intact for any contingency in your quarter.

In this opinion I find all the general officers with me agree, and I am myself so profoundly convinced of this that I beg leave most respectfully and urgently to press this upon your attention. It would not only insure success if there were no other troops present with the enemy as a reserve, but prevent failure if there should be. *The enemy is moving with steady step upon my position*—it is a strong one—and will no doubt attack early in the morning. My troops I can not get into position in time to attack myself at so early an hour as day-dawn. If I find he is not going to attack me, I will attack him without delay. I send you a map of the situation. I send this by a staff-officer. Respectfully, General, your obedient servant, L. Polk, Lieut.-Gen., Commanding."

Notwithstanding the weighty circumstances under which the correspondence between Gens. Bragg and Polk was conducted, it is hardly possible to preserve one's seriousness. When Bragg made such a gallant proposition to crown with laurels the brow of Leonidas Polk, how flat and unsoldierly a response was sent by the latter. Where he tries to be pathetic he is tame, and where his imagination runs with him he is ludicrous. The movement "with steady step" on his position appeared to have been made early in the day, but when he was writing his despatch, that steady step, as we have before seen, was turned east from all those roads, and resolved itself into rest in the bivouacs opposite Lee-and-Gordon's mill. Still Gen. Bragg tried to humor the former bishop, and answered him thus:

"Headquarters Army of Tennessee, Lafayette, Ga., Sept. 12, 1863, 12 o'clock at night. General: I have your despatch giving me your position and the disposition of the enemy oppposite to you. Your position seems to be a strong one for defence, but I hope will not be held unless the enemy attacks early. We must force him to fight at the earliest moment, and before his combinations can be carried out. Your generals who advise the concentration of the larger portion of the army with you, only know of Crittenden's corps being opposed to you, and did not know of the advance again of a heavy infantry force in the cove upon this place, and of another from the south, preceeded by a very large cavalry force. However, to avoid all danger, I shall put Buckner in motion in the morning and run the risk

here. You must not delay attack for his arrival, or another golden opportunity may be lost by the withdrawal of our game. Had you and the generals with you had the information in my possession at the date of your last despatch, your conclusions might have varied. But I trust that the cavalry sent south may hold the enemy in check until you finish the job intrusted to you. Action, prompt and decided, is all that can save us. The troops are ready to respond. I am, etc., Braxton Bragg."

In his report, Bragg says: "Early on the 13th, I proceeded to the front, ahead of Buckner's command, to find that no advance had been made on the enemy, and that his forces had formed a junction and recrossed the Chickamauga. Again disappointed, immediate measures were taken, etc." As there are no official documents to show how the whole affair terminated, except the diary of Lieut. W. B. Richmond, *aide-de-camp* to Lieut.-Gen. Polk, we will make extracts from that diary in regard to it.

"Sunday, September 13, [1863]. Clear and very warm. By 3 a.m., Gen. Walker was ordered to take position to right of Cheatham. At 4.30, Hindman reported in person at headquarters, at Mrs. Susan Parks,' near Rock-Spring church, on Pea-Vine road. At 6 a.m., Hindman was ordered to take position between Cheatham and Walker. The new line thus formed left Cheatham with three brigades in front and one in reserve; Hindman, two in front and one in reserve, and Walker, three in front and one in reserve. Orders issued at 9 a.m., before the line was formed, to division commanders to inform corps headquarters when they were in line, as the order was for the whole line to advance. About this time information came from Pegram that there was no enemy on the Ringgold road, and there was a movement of the enemy from that road toward the Gordon's-mill road. The enemy were only about one and one-half miles out on that road and Strahl [commander of a brigade in Cheatham's division] was sent out to develop them. The first guns were fired about 12.30, and Strahl retired with the intention of drawing the enemy after him on Cheatham. After some artillery practice the firing ceased.

"Gen. Bragg and staff arrived at Gen. Polk's quarters about 9 a.m. Buckner was ordered partly out and then ordered back.

At 2 p.m., Walker was ordered to swing from right toward left, in order to strike the enemy, said to be at Pea-Vine church in force. Before, however, the order was executed, it was discovered that, leaving only his skirmishers to deceive, he had gone with his whole force toward Chattanooga. At 5 p.m., Gen. Bragg and staff returned to Lafayette. Monday, September 14. Clear and warm. At 9 a.m. all the troops started for Lafayette. General returned by 6 p.m." etc.

The inactivity of Gen. Bragg at this juncture is still more inconprehensible than it was at Dug Gap. Four miles south of Lee-and-Gordon's mill he concentrated six divisions—including Buckner's which was on the way there—just double the force Crittenden had at the mill. Knowing how little capacity Gen. Polk possessed for the management of such an expedition, why did not Gen. Bragg come upon the ground early and direct the movement himself? Gen. Polk was uneducated in the art of war, was tardy and timorous, and, as circumstances demonstrated, was afraid to attack Crittenden's three divisions with his four, but wanted Buckner's two divisions in addition.

His communication of the previous day shows that he was fearful that the enemy was surely moving on him with "steady step," and after once posting his troops in a strong position he would have stuck to it forever, waiting for the enemy, who had no idea of attacking him. On the contrary, that day Crittenden received orders to immediately move his two divisions to a position on Missionary Ridge, covering the Chattanooga Valley, leaving Wood alone at the mill, with instructions to Wood to hold that position as stubbornly as posssible, and, if finally compelled to give way, to fight and slowly retreat toward Chattanooga; then to take position with one brigade in front of Chattanooga, and to place the other on the nose of Lookout, and there fight to the last; of course, with the supposition that the other troops that were in Chattanooga would support him. Hence, supposing that under a misapprehension, Bragg lost the opportunities of September 13 by inactivity, there is nothing to show why he should not have attacked Crittenden on the 14th. Crittenden was covering Chattanooga; if he was attacked and compelled to give way he would have to retreat toward that city, and Thomas, who was still at Stevens' Gap, almost eighteen miles away, could not help Crittenden.

It is impossible to ascribe this frittering-away of the opportunity that chance at that time presented to Bragg to anything else than his individual indecision of character and the lack of that indomitable energy and cool daring which, allied with accurate planning, makes perfect generalship. Those three memorable days of September, 1863, which would have made a talented general famous, manifested Bragg's mediocrity and low-grade generalship, above which he never arose subsequently.

Bragg then relinquished the idea of trying to defeat Rosecrans' army in detail; but, in anticipation of shortly receiving some additional reënforcements, busied himself in plans for the destruction of that army at one stroke.

CHAPTER IV.

HALLECK. CONCENTRATION OF OUR ARMY. ENEMY'S ORDERS.

THE following despatches of Gen. H. W. Halleck, sent to Gen. Rosecrans, are worthy of notice. His despatch of September 6, 1863, says: "You give no information of the position of Bragg and Buckner; if they have united it is important that you and Burnside unite as quickly as possible, so that the enemy may not attack you separately." Could not he see the importance of it before? At the time of the despatch, Buckner was on his way to Chattanooga, and Burnside was scattering his forces through the whole of East Tennessee.

Again, in a despatch of the same date, Halleck says: "I have heard nothing from Burnside since his despatch of August 31, [that was the time Burnside was on the point of crossing the Cumberland Mountains] the substance of which was sent you. His instructions were to *advise you of his movements*, and connect as soon as possible with your left. There is no reason now to suppose that any of Lee's troops have been detached, except perhaps a small force from Charleston." From this it is clear that until that time, Halleck never contemplated ordering Burnside to actively coöperate with Rosecrans in the campaign against Chattanooga.

After receiving information that Chattanooga was evacuated, that Bragg was in retreat, and that 2000 rebels surrendered to Burnside at Cumberland Gap, Halleck again mounted his strategic stilts and sent to Rosecrans, on September 11, the following despatch: "Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland Gap that he holds all East Tennessee above Loudon, and also the gap of the North-Carolina Mountains. A cavalry force is moving toward Athens, to connect with you. After holding the mountain passes on the west, and Dalton or some other point on the railroad, *to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided* whether your army shall move further into Georgia and Alabama. *It is reported by deserters that a portion*

of Bragg's army is reënforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible."

This despatch shows such a contemplative placidity by the great strategist that one would think Halleck wrote it right after one of his luxurious dinners, washed down with genuine Madeira and Tokay. His strategy in this despatch reveals itself so magnificently, and his future decision, whether Rosecrans shall move farther into Georgia and Alabama or not, looks so important that one would instinctively deem that he, Halleck, was the sole arbiter of the military destinies of the Nation. Then he condescends to notice those ragged rebel deserters (who by the way, were sent to him purposely) and their report that Bragg's troops were reënforcing Lee, and then authoritively remarks, in fact orders, that its verity or falsity should be ascertained as early as possible. And this was written on the day when Negley and Baird were trying their best in McLamore's Cove, to escape the deadly grasp of the enemy.

But Halleck himself soon had an opportunity of ascertaining the truth of the reports of those deserters. The next day he found out that Longstreet, with his corps, disappeared from the army of Lee, and was sent by rail west to Atlanta and thence to Bragg. He also received a despatch from Gen. Hurlbut at Memphis, Tenn., informing him that the bulk of Johnston's Army of the Mississippi was sent to Bragg, and that he considered the news reliable. Then Halleck abandoned his gasconades, and from a great man he became a small one. He saw that his incapacity conjured up a portent, and the phantom of the responsibility before the Nation in case Rosecrans' army was destroyed, was threateningly rising before him; and to evade that responsibility, he became cringing. He telegraphed to Burnside at Knoxville, to Hurlbut at Memphis, and to Grant at Vicksburg, to immediately send troops to Rosecrans. Grant being at New Orleans, he reiterated his orders; he telgraphed to Sherman at Vicksburg again, to Schofield in St. Louis, and even to Pope in the Northwest, to send troops to Rosecrans, as if those troops could fly and reach their contemplated destination in a couple of days, while the Army of the Cumberland was facing the enemy, preparing to fight. But it

is of no use to continue our remarks on Halleck. We have only to say that nothing could be produced by that excessive telegraphing before the great battle was fought except the demonstration that Halleck was fearful and appreciative of his own incompetency.

Speaking in his report of the time Crittenden's corps was located at Lee-and-Gordon's mill, Gen. Rosecrans says: "Thus it was ascertained that the enemy was concentrating all his forces, both infantry and cavalry, behind Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of Lafayette, while the corps of this army were at Gordon's mill, Bailey's Cross-roads, at the foot of Stevens' Gap, and at Alpine, a distance of forty miles from flank to flank, by the nearest practical roads, and fifty-seven miles by the route subsequently taken by the Twentieth army corps. It had already been ascertained that the main body of Johnston's army had joined Bragg, and an accumulation of evidence showed that the troops from Virginia had reached Atlanta on the first of the month, and that reënforcements were expected soon to arrive from that quarter." Then added: "It was now a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of the army."

We have mentioned the instructions given to Gen. Crittenden on the 13th to take a position on Missionary Ridge with his two divisions, and cover the Chattanooga Valley, which was done; but in the evening a new order came to move his divisions down to Chickamauga Creek, placing VanCleve's at Crawfish Spring, connecting with Wood's at Lee-and-Gordon's mill, and Palmer further up the river at Gowen's Ford. At Bailey's Cross-roads, Gen. Thomas on the 12th posted Brannan's division on the left of Baird, and Reynolds' second brigade to the left of Brannan, while Turchin's brigade of Reynolds' division, which on the previous day while at the fork of the roads on the mountain, was directed to seize Cooper's Gap, remained before that gap. The same day Gens. Brannan and Baird went with parts of their commands on a reconnoissance to Davis' Cross-roads, and two miles beyond, but found no enemy other than a few mounted men. Next day, the 13th, Reynolds' division concentrated on the road leading from Cooper's Gap to Catlett's Gap, and on the 14th took position at Pond Spring near Chickamauga Creek on the same road,

where Wilder's mounted infantry brigade joined him. Gen. McCook received orders to join Thomas on the 12th at midnight, and commenced the movement on the 13th up the mountain, and on the 14th, encamped in Lookout Valley.

Let us consider a moment the subject of the concentration of our army. Our objective point was Chattanooga; it was a matter of necessity to make a strong demonstration with the largest part of our army on the communications of the enemy. The configuration of the mountain ranges and scarcity of passes to cross or climb Lookout was the cause of such an extraordinary lengthening of our front. The enemy abandoned Chattanooga and moved south to Lafayette. The idea that he was evading the fight occasioned the descent of our troops into Broomtown Valley on the extreme right, into McLamore's Cove in the centre, and the move toward Chickamauga River on the road to Lafayette on our left. On that road between Chickamauga River and Lafayette, the enemy's army was found to be concentrated and screened by Pigeon Mountain.

On September 13, enough was ascertained to believe that the enemy was largely reënforced, and was sure of receiving additional troops. Making a stand at Lafayette, he threw us on the defensive, and being so widely scattered, we dared not attack him. If, right after the success of our demonstration and the evacuation of Chattanooga, instead of crossing Lookout we had withdrawn the corps of Thomas and McCook by the Lookout Valley to Chattanooga, we could have rectified our front and have met the enemy squarely, should he attack us in front of, or beyond Chattanooga, covering the approaches to it perfectly, and facing south or southeast according to the direction in which the enemy would be approaching. The probability was that in such a case the enemy would not remain at Lafayette, but would have shifted his position to Ringgold or Dalton, and approach us from that direction. Now, as we stood facing east, our objective point, Chattanooga, was lying north of our left flank at a distance of twelve miles, and from our center at about twenty-seven miles.

In order to cover Chattanooga well, the front of our position, should it have been selected on the spurs of Missionary Ridge, would have to be so taken as to intersect the main Lafayette-

and-Chattanooga road at right angles. To reach such a position our army would have to make a flank movement in the face of the enemy's army, a very delicate and dangerous operation. To risk being attacked on the march while performing such a flank movement in the daytime, was to put our army in jeopardy. Still we would have to make a flank movement in some way in order to get the army out of its false position.

When Gen. Rosecrans decided to concentrate his army, there were two ways to do it. On the night of September 14, McCook's corps and Col. McCook's division of cavalry were bivouacking in Lookout Valley, Crook's division of cavalry being left to watch the gaps of Lookout opposite Alpine. On the same day, Granger's three brigades of the reserve corps arrived at Rossville, four miles south of Chattanooga. From Rossville to Lee-and-Gordon's mill is about eight miles. If McCook's cavalry was ordered, on the 14th, to join Thomas by forced marches, it could have descended through Stevens' Gap into McLamore's Cove on the night of the 15th, and relieved infantry at the fords and gaps. Granger's three brigades might have advanced to within supporting distance of Crittenden, and Thomas' corps on the night of the 15th or 16th, might have been ordered to make a night-march, passing to the rear of Crittenden's corps. On the 17th, both corps might have fallen back to a position selected on the spurs of Missionary Ridge somewhere in front of Rossville, by which time McCook's corps if directed to march to Chattanooga by the Lookout Valley, would have joined them.

The other way to concentrate the army was, to direct McCook to join Thomas in McLamore's Cove, then to shift Thomas to the left to give room to McCook, and finally, by making a night-march, to pass Thomas and McCook to the rear of and beyond Crittenden. This last plan was adopted by Gen. Rosecrans.

While waiting for McCook's corps, after Wilder's mounted-infantry brigade joined Reynolds, Gen. Turchin of Reynolds' division, started with the Ninety-second Illinois of that brigade on a reconnoitering expedition to the gorge of Catlett's Gap, skirmishing with the mounted pickets of the enemy from the Chickamauga Creek out to the mouth of the gap, where the

CAMPAIGN FOR CHATTANOOGA, 1863.

Location of the armies on the night of September 17.

MAP No. 4.

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

Thomas' Corps:
a Brannan. *b* Baird.
c Turchin. *d* King of Reynolds'
e Negley.

Crittenden's Corps:
f Hazen and Cruft, and *g* Grose of Palmer's. *h* Beatty and Dick, and *i* Wood and Barnes of VanCleve's.
k McCook's Corps.

a Hindman (1 division). *b* Buckner (2 divisions).
c Cheatham (1 division). *d* Walker (2 divisions).
e and *f* Breckinridge and Cleburne.

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enemy's reserves were found drawn up and a strong line of skirmishers posted to the right of the road, resisting the advance. Having received instructions to avoid bringing on an engagement, Turchin retired with the Ninety-second regiment to the camp. The same day, September 14, there was a reconnoissance made by another part of Wilder's brigade to the Bluebird Gap, south of Dug Gap, but it did not meet any of the enemy. On the same day Gen. Brannan advanced one brigade to Chickamauga Creek, to the right and south of Reynolds. On September 16, Gen. Turchin, with his own brigade, again made a reconnoissance to Catlett's Gap. The enemy fell back as he advanced until he came upon a force strongly posted with two pieces of artillery in the roads. He made a second reconnoissance on the afternoon of that day, with but little result, as he could advance but a short distance farther, the enemy being in force in his front. Leaving a strong force in the gorge to watch the enemy, the brigade withdrew to camp in the vicinity of the gap.*

On the 17th, the following movements were made: Palmer's division, stationed opposite Gowen's and Owen's fords, transferred Grose's brigade from Gowen's to Glenn's Ford; Thomas' corps moved into position down the creek; Brannan, to the left of Reynolds, extending to Gowen's Ford; Baird from there down to Bird's mill, and Negley to between that and Owen's Ford. King's brigade of Reynolds' remained at Pond Spring, and Turchin's at Catlett's Gap. Barnes' brigade of VanCleve's division, stationed at Glenn's Ford, was sent to reënforce Gen. Wood at Lee-and-Gordon's mill. McCook's corps descended into McLamore's Cove and took positions vacated by Thomas' corps, his left connecting with Reynolds. Thus the shifting of our army to the left commenced. After Gen. McCook received orders at midnight on the 12th, to join Thomas, it took him just five days to accomplish it; five anxious days, during which, with a more active and daring enemy the ruin of two of our corps might have been accomplished.

After his fiasco on September 13, in regard to the assault on

* The rebel Gen. Hill in his report says that a strong Yankee force appeared at Catlett's Gap on the 16th, and that he reënforced Deshler's brigade, occupying that gap, with Breckenridge's division.

Crittenden's corps, Gen. Bragg, rightly guessing that we were waiting for the junction of McCook's corps, busied himself in preparing a stroke whereby our left would be out-flanked and his army placed between ours and Chattanooga before we were able to shift our army to a better position. In his report he says: "Again disappointed [meaning on the 13th], immediate measures were taken to place our trains and limited supplies in safe positions, when all our forces were concentrated along the Chickamauga, threatening the enemy in front. Maj.-Gen. Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry, occupied the positions on the extreme left, vacated by Hill's corps, and was directed to press the enemy in McLamore's Cove to divert his attention from our real movement. Brig.-Gen. Forrest, with his own and Pegram's divisions of cavalry covered the movement on our front and right. Brig.-Gen. B. R. Johnson, whose brigade had been at Ringgold holding the railroad, was moved toward Reed's bridge, which brought him on the extreme right of the line. Walker's corps formed on his left opposite Alexander's bridge; Buckner's next, near Tedford's Ford; Polk's opposite Lee-and-Gordon's mill, and Hill's on the extreme left. With Johnson moved two brigades, just arrived from Mississippi and three of Longstreet's corps, all without artillery and transportation.

"The following orders were issued on the night of the 17th for the forces to cross the Chickamauga, commencing the movement at 6 a.m. on the 18th by the extreme right at Reed's bridge:

"Headquarters Army of Tennessee,

[Circular.] In the field, Leet's Tan-yard, Sept. 18, 1863.

1. Johnson's column (Hood's) on crossing at or near Reed's bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee-and-Gordon's mill.

2. Walker, at Alexander's bridge, will unite in this move, and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.

3. Buckner, crossing at Tedford's Ford, will join in the movement to the left and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee-and-Gordon's mill.

4. Polk will press his forces to the front at Lee-and-Gordon's

mill, and if met by too much resistance to cross, will bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford, or at Tedford's, as may be necessary, and join in the attack wherever the enemy may be.

5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the cove, and by pressing the cavalry in his front ascertain if the enemy is reënforcing at Lee-and-Gordon's mill, in which event he will attack them in flank.

6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, and cover our rear and left and bring up stragglers.

7. All teams, etc., not with troops, should go toward Ringgold and Dalton, beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains. Rations when cooked, will be forwarded to the troops.

8. The above movements will be executed with the utmost promptness, vigor, and persistence.

By command of Gen. BRAGG.

G. W. BRENT,
Asst. Adjutant-General."

CHAPTER V.

TOPOGRAPHY. POSITIONS. ENEMY'S MOVEMENTS AND OUR COUNTER-MOVEMENTS.

BEFORE proceeding further, let us look upon the configuration of the country where the contending armies were about to meet.

West-Chickamauga River has its source in the upper part of McLamore's Cove; its general course, from its source as far as the north point of Pigeon Mountain, being from southwest to northeast, but beyond Pigeon Mountain, pressed by the foot-hills of Missionary Ridge, it makes a general curve eastward, and afterward courses again to northeast, but diverging somewhat farther from Missionary Ridge. The river has innumerable crooks or bends. Lee-and-Gordon's mill stood on the left side of the river where it bends to the east, and where the main Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road crosses the river. The mill stands just about half-way between those two towns. Around the mill and for some distance east and northeast of it, the left side of the river is high and precipitous, but farther north the ground on both sides of the river is comparitively level, yet the banks are in many places high and preciptous. The water below the mill is of considerable depth, but there were many fords. Dalton's and Tedford's fords below the mill are the nearest to it. Then comes Alexander's bridge between two and three miles from it. Reed's bridge is almost due west of Ringgold, whence a road goes directly to it. Lambert's and Byron's fords are between these two bridges.

Pea-Vine Creek and Chickamauga River form almost one valley, Chickamauga Ridge limiting it on the east. The ground in that bend of Chickamauga is a table-land, but slighly rolling, gradually rising from the river toward the spurs of Missionary Ridge, and at that time was covered with scatterd timber, principally oak, the woods in places being filled with thick underbrush. Missionary Ridge was also covered with woods. Between Lee-and-Gordon's mill and Rossville, a ham-

let on the south slope of Missionary Ridge four miles from Chattanooga, there were many clearings around farms on both sides of the road, as there were also openings along the river, but the intermediate ground was wooded.

The roads from the before-mentioned bridges and fords ran in a northwesterly direction through these woods into the main road or continued beyond it and over Missionary Ridge into Dry-Valley road, leading to Rossville. Among the farms which played a conspicuous part in the Chickamauga battle were: Vineyard's farm, one and three-quarter miles north of Lee-and-Gordon's mill; Kelley's farm, three and one-quarter miles from the mill; Snodgrass' farm one-half mile due west of Kelley; Dyer's, three-quarters mile northwest of Vineyard; Widow Glenn's, three-quarters mile south of Dyer's and on a road coming from Crawfish Spring. From Glenn's house runs a road leading northwest by Vidito's farm, passing through a gorge in the spurs of Missionary Ridge, there climbs the ridge and, passing through McFarland Gap, goes to Rossville. On that road, one mile from Glenn's, was Vidito's farm. A quarter of a mile south of Kelley's field was Poe's field, and a quarter of a mile beyond this was Brotherton's farm. Three-quarters of a mile north of Kelley's house on the main road stood McDannel's house, and half a mile north of this stood a meeting-house, east of which was Col. Cloud's. The roads from Alexander's and Reed's bridges pass by McDannel's and, crossing the ridge by McFarland Gap, go to Rossville.

Missionary Ridge with its foot-hills and spurs presents very strong positions for defence, but running in a slanting direction toward the main Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road and thus forming an acute angle with it, makes those positions faulty. A position to be advantageous, ought to intersect our main communications squarely. But in this instance, whatever position we might have selected on the slopes of Missionary Ridge, its right flank would have been advancing too much toward the enemy and the left flank receding too much. If a position were taken south of Rossville along Missionary Ridge it would not have covered the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road. If it were taken at Rossville where that road crosses the ridge, its left flank would have been easily turned and the army com-

pelled to leave the position. In fact the topography of the ground between Lee-and-Gordon's mill and Chattanooga, notwithstanding the strength and natural advantages of Missionary Ridge for defensive operations, does not present a suitable position for an army to perfectly cover Chattanooga, and oblige the enemy to attack that position squarely in front.

The only proper position for an army to advantageously resist the enemy coming from the south is in front and around Chattanooga, where the elevations encircling that town admitted the erection of strong lines of fortifications. Yet even that position, strategically considered, is also faulty, because, although protecting Chattanooga, it does not cover the communications of the army. Those communications by railroad would have been untenable, as they run to Bridgeport on the south side of the Tennessee River, which the enemy approaching Chattanooga would easily intercept, while the common roads on the north side of the river through the mountains are too difficult and long to reach the base of supplies, which necessarily would have to be at Stevenson or Bridgeport.

These topographical features alone, when properly considered by a military man, should have induced our authorities at Washington to reënforce the Army of the Cumberland, before it was entering the campaign for the possesion of Chattanooga, by at least one-third if not one-half more troops than it had. But our great generalissimo, Halleck, apparently had no such consideration to entertain himself, and would not consider any suggestions presented by others, even by the commander-in-chief of the army, appointed to enter into such a campaign.

The object of the commander of the enemy's army was now to flank our left and interpose his army between our army and Chattanooga. On the 17th, he commenced to move his troops toward his right, which we could plainly observe from our positions looking at the clouds of dust rising beyond Pigeon Mountain, and could judge of the direction of the movement by the way the wind was drifting them. Buckner's corps, consisting of Preston's division of three brigades and Stewart's division of three brigades,* moved from the neighborhood of

* The fourth brigade of B. R. Johnson was detached to Ringgold, and when two Mississippi brigades of Gregg and McNair came to Ringgold on the eve of the

Lafayette and bivouacked half-way between Rock-Spring church and Pea-Vine church. Walker's reserve corps, consisting of two divisions, his own of two brigades, the third under Gen. Gist being detached to Rome* and Liddell's division of two brigades, bivouacked at Rock-Spring church. Polk's corps, consisting of Cheatham's division of five brigades and Hindman's division of three brigades, bivouacked at Anderson's. Hill's corps, consisting of Cleburne's division of three brigades and Breckenridge's division of three brigades, did not move on the 17th, but remained at the gaps of Pigeon Mountain. Three brigades from the Mississippi and two brigades of Hood's division, Longstreet's corps, just arrived at Coosa Station, together with Johnson's brigade, moved under Gen. B. R. Johnson to Ringgold.

While these movements were going on, our brigade of cavalry, under command of Col. Minty, was posted to protect Reed's bridge, and a mounted-infantry brigade, under Col. Wilder, was stationed at Alexander's bridge. Gen. Granger with his three brigades and two batteries of artillery of the reserve corps, posted in front of Rossville, sent, on the 17th, Gen. Steedman, with six regiments and a battery, on a reconnoitering expedition toward Ringgold. Steedman started at 3 a.m., and moved without opposition until within two miles of Ringgold, where he encountered and drove in the enemy's pickets, and crossing the East Chickamauga within three-fourths of a mile of Ringgold, placed a section of artillery on the crest of the ridge commanding the town, and drove the enemy out of it. Discovering from the heavy clouds of dust rising from the roads leading from Tunnel Hill toward Lafayette, that large bodies of troops were moving, he deemed it prudent to withdraw. Recrossing the Chickamauga, he returned six miles toward Rossville, bivouacking for the night at Battle Springs. At 11 p.m., the enemy, who followed him, threw half-a-dozen shells into his camp, and then, under cover of night, speedily retired. At 8 a.m., on the 18th, discovering no signs of the enemy, Steedman moved, reaching Rossville at 1 p.m.

battle as reënforcements to Bragg, they were put under command of Johnson, making for him a provisional division.

* Gist's brigade participated in the battle on September 20.

Early in the morning of September 18, the movements of the enemy's various commands commenced, in order to achieve the grand out-flanking of our army. Temporarily leaving Benning's brigade—of Longstreet's corps—at Ringgold to protect the depot at that point, Gen. B. R. Johnson, with his brigade, moved at 5 a.m., toward Leet's tan-yard, pursuant to orders from headquarters. He also had the following force with him: McNair's and Gregg's brigades, from the Mississippi; Robertson's brigade of Hood's division—Law's brigade of the same division remaining at Ringgold long enough to cook their rations—and two batteries of artillery. This force had only proceeded three miles from Ringgold when a despatch was received from the headquarters of the army to return to Ringgold, and thence take a direct route to Reed's bridge. Gen. Johnson at the same time received orders for the execution of the entire movement. He reached the Graysville-and-Lafayette road, and there heard from some citizens that the Yankees were about a mile from that point. He had commenced the formation of a line of his three brigades, with Robertson's in reserve, when Gen. Forrest came up with his escort and some cavalry and started to the front, supported by Johnson's skirmishers. He soon commenced skirmishing with Minty's cavalry, which was disposed along Pea-Vine Creek, with its reserves and a section of artillery posted on a ridge.

Some of Johnson's artillery was put in position, which drove back the Union dismounted reserves and their artillery. The line of brigades after crossing the creek, traversed the western declivity of the ridge and found our cavalry in position back of the bridge, and a party by the bridge trying to destroy it. The skirmishers of the Twenty-third Tennessee regiment becoming engaged, the whole regiment, supported by the brigade, charged the Union forces and drove them off, saving the bridge. A few men were killed and wounded on both sides.

Gen. Hood, having arrived from Dalton, joined Johnson's command at the bridge, and assumed command of the whole force. The troops crossed by 4 p.m., partly over the bridge and partly by the ford immediately above it, and advanced to Jay's steam-mill, three-quarters of a mile from the bridge, and there took the road to Alexander's bridge, one regiment of the

left or Gregg's brigade being deployed across the road, while the others formed in columns by companies, and thus preserved their original formation. After traveling the road to Alexander's bridge for a short distance, the troops moved southwest for two and one-half miles on the road to Lee-and-Gordon's mill. They then halted within half a mile of the fields of Vineyard's farm on the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, and about half a mile west of Dalton's Ford, where, in the darkness of the evening, the skirmishers at the head of the column became engaged. Gregg's brigade immediately deployed under a sharp fire, losing a few men, while McNair's and Johnson's brigades deployed facing southwest. Robertson's brigade formed facing northwest to protect the train in the rear, one regiment guarding the train.

One-third of the forces remained awake during the night, the rest sleeping on their arms. Obstructions to cavalry were hastily placed in front, skirmishers thrown out to the field east of Vineyard's house, 150 yards in front of their left, and scouts were sent toward the Lafayette road. Law's and Benning's brigades, of Hood's division, joined this column during the night, and Forrest's command of cavalry bivouacked behind Hood's line.

While this force of daring rebels was penetrating so far on our side of the river, and so closely approaching to our extreme left at Lee-and-Gordon's mill, Col. Minty after being driven from Reed's bridge, was informing Gen. Granger of the circumstances. Thereupon Granger, at 4 p.m., started McCook's brigade toward Reed's bridge, and Whittaker's brigade to Ringgold or Red-House bridge over the Chickamauga. McCook advanced to within one mile of the bridge and there skirmished with the enemy, taking some prisoners. To ensure the safety of McCook's brigade, Gen. Steedman moved, at 5 p.m., with Mitchell's brigade to support it, effecting a juncture therewith late in the evening. Whittaker could not reach the Red-House bridge, as he met a large force of the enemy before he arrived there, and, although he held his ground, he lost sixty men. Of course, none of these commanders knew anything of the number and character of the rebel troops that crossed the river by Reed's bridge after the retreat of Minty's command.

Pursuant to Gen. Bragg's orders, Walker's corps started early but, although the distance from Rock-Spring church to Alexander's bridge is only about five miles, yet it was nearly 2 p.m. when the advance of that corps was half a mile from that bridge, which was defended by Wilder's mounted infantry. As Gen. Liddell's division formed the head of Walker's column, Gen. Walthall was ordered to capture the bridge with his brigade. He deployed it to the right of the road and, after driving in the Union skirmishers, moved his brigade under the fire of a Union battery posted on the opposite side, through thick underbrush toward the river. His men laid down, a battery was put in position, and the Twenty-ninth Mississippi regiment, which stood opposite the bridge, charged to the bank of the river, under the galling and heavy fire of Wilder's men, and drove the Union troops from the bridge. But it was found that the planking had been removed from the stringers, hence crossing it was impracticable.

The whole corps then moved one and one-half miles down the river and crossed at Byron's Ford at night, the ordnance train being left on the south side of the river because of the rocky and uneven bottom of the ford. The troops moved up the river for about a mile, and there bivouacked nearly opposite Alexander's bridge.

Buckner's corps started early, but as his column had to follow a part of the road taken by Walker's corps, there was considerable delay occasioned by the encounter of the two columns so that Stewart's division reached Tedford's Ford at 2 p.m., and formed: Bate's and Clayton's brigades in front, and Brown's in the reserve, with batteries posted on the wooded heights above and below the ford. There were some Union troops on the other side of the river toward Alexander's bridge, which retired when sharpshooters and batteries opened on them. Three companies from Clayton's brigade were then sent across the stream to occupy as skirmishers, a wooded hill beyond, and after nightfall the whole brigade crossed and bivouacked on the opposite side of the creek. Preston's division was directed to cross at Dalton's Ford, but only Gracie's brigade crossed there and bivouacked on the other side. The whole of Cheatham's division of five brigades also moved to, and bivouacked

in the vicinity of Dalton's Ford. Hindman's division pressed down toward Lee-and-Gordon's mill. Cleburne was stationed at Anderson's, and Breckenridge at Glass' mill.

Thus, on the evening of September 18, Gen. Bragg succeeded in throwing a force of four divisions over the Chickamauga River, and securing crossings for three more divisions, while we were far from being aware of the extent of that movement. This was a bold and a proper plan, and, as a grand tactical movement, it is worthy of critical consideration. We should imagine that Gen. Bragg had at least a common sketch of the ground on which that manœuvre had to take place, and that he studied that sketch somewhat diligently before he issued his orders for the movement. That sketch should have shown him that the only road by which Thomas and McCook could slip out of the bag formed by Pigeon Mountain and Missionary Ridge—in which their army corps were still deeply immured even during September 18—was the road leading from Crawfish Spring into the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, and joining it about a mile south of Kelly's house. That, in order to interpose his own army between the Union army and Chattanooga, he had to bar that road. He could have done so just as well as not, yet he did not do it. There was less distance for Hood's and B. R. Johnson's columns to make from Reed's bridge to the fork of those roads than the distance they made to reach Vineyard's farm, and there at the fork the country was more open, and several farm-houses stood around which could guide the formation of the line in the night. There was also a direct road from Reed's bridge to Dyer's tan-yard and farm. If Hood's position had been taken there, only a mile would be needful for Walker's brigades to reach it from the locality of his bivouac.

To accomplish that, Bragg's orders (circular) of the 18th should have been amended to read something like this:

1. Johnson's column (Hood's) on crossing at or near Reed's bridge to move on the road leading from Jay's steam-mill southwest to Dyer's farm and tan-yard, and to form there across Lafayette and Crawfish-Spring roads, facing south.

2. Walker, crossing at Alexander's bridge or nearest ford, to move toward Dyer's farm and tan-yard and join Hood.

3. Buckner and Cheatham to cross behind Walker and connect with him in forming a line.

The balance of the orders might have remained as they were. There is no doubt that Hood would have carried such an order out to the letter, and the others would not have failed. It is said that sometimes a pen-stroke changes the fate of empires, and surely a slight change in Bragg's order might have led to different results of the campaign. But it is useless to speculate as to the possibility of the owl changing its heavy flagging flight from tree to tree, to the eagle's graceful sweep and bold ascent into the clouds.

But what is still more remarkable is the fact that as soon as there was sufficient light for the movement, Hood's line was shifted to the rear and its right flank, which in the night was not far from the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, was now thrown far back to correspond with the elevated ground in the rear, so as to make the line of formation in the shape of a graceful curve, leaving that road to us entirely unobstructed. We were surely thankful for that sort of accommodation and were not slow to profit by it.

While the enemy was throwing some of his troops on our side of the river and securing the crossings for others, Gen. Rosecrans' intention was to shift as secretly and quietly as possible, VanCleve's and Palmer's divisions of Crittenden's corps, to the left of Wood's, at Lee-and-Gordon's mill; to pass Thomas' corps beyond Crittenden toward Kelley's house, and to bring McCook up far enough for him to be able to support the right or the left of our army. Hence there was a necessity for most of the movements to be made during the night.

In the afternoon of September 18, VanCleve was ordered to move his division and form it on the left of Wood's division, and Gen. Palmer to relieve Barnes' brigade of VanCleve's division, stationed at Glenn's Ford, with one of his brigades, which was done, Col. Grose relieving Col. Barnes. Toward evening, Gen. Negley was ordered with his division to relieve Palmer and send one brigade to Crawfish Spring, while Palmer was ordered to march his division and form it on the left of VanCleve. Palmer wrote an order for Grose, as soon as relieved

to march to Crawfish Spring and await orders; for Gens. Hazen and Cruft to follow Grose, the movement being placed under Gen. Cruft's supervision, and Palmer went ahead to look up the position to the left of VanCleve.

Unfortunately, before Grose was relieved, Gen. Beatty, of Negley's division, wanted to relieve Gen. Hazen's brigade, but Hazen refused to be relieved before Grose was. Considerable time was lost before the thing could be rectified, and it was nearly midnight before Grose was relieved and the division started. Palmer expected to get his division in position by 10 p.m., but it was nearly daylight when it at last was formed. When there are many troops to follow the same road in the night-time, the march becomes most fatiguing to the troops and wears out men more than a battle. Such a march on the eve of battle is ruinous, yet just such marches happen, if at all, on the eve of battles.

Gen. Thomas, leaving Negley to relieve Palmer, was to move with Baird's, Brannan's, and Reynolds' divisions. Baird's was the first to start; it was only three and one-half miles from its position to Crawfish Spring, yet the roads were so encumbered by troops and trains that it did not reach Crawfish Spring until midnight. At Crawfish Spring, Gen. Thomas received orders "to march [with these three divisions] on the cross-road leading by the Widow Glenn's house to the Chattanooga-and-Lafayette road, and take up a position near Kelley's farm on the Lafayette road, connecting with Crittenden on my right at Gordon's Mill."*

The divisions commenced to move, but there was more halting than moving. Although the supply-trains were sent by the Chattanooga-Valley road toward Chattanooga and separate from the troops, yet the ammunition-train was moving with the troops by the same road behind each division. The night was dark and foggy; the fences along the road were set on fire wherever farms were, and the smoke filling the air made it heavy and oppressive. A wagon delayed by broken harness or some other trifling cause, detained the whole division following it for an hour. Sometimes an ammunition wagon would

* Report of Maj.-Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, September 30, 1863.

approach dangerously close to the burning fence, and occasionally one would dart over the burning rails scattered on the ground. It was a wonder that some fearful explosions did not happen. The dull rumbling of the wheels on the dusty roads, the occasional snorting of animals, the clinking of arms, and the subdued voices of tens of thousands of men gathered in close proximity presaged the gathering of the force that would burst in a storm of battle on the morrow.

It was marvelous that Thomas' column was not observed as it approached the Lafayette road, near which pickets of Hood's forces were stationed, and about whose close proximity we had not the slightest idea; but this large force of the Unionists passed right by them without a shot being fired or an alarm of any kind sounded. It appeared to us as if there were no other troops in the surrounding woods, and that we were in perfect security.

The night-marches of large bodies of troops are necessarily slow, because in the first place, men and trains have to follow only the road, hence the column becomes exceedingly long, and the marching made with a broken step, now halting and again hurrying in order to close up. In the second place, every obstacle however trifling and easily overcome in the daytime, appears magnified and insuperable in the night. If the troops had to make a speedy march in the daytime, they could have given the road to artillery and trains and marched themselves, on the sides of the road and in closer order; but in the night-time it is impossible to do so.

The head of the column of Baird's division was, at daylight on September 19, reaching Kelly's farm, Brannan's following at some distance behind, while Reynolds' division having passed beyond Crawfish Spring, halted at Osborne's at daylight to rest and to cook coffee. About 8 o'clock it again moved on. On the way to Kelly's farm, Gen. Thomas found Wilder's mounted-infantry brigade in position on the heights east of Widow Glenn's house, which it occupied after having been driven from Alexander's bridge by the enemy on the day before. Thomas formed Baird's division at the fork of the roads leading to Reed's and Alexander's bridges, facing east and a little south, and Brannan's division to the left of

Baird, intending to form Reynolds' division to the right of Baird when it arrived, thus connecting the right of his line with Wilder's brigade, although it could hardly have formed a continuous line. McCook's corps reached Crawfish Spring at daylight and was posted there as a reserve.

Our line of formation, early on the 19th, was along the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, Crittenden's three divisions on the right from Lee-and-Gordon's mill, extending for one and one-half miles northward; then there was a long break partially filled by Wilder's brigade, and then two of Thomas' divisions were formed on the extreme left with a third one on its way thither. McCook's corps was to the right and rear of our extreme right.

While we were assuming this shape, the rebel army, close to us, was also forming. Hood's three brigades under Gen. Law on the right and rear of B. R. Johnson's division with two brigades in the line and one in reserve, formed a front somewhat curved, with the left considerably refused along an elevation about 1000 yards east of the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, the center of it being nearly opposite the eastern field of Vineyard's farm. This line was ready for action at 7 a.m., both divisions being under command of Gen. Hood. Buckner's two divisions crossed the river and Stewart's division formed on the left of Johnson's in a brigade column of three lines, and Preston's took position in the same order to the left of Stewart's. Walker's corps at daylight, marched in the direction of Lee-and-Gordon's mill for one and one-half miles, then halted for further instructions. Cheatham's division, early in the morning, crossed the river at Dalton's Ford, moved northward by the flank for some distance, and halted, forming front westward, and stood in the rear of Buckner's corps.

Gen. Bragg was thus packing two-thirds of his army into the narrow corner formed by the Chickamauga River and the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road just below Lee-and-Gordon's mill, under the delusion that on the morning of September 19, our army was still posted in the position in which he knew it to have been posted on September 18, that is with our extreme left at Lee-and-Gordon's mill and our center and

right extending far up into McLamore's Cove, while it was now quite the reverse. Our night-movements made our left of yesterday our right of today, while our left was three and one-half miles north of Lee-and-Gordon's mill, and by so much nearer to Chattanooga, thus outflanking his formation by nearly two miles. The space where his supposed flanking columns were packed was so small that Preston's division, of Buckner's corps, being on the extreme left of the line, was hemmed into a bend of Chickamauga River in a column of brigades, so that should there have been a movement to the front it would not be able to advance without twice crossing another bend of the river which was right in front of that division.

It was after 9 a.m., and still Bragg had not his army in readiness for the advance, and would not have been ready for some time longer if the sounds of musketry and occasional firing of cannon had not forced the illuminative fact on his mind that the cat was out of the bag. The rebel Gen. Hill, in his report, sarcastically mentions that he "found upon reporting to the commanding general, that while our troops have been moving up the Chickamauga, the Yankees had been moving down, and outflanked us."

Chance plays a great rôle in military operations, and were it not for chance helping us, the forces gathered by Bragg on this side of the river might have fallen on Crittenden and McCook and isolated Thomas from them. But it was destined to be otherwise.

Col Dan. McCook, who, on receipt of Minty's report, was ordered by Gen. Granger to advance with his own brigade toward Reed's bridge on the evening of the 18th, as has been narrated, halted within a mile of the bridge and was there supported by Mitchell's brigade, sent for that purpose. He there had in front of him some of Minty's cavalry who had been driven from the bridge at 2 or 3 p.m. that day, and the bridge—his objective point—was in the possession of rebel cavalry. McCook on his arrival in the evening probably heard from the cavalrymen that toward evening a rebel brigade crossed the bridge to our side of the river and then marched up stream in the direction of Alexander's bridge.

The probability is that it was Benning's brigade of Hood's division that remained for some time at Ringgold after Johnson's forces left, and had come down to join Robertson's brigade of Hood's division, and it is likely that its movement was noticed by some of our advanced cavalry-vedettes.

Both our brigades early in the morning of the 19th, were ordered to move back to Rossville. But before moving away, Gen. Steedman, who was in command of both brigades, sent a regiment under Lieut.-Col. Brigham to destroy the bridge. Our men charged on the rebels, drove them off the bridge, and burned it. Now Dan. McCook, after starting his brigade, wanted to know what was going on around Kelley's house. He went up there and, meeting Gen. Thomas at Gen. Baird's headquarters, reported to him that while he was bivouacked near the bridge he was aware of only one small rebel brigade having crossed the bridge in the evening, and he thought it was isolated in the woods and could be captured. Gen. Thomas took it under consideration, and, being desirous to reconnoitre the ground toward Chickamauga, ordered Gen. Brannan to move with his division to capture that little rebel brigade. He, of course, was not aware at the time what rebel forces crossed in other places to our side of the river, nor where they formed.

In his report, Gen. Thomas says: "Upon this information, I directed Gen. Brannan to post a brigade within supporting distance of Baird on the road to Alexander's bridge, and with his other two brigades to reconnoitre the road leading to Reed's bridge to see if he could locate the brigade reported by Col. McCook, and if a favorable opportunity occurred, to capture it. His dispositions were made according to instructions by 9 a.m." Gen. Brannan apparently put Croxton's brigade on the road to Reed's bridge instead of Alexander's bridge, and with Connel's and Vanderveer's brigades moved more to the left. But at that time the rebel Gen. Forrest, with his cavalry, was reconnoitering by Bragg's order in the direction of Reed's bridge. After Brannan moved, Col. Croxton advanced in the direction of Jay's steam-mill.

About 10 a.m., heavy musketry commenced in the direction of Reed's bridge. Brannan found that the "isolated rebel bri-

gade" was too strong to be captured, and sent to Gen. Thomas for reënforcements. Baird's division moved into the woods, but that was not enough; Johnson's division of McCook's corps, was hurried up to Thomas by Rosecrans, and went to the right of Baird; Palmer's and Reynolds' divisions hastened to the scene, and went to the right of Johnson. Still the rebel brigade proved to be too strong for capture, and turned out to be the greater part of the rebel army. And the rattle of musketry, interspersed with the sullen boom of the cannon, spread from left to right through the dense woods of the Chickamauga, continuing with unabated fury during the remainder of the day and even far into the night.

PART TWO.

Battle of September 19, 1863.

CHAPTER VI.

DURING THE DAY.

WHEN Col. Croxton advanced with his brigade he met the enemy's dismounted cavalry of Pegram's division, and, notwithstanding its stubborn resistance, drove it steadily for three-quarters of a mile, while Brannan, with two other brigades, Connel's in front and Vanderveer's in reserve, met and also drove some cavalry. The rebel Gen. Forrest sent to Polk for Armstrong's division of his cavalry, but, receiving only Dibrell's brigade, went himself to get some infantry reënforcements. Wilson's brigade of Walker's division,* was ordered to reënforce him, which was soon followed by Ector's brigade of the same division. Wilson, supported by cavalry, furiously attacked Croxton, who being overpowered, commenced to give way; and while stubbornly fighting and gradually falling back, sent to Thomas and to Brannan for reënforcements.

Baird's division advanced to the left of Croxton, with King's and Scribner's brigades in the front line and Starkweather's in reserve, and drove the enemy back toward the river, taking some 200 prisoners. In ordering Baird to move forward, Gen. Thomas apparently directed Starkweather to help Croxton also, but Starkweather mistaking the direction, went to the left. Meantime, Ector's rebel brigade, by Forrest's direction, passing to the rear and to the right of Wilson's, met Brannan's force. Brannan sent the Thirty-first Ohio of Connel's brigade to reënforce Croxton, and the Seventeenth Ohio was ordered to join Vanderveer; so Connel had only two regiments. The Ninth Ohio remaining back, joined this

* Gen. Walker commanding a corps, Gen. Gist ought to have commanded his division, but was detached with his brigade at Rome.

brigade of Vanderveer's about the same time. Gen. Ector, supported by cavalry, attacked Brannan, but was repulsed with loss and driven back some distance. Croxton passed to the rear to obtain ammunition, but one of his regiments, the Fourth Kentucky, went on with Baird's troops. Baird and Brannan now connected their forces and halted for readjustment; and Baird, hearing from the prisoners that a large rebel force was on his right, made dispositions to change front to the right, ordering Gen. King to change front to the right at once, his left being supported by Brannan's forces, Baird himself going toward Scribner's brigade to see his command properly posted.

At 11 a.m. the rebel Gen. Walker was ordered by Gen. Bragg to move Liddell's division to reënforce his troops on the right and to attack the enemy at once. By 12.15 p.m., just when Baird was going to Scribner's brigade, that brigade was struck in flank by the rebel Liddell's division, and notwithstanding all the stubborness of the men and the efforts of the officers, the brigade could not withstand the shock of the sudden charge, and was broken and borne to the rear in utter confusion. Four pieces of Scribner's battery were captured, and the enemy, sweeping further to his right, struck the regular brigade of King before it could get into proper position, took its rifled battery,* and drove the brigade in complete disorder, upon Brannan's forces, taking over 400 prisoners, almost all regulars.

During this action, Starkweather was coming up to take a position to the right of Scribner, and his brigade was attacked by the enemy and suffered severely, his battery also losing almost all its horses. But while Baird's brigades were thus terribly put out of shape, Vanderveer's and part of Connel's brigades, of Brannan's division, impetuously attacked the extreme right of Liddell's division, and the Ninth Ohio, a German regiment commanded by Col. Kamerling, supported by the Seventeenth Ohio and Eighty-seventh Indiana regiments, with an extraordinary dash, wedged themselves into the rebel crowd, driving it back, and the Ninth recaptured

* Battery "H", Fifth U.S.A., formerly Loomis' Michigan battery; Capt. VanPelt was taken prisoner.

King's regular battery. The enemy rallied and commenced to press Vanderveer's left again, which began to falter, the brigade under this pressure, gradually changing front, when the Ninth Ohio and two other regiments attacked this part of the enemy in flank and drove him back demoralized. Meantime, to the right of Baird, Johnson's division of McCook's corps, which was sent to Thomas by Gen. Rosecrans, was advancing, and Liddell, being outflanked, commenced to quickly fall back, and then retired toward the river, there to reform his successful but decimated command.

This encounter on our left, continuing for over three hours, told disastrously on some of our commands. King's regular brigade and Croxton's brigade having sustained heavy losses, particularly the first; but the enemy, being terribly in earnest, suffered still more. Wilson's and Ector's brigades were badly broken; the first after this encounter mustered only a little over 400 men,* and Ector's fared no better. Liddell's division also sustained heavy losses here, more than at any time during the balance of the two-days battle.

This battle on our left disconcerted the commander-in-chief of the rebel army. His contemplated plan to fall upon the supposed left of our army in the cove had dissolved like a dream. After sending the whole of Walker's reserve corps against our left, he hurried there Cheatham's division of five brigades, and ordered Gen. Polk to also send to the extreme right of the line Cleburne's division of Hill's corps. Until he was assured of stopping our advance on his right, he dared not order the attack of his center, and that gave us time and opportunity to form our line, if not perfectly, yet with the possibility of resisting Hood's and Buckner's forces, which stood waiting opposite our center and right.

When Gen. Johnson reported to Thomas, he was ordered to form his command, move forward to the right of Baird, and attack. The division formed with Willich's brigade on the right, Baldwin's on the left, and Dodge's in the reserve, and moved forward. Meantime, Gen. Crittenden, at 9 a.m., ordered Col. Grose of Palmer's division, to move north with his brigade and reconnoitre the Chattanooga road as far as Mc-

* Col. C. C. Wilson's report, October 1, 1863.

Dannel's and communicate with Gen. Thomas, which was done.

When the battle commenced on our left toward Reed's bridge, while everything was perfectly quiet in front of our right, Gen. Crittenden ordered Palmer's division to report to Thomas, which order was approved by Gen. Rosecrans. Col. Grose on his return, met and joined his division. Approaching Kelly's farm, Palmer formed his command and moved by brigades in echelon, left in front, in the direction of the fire; and almost at the same time Johnson advanced, Palmer was on his right. Hazen's brigade being on the left, Cruft's in the centre, and Grose's on the right. This movement of two of our divisions relieved Baird, and drove Liddell's rebel division toward the river; but at that time Cheatham's rebel division was advancing to the relief of Walker's corps with Jackson's, Preston Smith's, and Wright's brigades in the first line, and Maney's and Strahl's in the second. They attacked Johnson's and part of Palmer's commands, and, although they charged with determination and persistency, and compelled Johnson to recede some distance, yet our divisions fought so stubbornly —partly behind some improvised barricades of logs—that all the endeavors of the enemy to dislodge us proved futile; and Cheatham's brigades suffered very severely in this struggle, which lasted over two hours, besides losing five pieces of artillery. The rebel Gen. Jackson claimed* that his brigade captured three pieces of artillery and a pile of knapsacks left behind by our men. The rebel Gen. Wright, in the conflict with Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division, supported by Dodge's brigade of Johnson's division, sustained very severe losses in killed and wounded besides having Carnes' battery of his brigade captured by our side. For a time, Maney relieved Jackson, and Strahl relieved Preston Smith, while Wright was obliged to fight for over three hours until Clayton's brigade of Stewart's division, came to his support.

Bragg ordered Gen. Stewart to move his division to the right and take place between Cheatham and Hood, and to the request for special instruction, answered that Stewart must be guided by circumstances. Knowing that Cheatham required

* Gen. Jackson's report, October 3, 1863.

support, he moved his division north and reached the field of battle at the time Jackson and Preston Smith fell back for want of ammunition, and Wright was entirely broken. Stewart moved Clayton at once with his brigade, to the support of Wright, forming his other brigades—of Brown and Bate—to the left of Clayton. Before Stewart's division was placed in front of Palmer, the head of Reynold's column of two brigades was approaching Kelly's farm, Turchin's brigade in front, King's brigade following. Gen. Reynolds sent an order to Gen. Turchin to form his brigade southeast of Kelly's house, while he in person directed the head of King's brigade off the road preparatory to forming it; but on the solicitation of Gen. Palmer to reënforce him, Reynolds directed Col. King, with three regiments, to join Palmer on his right, and ordered two rear regiments, the Ninety-second and Thirty-sixth Ohio of Turchin's column, then within reach, to take place on the left of Palmer, sending Capt. Wm. B. Curtis, A.A.G., of the Third brigade, to inform Turchin of what had been done, and to order him to join his regiments, which he had placed on the left of Palmer with the rest of his brigade. Reynolds then, with the Seventy-fifth Indiana and Harris' battery of artillery, remained near the Chattanooga-and-Lafayette road back of the right wing of Palmer's extended line, for the purpose of organizing a reserve, as he saw no one in the neighborhood.* This action of separating his own small division in two parts, and placing those parts on the opposite flanks of another division, not even belonging to his own corps; removing them from his own control; and leaving them without anyone to direct their movements, while he remained in the rear and trying to organize something out of nothing, does not look like generalship. If Reynolds had stationed the whole of his division and his two batteries on the right of Palmer, the enemy never could have broken our centre; a disaster which occurred toward evening.

Rebel Gen. Clayton attacked Hazen's brigade, now supported by two regiments of Turchin's, but could not make an impression on our line. The fire of musketry was rapid and continuous, the enemy occasionally approaching our line quite

* Gen. Reynolds' report, September 23, 1863.

closely, and being terribly punished for his temerity. After spending all his ammunition and losing about 400 men, Clayton withdrew.* The action lasted about an hour, terminating at about 3.30.

There was now a lull in front of Johnson's and Palmer's divisions. Gen. Turchin, with the balance of his brigade, the Eleventh Ohio and Eighteenth Kentucky,† and the Twenty-first Indiana battery, joined his other two regiments on the left of Palmer's division, and as Gen. Hazen withdrew his brigade for want of ammunition, Turchin formed his brigade in place of Hazen's, and on the left of Gen. Cruft's brigade. At that time Johnson's division that stood to the left of Palmer's, moved forward, driving Cheatham's skirmishers for about a mile, and halted in front of the position on which Cheatham's division was formed. Here Gen. Baird, after leaving King's brigade on the road to Reed's bridge to watch the enemy in that direction, joined Johnson with Scribner's and Starkweather's brigades, while Brannan's division was withdrawn to Kelly's farm to reform, and there took position.

Gen. Palmer, seeing no enemy in his immediate front, and hearing heavy musketry and cannon firing to the right of him, had an idea that it would be expedient to move in that direction and help such of our troops, if any, who might be hard pressed by the enemy. With this philanthropic design in view, he ordered Grose's brigade—which was on his right—to move to the right, and the movement commenced. He was then coming to Gen. Cruft, and when on the point of ordering him and his brigade to move also to the right to support Grose, a rebel force moving quickly toward our front covered a portion of Grose's and Cruft's brigades with a sheet of firing and impetuously charged on our line. This was the attack of the rebel Gen. Brown and his brigade, which was ordered by Stewart, after Clayton withdrew. Grose's command being taken in flank, gave way, while the right of Cruft's wavered and then started to run. The confusion was quickly communicated to the balance of the brigade.

* Gen. Clayton's report, October 3, 1863.

† The Eighty-ninth Ohio Regiment was left on a detached duty at Tracy City, north of the Tennessee River, and afterward came to Rossville with Steedman's division of the reserve corps, and fought on September 20, under Gen. Steedman.

The rebel brigade, at this particular time, exposed its right flank, and Turchin immediately moved forward and, partially wheeling to the right, made an impetuous bayonet-charge on its exposed flank. The enemy stopped, faced about, and commenced to run; Cruft's men rallied and joined Turchin's in the chase, pursuing the enemy for a quarter of a mile and capturing a considerable number of prisoners. At Gen. Turchin's suggestion, the commands were then halted, and returned to their previous position in the line. It is a pertinent query to institute here as to what would have become of Turchin's and King's brigades, so widely separated, if Gen. Palmer, following his feeling of commiseration for other commands, had had time to withdraw his entire division away to the right and have left those brigades—unwisely entrusted to him by Reynolds—isolated and in the lurch; and what would have become of Gen. Reynolds himself, and his reserve of one battery?

Giving an account of this incident in his report,* Gen. Palmer says: "While riding toward Cruft's brigade to order him [Cruft] to move to the right to support Grose, a heavy force came down upon him and Turchin. For ten minutes or more our men stood up under this fire, and then the enemy charged them and *bore them back*. Cruft, Turchin, and all their officers exerted themselves with distinguished courage to arrest the retreat, and I gave them what assistance I could. It seemed as if *nothing would prevent a rout; but as if by magic*, the line straightened up, the men turning upon their pursuers and as quickly as they turned and fled, were in turn pursued. Many prisoners were brought to me at this point by soldiers for orders."

This report is *incorrect*. Turchin's men were not *borne back* an inch; on the contrary, when Cruft's men commenced to run, they rushed forward with bayonets at a charge as soon as the enemy's flank reached them. That was the *magic* which induced Cruft's men to face about and to join in the charge. Gen. Palmer should not have tried to palliate a temporary disorder of one of his brigades at the risk of making his report inconsistent, and doing injustice to another command. Any

* Report of Maj.-Gen. J. M. Palmer, September 30, 1863.

practical soldier knows that if the whole line commences to run from a maintained pursuit they would run indefinitely, unless some part of it should make a stand. On the other hand, if a part of the line retreats and the other charges forward, it stops and confuses the enemy and gives a chance to the fleeing part to recover and face to the front. There is no *magic* that can make a running regiment turn and face the enemy.

The rebel Gen. Brown* of Stewart's division, who made that attack, unconsciously rebukes Gen. Palmer in his report for that *incorrectness*, and states the truth relative to the action of Turchin's brigade. Gen. Brown's brigade consisted of the Eighteenth, Forty-fifth, Thirty-second, and Twenty-sixth Tennessee regiments, and Newman's battalion; in all 1341 officers and men participated in that attack. Describing his onslaught, Gen. Brown says: "but again we advanced, driving back his [our] second line up to and beyond the summit of the ridge, until my right rested upon and my center and left had passed the crest. *Unfortunately*, however, at the moment when the rout of the second line was about being made as complete as the disaster to the first a few minutes previous, a *force of the enemy appeared on my right flank and had well-nigh turned it*, compelling the Eighteenth and Forty-fifth Tennessee regiments to *retire rapidly and in some confusion*, under a heavy enfilading fire. *This necessitated the withdrawal of the center and left*, there being no support upon my right for a mile and none in my rear nearer than 600 yards, and which was then not in motion."

A fair question may now be asked,—could the enemy have been outflanked on his right if the whole line were "borne back" as Palmer says? It is due to the brave men who composed Turchin's brigade at that time and who gallantly rushed against the rebel bullets without wavering, that the unfairness of the report of Gen. Palmer, who was then present and in temporary command of them, should be exposed and refuted.

But this episode was only a preliminary to the attacks that succeeded it. At the time when Brown's brigade was ordered to the attack by Gen. Stewart, he also ordered Gen. Bate, with

* Report of Brig.-Gen. J. C. Brown, C.S., October 13, 1863.

his brigade, to form on the left of Brown, and Gen. Clayton, with his brigade, after it had been supplied with ammunition, to form on the left of Bate, and when they were ready they were commanded to attack the Union line. Bate's and Clayton's brigades attacked Grose—of Palmer's division—and King —of Reynolds' division. Grose's brigade firmly stood its ground, and his battery on the left, enfilading the right of the enemy, compelled him to fall back; but King's brigade, being taken in front and flank gave way. At that time, Gen. Hazen, after supplying his brigade with ammunition, was moving with it in the rear of the line toward the right, and seeing the mishaps of King's brigade, formed behind it while it was being driven by the enemy, but the rebel charge was so impetuous that his brigade could not arrest it, and his men commenced to fall back also.

Meantime, Gen. Reynolds, with Harris' and Swallow's two batteries, Lieut. Russel's battery "H," Fourth U.-S. Artillery, and a section of howitzers of the Ninety-second Illinois, was exciting himself to rally sufficient stragglers to support these batteries. Gen. Hazen, also, leaving his own command, applied himself to collecting into one battery as much of Palmer's artillery as possible, and gathering enough stragglers to support it. At the request of Reynolds, Gen. Thomas sent Brannan's two brigades from Kelly's farm to support Reynolds, and these rapidly neared the scene of conflict where most of Clayton's and a half of Bate's rebel brigades were chasing our fugitives across and beyond the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road. Met by the fire of our artillery, and threatened by Brannan's troops on their right, and some of our troops from our line on the left, the rebels deemed it discreet to withdraw.

This incident is worthy of critical consideration, in order to show how, under excitement and want of knowledge of the enemy's forces brought into action, a comparatively trifling affair is sometimes magnified into an event of almost national importance.

In his report* Gen. Reynolds, states that when he was sending the Ninety-second Illinois to the support of Col. King, that

* Maj.-Gen. J. J. Reynolds' report, September 23, 1863.

regiment could hardly clear the front of the batteries, when it was struck and routed by our own fugitives from the front, followed by the enemy; that with all his exertions he finally succeeded in reforming *several* regiments in rear of batteries; that battery "H," Fourth U.-S. Artillery, commanded by Lieut. Russell, joined him at this time; that these batteries "*fired with terrible effect* upon the enemy," and checked him; that the enemy then "shifted further to the right where there was evidently an opening in our lines," and flanking our troops and batteries, compelled them to fall to their right-rear, the batteries "changed front and fired to the right, and the line was reformed along a fence, nearly perpendicular to its former position, with the batteries in the edge of the woods, the enemy pushing still further to the right and rear." There was evidently something extraordinary about those rebel troops, when they could not be torn to shreds by twenty-four of our guns firing canister in their front, and afterward in their flank, in addition to the musketry fire at short range.

But this was not all. We have before related how Gen. Hazen, after being relieved by Gen. Turchin, moved to the rear to supply his brigade with ammunition. Hazen, in his report* states that just after accomplishing it there appeared to be a vigorous attack made on our lines immediately beyond the ground fought over by Grose's brigade; that he moved his brigade to the right and, "forming it so as to face the sound of battle," moved forward and took position as support to Reynolds' troops, at an angle of forty-five degrees with the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road; that when the line (of Reynolds' troops) in his front gave way, his men moved "to the top of the crest and withstood the shock until *they were completely flanked upon their left*, then obliqued well to the right and *took position upon a high elevation of ground*, confronting the left flank of that portion of the enemy which had broken our center."

Now, remembering that our fugitives and artillery under Reynolds wheeled before the rebels to the right and rear, and were consequently confronting the right flank of the rebels; while Hazen's brigade, according to his report, was confronting

* Report of Brig.-Gen. W. B. Hazen, September 28, 1863.

their left flank. The rebels were apparently passing between the musketry firing of Hazen's brigade on their left and the batteries of twenty-four guns of Reynolds, "fired with terrible effect" on their right, and yet the rebels moved on. Hazen says: "I found myself the *only* general officer upon that part of the field, and to check the farther advance of the enemy was of the utmost importance." So Hazen leaves his brigade and goes to work to get into position all the artillery "then in reach, including a portion of Standart's, Cockrell's, Cushing's, and Russell's batteries, in all about twenty pieces, and with the aid of all the mounted officers I could find, succeeded in checking and rallying a sufficient number of straggling infantry to form a fair line in support of the artillery." Here, then, are two generals, one a division commander rallying his own command behind his own batteries, while the other, commanding a brigade, forms batteries belonging to his division, and flies around to get stragglers to support them, while his own brigade, left "upon a high elevation of ground," was standing alone and inert.

Gen. Reynolds claims that Russell's battery was with him; Gen. Hazen claims it was with him. Dividing that battery by two and supposing it had only four guns, Reynolds' battery consisted of twenty guns, and Hazen says his battery consisted of twenty guns also, hence there were forty guns, both, according to the reports of those generals, placed in different positions, yet both firing at the same rebel force, and both supported by stragglers of King's brigade, with Hazen's brigade standing afar off on the other side of the break, while the daring rebels were steadily going ahead. To explain the inconsistency of his brigade being away from those batteries, Hazen says: "*My brigade could not be brought into position in time, there being but about two minutes* to make these dispositions *before the blow came,* when the simultaneous opening of all the artillery with grape *checked and put to rout* the confronting column of the enemy." Consequently there should be no doubt but that Hazen's battery routed the enemy, although Gen. Reynolds thinks differently.

After his line was reformed along the fence, with batteries in the edge of the woods and "the enemy pushing still further

to the right and rear," one would think that the enemy at last ran against Hazen's batteries and there the "grape checked and put" him "to rout"; but Reynolds shows that it was not so; and says: "I rallied and formed into double line some *ten or twelve* other *returning* [?] regiments which came in from the left center, and placing the front line under the immediate command of Col. Croxton, Tenth Kentucky, ordered them to swing around on the left flank as a pivot; this order was well executed by both lines in our rear, thus entirely cleared of the enemy." Surely, those "ten or twelve regiments" belonged to the two brigades of Brannan sent there by Gen. Thomas upon the request of Reynolds, and, although the sense of the phrases of the report is cloudy, still those two brigades must have cleaned out the rebels.

What is striking and incongruous in the reports of these two generals is this: that Reynolds does not mention Hazen and his batteries at all, or even his brigade; while Hazen also refrains from saying a word either of Reynolds, or his batteries, or of Brannan's troops, until his own batteries "checked and put to rout" the enemy, and then, and only then, he notices Reynolds and says: "Reynolds came and made further dispositions of the troops," etc. But, before coming to that, Gen. Hazen emphatically declares in his report, that "It is due Lieutenants Baldwin, First Ohio Artillery, commanding Standart's battery, Cockerill of the same regiment, commanding battery, Cushing and Russell, Fourth U.-S. Artillery, commanding batteries, to state for accuracy in manœuvering and firing their guns in the immediate presence of the enemy on the occasion above referred to, the *army and country are placed under lasting obligations.*" At such an emphatic, almost solemn, declaration of a brigadier-general intimating that by routing that rebel force which, as he says, "broke our center," the great danger, not only to the army, but to the country has been averted, it is well to inquire what that rebel force was.

The rebel Gen. Bate had in this attack* three regiments in the line of battle, the Twentieth Tennessee, Thirty-seventh Georgia, and the Fifty-eighth Alabama, and two regiments, the Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee, consolidated as a

* Report of Brig.-Gen. W. B. Bate, C.-S. Army, October 9, 1863.

reserve, besides the Fourth Georgia Sharpshooters on the right of the brigade. On the left of the front line stood the Fifty-eighth Alabama. His effective force is shown to have been 1212 infantry, officers and men. Gen. Clayton* had three Alabama regiments that were originally 1446 strong, but in his first engagement that afternoon, and before he was ordered to support Bate in his attack, he lost—according to his own report—about 400 officers and men; consequently, in his attack with Bate he could not have had but a few more than 1000 men. When the attack was first made the right of Bates' line was repulsed, but the Union troops in front of his left, as well as in front of Clayton, gave way and were pressed and pursued only by the Fiftieth Alabama and the Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee of Bates' force, comprising at the most liberal computation but two-fifths of that brigade, and by all of Clayton's brigade. Adding to this number some forty or fifty stragglers belonging to Law's brigade of Hood's division, who joined in the attack, and the whole rebel force which, as Hazen says, "broke our center," amounted to but 1500 men. Upon our side, Col. King had four regiments in his brigade, and there was the Ninety-second Illinois, and adding the strength of these regiments to that of Hazen's brigade, there must have been at least 2500 men right at hand, supported by forty pieces of artillery, to resist the enemy's 1500. Then, our troops were reënforced by two more brigades of Brannan's division, the whole force thus amounting to between 5000 and 6000 men concentrated against 1500 of the enemy. What danger could there have been to the army or the country resulting from such disproportionate forces? If those rebels went as far as Chattanooga, there is no doubt that our army, not saying anything of the country, would have been just as safe as if they never went there. The fact of the matter is that if Gen. Hazen, after putting his brigade in support of Reynolds' troops and seeing the breaking-up of the line in front of him, had quickly folded his deployed regiments into columns on the center, thus leaving space enough between the battalions for the fugitives to pass through, and then impetuously charged upon the enemy, who by the success had itself

* Report of Brig.-Gen. H. D. Clayton, October 3, 1863.

become disorganized, he would have scattered the rebels to the winds.

Instead of that, according to Col. Aquila Wiley's report of September 25, 1863, commanding the Forty-first Ohio, one of Hazen's own regiments, Hazen allowed the left of his brigade to be struck and carried by the impetus of our fugitives, while a part of his right flank, including the Forty-first Ohio, were pushed to the right and were falling back, occasionally firing, until the rebels commenced to retreat, and then Wiley says: "the regiment again moved to the left and joined the brigade."* Impartially considering the whole performance, it is hard not to come to the conclusion that our commanders lost their presence of mind in the face of that brilliant dash of the enemy, and in order to cover their lack of military self-possession and quickness of decision under the adverse circumstances, magnified the mouse into an elephant.

A much more serious and important struggle was going on farther to the right of Palmer and Reynolds, where our five brigades were withstanding the pressure of the seven brigades of the enemy for over two hours, and were on the point of succumbing. At the time that Palmer's division reached Johnson's and, moving east to the front, engaged the enemy, Gen. Crittenden, being at that time in the neighborhood of Widow Glenn's house, where Gen. Rosecrans' headquarters had been established, sent Maj. Mendenhall, his chief of artillery, and Col. McKibbin of Rosecrans' staff, toward Palmer's position to see what was going on, and to communicate with Gen. Palmer; but they quickly returned without attaining their

* The pompous report of Gen. Hazen so struck Horace Greeley that he, in his "American Conflict," making his, as usual, garbled account of the battle of Chickamauga, talks of the "breaking of our center" on September 19, and substantially repeats that report, winding up the thing in the following way: "the rebel charge being so impetuous and weighty as to throw our front into disorder; but this was soon retrieved. Brig.-Gen. W. B. Hazen of Crittenden's corps, massing twenty guns on a ridge that commanded the Rossville road, forming an infantry support of such men as he could hastily collect—*his own brigade not being at hand*—and pouring a cross-fire of grape at short range into the enemy's charging column, *till it recoiled in disorder, and the day was saved.*"—[Vol. II, xviii., "The Chattanooga Campaign."] The commanders of all rebel regiments which participated in this dash, including Gen. Clayton, say that they "fell back leisurely and in order."

object, having been halted and fired upon by the enemy. This information led Crittenden to believe that Palmer was not only fighting in his front, but was also attacked in his rear and perhaps surrounded.* He at once despatched Lieut.-Col. Loder, his inspector-general, and Col. McKibbin to Rosecrans to report facts and ask permission to bring up VanCleve to support Palmer. VanCleve, leaving Barnes' brigade with Wood's division at Lee-and-Gordon's mill, moved his other two brigades—of Gen. Sam. Beatty and Col. Dick—northward and formed to the right of Reynolds' second brigade under Col. King, which was formed on the right of Palmer's division.

Meantime, Rosecrans ordered McCook to send Davis' division to support VanCleve. Gen. Davis formed his two brigades of Heg and Carlin, on the right of VanCleve. His line thus formed was placed a few hundred yards east of the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road in front of Vineyard's farm, on a slight ridge and ran across a field belonging to that farm, and lying on the east side of the road, and into the woods on the south side of that field. Col. Wilder, with a part of his mounted-infantry brigade also joined these forces on Davis' left.

That made this line consist from left to right of the following troops, and in the order designated: Beatty, Dick, Heg, Carlin, and Wilder. Without the slightest knowledge of our commanders at the time, this alignment of troops faced the enemy's line, composed of Hood's division of three brigades, under Gen. Law, and B. R. Johnson's provisional division, also of three brigades; the whole force being under the command of Gen. Hood, and also being the same force that, on the preceeding evening, crossed by Reed's bridge and an adjacent ford above it and penetrated so daringly into the territory on our side of the Chickamauga River. This latter force, which was formed as early as 7 a.m. for an attack, was standing idle because Gen. Bragg, having been unexpectedly attacked on his extreme right where only his reconnoitring cavalry discovered the enemy in force, was constantly sending troops there, and had not till now ordered this force to attack, until he could be sure of making his right entirely secure. For four hours the battle was raging on the rebel right and center, while here everything

* Maj.-Gen. T. L. Crittenden's report, October 1, 1863.

was comparatively quiet. There were some shots exchanged between the skirmishers of Preston's division that stood to the left of B. R. Johnson, and our own troops at Lee-and-Gordon's mill, and occasionally there was some cannon firing, but there was no fight on Hood's line, and perhaps there would not have been for some time longer if our troops had not challenged the enemy.

After forming his brigades, at 2 p.m., VanCleve commenced to advance. His skirmishers met the skirmishers of B. R. Johnson's rebel division and drove them in; then our troops attacked Johnson's and Gregg's brigades, Beatty's brigade striking the left of Johnson and the right of Gregg; but, after considerable firing, this attack was repulsed by the enemy. The rest of Gregg's brigade, which was far larger than Johnson's, was hotly engaged by Dick's brigade, the struggle there being stubborn and more protracted than on our left, but the enemy, although suffering severely,* repulsed our attack.

At 2.30 p.m., rebel Gen. Hood ordered Johnson to advance and attack. The enemy moved forward, but owing to thick underbrush, could not preserve the alignment. Johnson's brigade and two regiments of Gregg's were separated from the balance of Gregg's brigade, while the left regiment of this brigade—the Fiftieth Tennessee—that faced more southwest, was extending its front so much that two regiments of McNair's brigade were put in between it and the centre of Gregg's. In this formation Gregg's and McNair's brigades were pressing Dick's brigade of our line, which, notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of our men, was gradually giving way. At this time, Gen. Davis advanced in echelons from his right with the intention of taking the enemy in flank, but Robertson's brigade of Hood's division, was brought forward, and changing front by regiments to the left, met Davis' troops at Vineyard's field on the east side of the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road. Davis' brigades stood the ground for some time, his Second Minnesota battery, planted in the field on an elevation, causing great loss to the enemy, they having none wherewith to oppose it.† Hood called on Buckner for reënforcements, and he

* Report of Brig.-Gen. B. R. Johnson, C.S., October 23, 1863.

† Longstreet's troops did not bring any artillery with them.

ordered Gen. Preston, who stood on the left of Hood's line, to send a brigade to him. Col. Trigg was ordered, with his brigade, to move to the relief of Hood's troops.

Our Col. Heg's brigade, meantime, was pressing Robertson's, but the latter, by an impetuous charge, drove our men from their position and obliged them to fall back across the field and take a position west of the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, behind Vineyard's farm-buildings, fences, and trees. There a desperate struggle ensued, during which Col. Heg was killed; and there also some hand-to-hand fighting occurred. Still, notwithstanding the fact that Robertson was reënforced by Benning's brigade of Hood's division, our men clung to their position with desperate tenacity, dealing hard blows to the enemy and thinning his ranks terribly.*

While this struggle was going on around Vineyard's farm, Gregg and McNair were driving our troops, under command of Col. Dick, toward the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road through the thick woods and then halted for alignment. Gen. Gregg went a short distance to the front to reconnoitre, when our skirmishers halted him, and when he turned his horse to escape was shot through the neck. The brigade moved on, but in a short time Robertson's men, on the left and rear of that brigade, happened to pass over the same ground where the incident happened, and recaptured Gregg and his horse. Dick's brigade now was driven beyond the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, and the left of Davis' line became exposed and terribly pressed by Hood's brigades, while his right brigade under Gen. Carlin, was now assailed by Trigg's brigade, who joined Robertson. Carlin was compelled to fall back to the skirt of woods bordering and on the east side of the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, with his battery posted in Vineyard's field on the west side of the road, and there our men made a stand.

Meantime, Johnson's rebel brigade, commanded by Col. Fulton, and the Forty-first and Third Tennessee regiments of Gregg's brigade, on the extreme right of the enemy's line, after moving some distance, encountered our brigade commanded by Gen. Sam. Beatty, who stood on the left of Dick.

* In the reports of three regimental commanders of Robertson's brigade and in the report of Brig.-Gen. H. L. Benning, C.S., these facts are stated.

The rebel troops were hotly received by musketry and cannon. Our position being on the rising ground, the enemy was freely showered with bullets and grape. The fight continued for an hour, when the defection of Dick's brigade on the right of Beatty compelled our troops to retire to the open woods on the west side of the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road. Rebel Gen. B. R. Johnson, in his report of October 23, 1863, says: 'Approaching the road, a part of the brigade halted and poured its fire into the enemy's ranks, now in full view 200 yards in front; again advanced, crossed the road gained the cover of the woods on the left of the field in which the enemy's battery was posted, a clearing with enclosure intervening. The Twenty-fifth Tennessee regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Snowden, and a part of the Twenty-third Tennessee regiment now wheeled to the right, moved on the flank of the battery, gained the cover of a fence north of the clearing, poured into it a few volleys, charged and captured the battery."

The remainder of the rebel brigade now crossed the road, the Seventeenth Tennessee, the left regiment, advanced about 200 yards beyond the road, and the Third and Forty-first Tennessee of Gregg's brigade, a little farther, when a column of Union troops marching by the flank on the road, appeared on the left and rear of those two regiments. The Third quickly faced about and recrossed the road, but the Forty-first received a volley from our troops. The rebel brigade, as if under an electric shock, darted to the right and beyond the road into the woods, leaving eleven officers, sixty men, and the captured battery in our hands. This was a strong reminder to the enemy's commander that he went too far, and that reënforcements from our right to this part of the battle had arrived. For a time the rebels stood in view of the road and then slowly withdrew.

But the contest on Davis' front continued. As early as 3 p.m., Gen. Wood, who had remained until then at Lee-and-Gordon's mill with his two brigades, received an order from Gen. Crittenden to go to the support of VanCleve. Col. Barnes, who was in command of the brigade left with Wood by VanCleve, was likewise ordered to move in the same direction for a similar purpose. On leaving his position, Gen. Wood

suggested to Gen. McCook that it would be well to hold that position by at least a brigade, and, pursuant to that recommendation, Lytle's brigade of Sheridan's division, was ordered to reoccupy it. The move was timely, because Gen. Lytle arrived there just in time to prevent the enemy crossing the river at the mill, with the intention of occupying our position if it were vacated.

Going ahead of his command, Gen. Wood met Gen. Davis. While conferring relative to the situation, a staff officer came from Col. Martin, now commanding the brigade of Heg, reporting from the colonel that he could not maintain his position any longer, and at the same time a stream of fugitives commenced to pour out of the woods east of the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, crossing over the field on the west side of that road. They belonged to Heg's brigade. Col. Harker came up with his brigade of Wood's division, formed it, and engaged the enemy in front of Heg's brigade, while Buell's brigade, also of Wood's division, was forming in the rear of Carlin's brigade, which was fighting in the woods on the east side of the Chattanooga road.

Gen. Carlin's troops at that time were hard pressed by a determined attack of the rebel brigade of Col. Trigg of Preston's division, sent to reënforce Hood's command. Trigg, supported by Robertson, of Hood's division, impetuously attacked Carlin and Barnes who formed on the right of Carlin. Our troops gave way, and being hotly pressed by the enemy, poured out of the woods, swept away Buell's brigade which was forming in the field on the west side of the road, and then the whole crowd went beyond the field into the woods. The field was only about 200 yards wide, but the masses of our troops crossing it under the fire of the enemy suffered terribly. Wilder's men were lying behind the fence and opened fire upon the rebels, who stopped on the other side of the field in the woods. Our men then rallied and, forming a line behind the western fence of the field and assisted by Bradley's and Esteps' batteries, which poured grape into the enemy at short range, checked the rebels and compelled them to fall back.

After our troops had been reformed, Buell, supported by a portion of Carlin's brigade, moved into the field, but the

enemy's lines emerged from the woods on the east side of the road and advanced, steadily firing. At this time Col. Bradley with his brigade of Sheridan's division, appeared in the field, and advancing boldly to the front, engaged the enemy in conjunction with the others. Many losses were sustained, a great many horses of the batteries were shot, but the enemy's attack was repulsed. Barnes' brigade, which formed to the right of Davis, supported by Laiboldt's brigade of Sheridan's division, threatening the rebels in flank, contributed to the final retreat and withdrawal of the enemy.

CHAPTER VII.

DURING THE EVENING. RESULTS.

THE evening was approaching and the woods in the valley of Chickamauga, that had been so full of the rattle of musketry and the boom of cannon during the day, were gradually becoming stilled, when, from the ground traversed by the rebel troops in the charge by which VanCleve's brigades were driven beyond the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, a volley of musketry was heard. Then there was silence again; then again sharp musketry broke out and continued for several minutes. This firing was occasioned by the advance of Negley's division from the vicinity of Widow Glenn's house to the front.

During the preceding night, Negley relieved Palmer and VanCleve, and, during the day, guarded Owen's and Glenn's fords, the latter being by Glass' mill, where Beatty's brigade was stationed. This position brought Negley's division opposite to the rebel division commanded by Breckinridge. Early in the morning, pursuant to orders from Gen. Hill, Helm's brigade, of Breckinridge's division, made a demonstration at Glass' mill by crossing the river and attacking Gen. Beatty's brigade. Two of his batteries opened fire, and a part of Beatty's command was driven back. After some cannonading, during which Bridges' battery lost a number of men and horses, the enemy withdrew. At 2.30 p.m., Gen. Negley received orders to report to Gen. McCook; then, at 3.30 p.m., was directed by Gen. Rosecrans to take position and support Gen. Thomas. He moved half a mile to the left of Widow Glenn's house, or rather beyond it, when he discovered a gap in our line, through which as he thought,* the enemy was moving upon the right flank and rear of Thomas' line.

These were rebel troops of B. R. Johnson's division, driving VanCleve's two brigades to the west of the Chattanooga road.

* Maj.-Gen. J. S. Negley's report, September 26, 1863.

Stanley's brigade was sent forward, and Sirwell's brigade was sent in support of it. It was the advance of this command that got in the rear of the two rebel regiments—the Third and Forty-first Tennessee of Gregg's command, then with Johnson's brigade on the west side of the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road—and fired a volley into their rear, creating consternation throughout the whole rebel brigade. After the two rebel regiments recrossed the road, they were put in position by Capt. W. T. Blakemore, Gen. B. R. Johnson's *aide-de-camp*, and charged our force driving it back. This incident produced that short, sharp musketry which broke the stillness of the woods. At 6 p.m., Negley ordered his brigades to again push forward, hoping that by pressing the enemy farther back at that point, he would be able to connect with our other troops on his right or left. Our troops advanced on the enemy and skirmished for an hour, but no connection resulted, so Negley's division halted to bivouac.

But it was not destined that the struggle should terminate with the setting of the sun. When it was almost nightfall heavy musketry and cannon-firing were heard upon our extreme left, the cause of which was as follows: In the afternoon Gen. Hill, of the rebel army, was ordered to report in person to Gen. Bragg at Tedford's ford, and also to hurry Cleburne's division—which was at Anderson's, about four miles south of the ford—to that place. Hindman's division was likewise moved down the river from Lee-and-Gordon's mill, its position being occupied by Breckinridge. Gen. Hill, with Cleburne's division, was ordered to cross the river at Tedford's and move to the extreme right of the rebel lines, where Walker and Cheatham were, and attack our line. The march to the ford, the crossing of the river there and traversing the four miles from the ford to Cheatham's position, consumed the entire afternoon, and it was after sunset when he reached the position in the rear of Liddell's and Cheatham's divisions. With Polk's brigade on the right, in front of Jay's steam-mill, Wood's in the centre, and Deshler's on the left, with three batteries of artillery, Gen. Cleburne, at once passing through Liddell's and Cheatham's lines, advanced to the attack. He was supported by two of Cheatham's brigades, Jackson forming on the ex-

treme left of Cleburne, and Preston Smith moving as a reserve in the rear of Deshler's brigade.

In front of this advancing line of the enemy were Baird's two brigades and Johnson's three brigades of our army which had thrown up in their front rough barricades of logs for their protection during the intervals of quiet that gave them such opportunities in the afternoon. Toward sundown, Gen. Thomas came to see Gens. Baird and Johnson and, taking them toward Kelley's farm, showed them the position that he contemplated their commands should at once occupy. Before they had time to rejoin their forces, however, the rebel attack commenced.

Scribner's and Starkweather's brigades of Baird's division, occupied the same position from which they drove the rebels in the forenoon and which they were subsequently forced to abandon, while in front of a portion of Johnson's division was a large open field, opposite which his batteries were posted. Wood's and part of Polk's brigades both of Cleburne's division, were moving through that field to the assault, and the shower of bullets and grape hurled at them by our men was terrific. As Cleburne* says: "For half an hour the firing was the heaviest I had ever heard. It was dark, however, and accurate shooting was impossible. Each party was aiming at the flashes of the other's guns, and few of the shots from either side took effect."

As no night attack can be orderly, so there happened considerable confusion and disorder in the advance of the rebel line. Gen. Polk's brigade was crowding on Wood's, and this in turn was crowding on Deshler's. Finally Deshler moved far to the left, and opened Preston Smith's brigade of Cheatham's division, and Smith, with Capt. King, a volunteer aid, rode to the front in the dark, thinking they were with Deshler's command, and strayed into the Union line, where both were killed. Col. Vaughn, accompanied by Capt. Donelson, A.A.A.G. of the brigade, also came among the Union troops, making the same error as Smith and King;† and riding up to a soldier asked him to what command he belonged; the soldier for an answer fired at him, missed, and killed Capt. Donelson. Vaughn called up

* Report of Maj.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne, C.S., October 18, 1863.

† Report of Col. A. J. Vaughn, October 4, 1863.

some men of his command, who shot the Union soldier, when about 300 other Union soldiers surrendered, among whom was the color-bearer with the flag of the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania. Some of these men probably belonged to Baldwin's brigade. When the attack was repulsed, Gen. Johnson sent directions to his brigade-commanders to fall back. Soon after that Col. Baldwin, commanding a brigade, was killed, and Col. Berry, who was senior officer in the brigade, not being aware of the order, remained too long in the line after the other brigades commenced the movement to the rear. This was a senseless attack, lasting almost till 9 p.m.; it cost many lives to both sides, and was not of the slightest advantage to the enemy, neither was there the least occasion for its having been made.

At last the struggle of September 19 was over, and it will be well to critically consider what sort of a battle it was. Upon the 18th, Gen. Bragg concentrated eight divisions, of the ten of which his army was composed, to fall upon the left of our army during the ensuing day. During the night between the 18th and 19th, Gen. Rosecrans passed a large portion of his army to the north, so that his left of the 18th became his right on the 19th. And in the early morning, even as late as 9 a.m., the bulk of our army was at Lee-and-Gordon's mill and at Crawfish Spring; only the two divisions of Baird and Brannan had reached Kelley's farm, and were, therefore, separated from the main command by an interval of three miles. If Bragg had adhered to his original plan of attacking Rosecrans on the morning of the 19th, there is no doubt but that it would have greatly if not seriously embarrassed our army. But the first shots that he heard from our troops at Reed's bridge, disconcerted and alarmed him.

He then relinquished his original plan altogether and despatched his divisions one after another toward the north, until he had unwound the great ball of his troops that he had so carefully twisted up during the night and morning in an area of less than three square miles. Upon its evolution it was made a line extending seven miles long, and the conflict that occurred assumed the character of a purely *accidental battle.* Gen. Rosecrans had a plan—it consisted in putting his army,

as far as possible, between the enemy and its objective point, Chattanooga; but Gen. Bragg, after giving up his original plan, had no plan at all, and simply rushed into the *method of attrition*—the indiscriminate rubbing of his army against that of the enemy—a method consisting of perpetual attacks, without regard to losses or consequences; a method that has become somewhat celebrated since Gen. Grant used it in his Virginia campaign. But what might have been excusable in Grant, who, being supported by the unlimited resources of the North, could disregard the magnitude of his losses was anything but pardonable in Bragg, who should have known and remembered what limited resources the rebels possessed at that time. If Bragg had only manifested any desire to evade the battle, we certainly should not have provoked one at that time. But he rushed madly into the fight, and there was nothing for us to do but to accept the gage and defend ourselves. He told Gen. Longstreet,* when that officer joined him in the evening, "that the troops have been engaged during the day in severe skirmishing, while endeavoring to get in line of battle." If he called actions of such magnitude and loss of life skirmishing, what species of action would he deem worthy of being designated a battle? In that alleged "skirmishing" some of his brigades, as well as some of ours, lost one-half their numbers, and there were many that lost fully one-third of their effective strength.

No! it was not simple skirmishing, but a battle; a mad, irregular battle, very much resembling guerilla warfare on a vast scale, in which one army was bushwhacking the other, and wherein all the science and the art of war went for nothing. Both armies were scattered over a space of seven miles, and upon both sides there were formed three groups of troops that were desperately fighting, and that constituted three separate and distinct battles. One group was on our extreme left, where Brannan's, Baird's, and Johnson's divisions were fighting the rebel divisions of Walker, Cheatham, and Cleburne. To the right of that, or in the centre, was a smaller group, where Palmer's and Reynold's Union divisions were contending with Stewart's division. The third group was on our right, in

* Report of Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet, October [no date], 1863.

the vicinity of Vineyard's farm, where we had VanCleve's, Davis', and part of Sheridan's division, and the enemy was represented by Hood's, B. R. Johnson's, and part of Preston's division.

Gen. Bragg, angry at being foiled in his combinations, set his soldiers on ours without any plan, but simply to fight and damage our army in some way; to bleed it and tie it up in those woods where he found it, so that he might have the opportunity to more regularly and scientifically butcher it, if possible, the ensuing day.

On the whole, whatever advantage there was was gained by our troops. By a night manœuvre, in the face of the enemy, we extricated ourselves from a very awkward position, and in doing so used a road close to which the enemy was encamped in large masses. That road was our sole means of escape, and by its advantageous use we not only righted ourselves but blocked access to Chattanooga so effectually that before the enemy could get there he would have to destroy our army. By this manœuvre, Gen. Rosecrans demonstrated and boldly asserted his military talent.

On the cessation of hostilities our troops withdrew toward Missionary Ridge; the enemy's bivouacked principally where night found them.

The morale of our army was somewhat shaken, as the men felt sore that they were outnumbered by the enemy. The supicion that the rebels were reënforced from the East was made a certainty by the prisoners, who informed us that Longstreet's corps had joined Bragg. But whatever evil forebodings there might have been, were stifled by the sense of stern duty, and every soldier who was a man was determined to fight.

The night came, dark, cold, and cheerless. No fires were allowed to be kindled by either our men or those of the enemy. Fatigued by the last night's march, unnerved by the whole day's fighting, after munching some hard-tack, our soldiers wrapped themselves in their blankets, laid down on the cold ground, and fell asleep on their arms; while details from regiments and brigades were working industriously in felling trees, cutting and dragging old logs, carrying rails, and building barricades on the line to strengthen the position.

PART THREE.

Battle of September 20, 1863.

CHAPTER VIII.

OUR POSITION. THE ASSAULT ON OUR LEFT.

THE renewal of the battle with daylight being unavoidable, the great question was, where should the position be taken? Although there was only a slight disparity in numbers between our army and the enemy's — except in cavalry, of which the rebels had more — yet the general impression was that the rebels had received many reënforcements, including the whole of Longstreet's corps, and that we were largely outnumbered. There were only three small brigades of Hood's division that participated in the battle on September 19, and two more brigades of McLaw's division, which joined Bragg during the night, so that the whole force of Longstreet's troops was estimated by Gen. Bragg, in his report, at about 5000, and by some correspondents at 7000. But as there was no knowledge on our side of the real strength of that corps, it was thought that it must be at least 15,000 to 17,000 strong.

We supposed that the losses during the day were about equal on both sides, although the rebel reports show that they were larger on their side; yet it was thought the enemy had the advantage over us in troops that had not been used. Hindman's and Breckinridge's divisions had not been engaged, and two brigades of Preston's but very little; and, besides these, two brigades of Longstreet's corps, and Gist's brigade of Walker's corps, came up during the night; thus making eleven fresh brigades in all to go into battle the next day, while we had only three brigades of the reserve corps and Lytle's and Laiboldt's brigades of Sheridan's division, in all five brigades which had sustained but slight loss.

On the other hand, we had Negley's division, which was not much under fire; and if Post's brigade, which on the 20th acted

with cavalry, had been ordered to join its division, and Wagner's brigade been ordered to the front from Chattanooga, we would have had ten fresh brigades to go into the battle the next day. But for some reason neither Post nor Wagner were ordered to join their divisions. The rebels moved all that was possible of their commands from the rear to the front. We had at least 12,000 troops posted in various places along the railroad, out of which it seems as though one-half could have been brought to the front for a few days and then returned. With 5000 more troops we should have outnumbered the enemy on the battle-field, which might have been a great advantage to us.

We have fully demonstrated that, owing to the topographical features of the country, it is impossible to find a satisfactory position for an army north of Lee-and-Gordon's mill, in order that it may properly cover the approaches to Chattanooga, and that the best position to protect that point is right in front of it. Except the position of Chattanooga, there was only one position that perhaps might have answered our purpose, if occupied, better than any other between Chattanooga and Lee-and-Gordon's mill, and that was in front of Rossville Gap, with its left resting in the neighborhood of the McAffee church and its right extending toward McFarland's Gap, thus intersecting the Ringgold and Lafayette roads.

But there was no time to move the army to a distant position and to properly prepare that position for defence. The battle continued so late in the night and the troops were so fatigued and scattered so far south, that to move them even a few miles north on a single road would have deprived them of a few hours of rest which they greatly needed. So the position was taken in the rear of the ground on which our troops had been fighting during the day. It commenced at a point northeast of Kelley's house, extending in front and around Kelley's field in a southwesterly direction, thence diagonally crossed the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road and rested its right at Widow Glenn's house. It intended to cover two good roads leading across Missionary Ridge to Rossville and Chattanooga—the southern or Crawfish-Spring road, passing by Widow Glenn's house and then ascending the ridge, and the northern road

that comes from Alexander's bridge and crosses the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road between McDannel's and Kelley's houses, then ascends the ridge and joins the other road in McFarland's Gap. Thence the united road goes to Rossville along the western slope of Missionary Ridge. Between those two roads there were several intermediate roads also leading to McFarland's Gap.

Gen. Thomas having had an opportunity to look over the ground around Kelley's farm, put the divisions that fought under him during the day on the left wing of that position in the following order: Baird's on the extreme left with its left refused, then Johnson's, Palmer's, and Reynolds' at the crossing of the line with the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, and then Brannan's, although the last bivouacked far back of the line toward the ridge.

This part of the line, constituting the left wing, under the command of Gen. Thomas, was formed during the evening, was strengthened by barricades in the night and early morning, and during the morning underwent but slight changes. Negley's division, which belonged to Thomas' corps, was not with him during the day, and took—as has been shown—an advanced position toward evening, occupying the east side of the Chattanooga road opposite the space intervening between Dyer's and Widow Glenn's houses, and it was intended to be moved to the extreme left early in the morning, and placed to the left and rear of Baird's division to prevent that flank being turned by the enemy.

The right wing, consisting of Wood's, VanCleve's, Davis', and Sheridan's divisions of infantry, and all the cavalry that was on the right, including Wilder's mounted-infantry brigade, was put under command of Gen. McCook. It was already dark when these divisions moved back toward the ridge, where it was impossible to form on the continuation of the line of the left wing, so they bivouacked in a somewhat irregular way: Sheridan's and Davis' west of Widow Glenn's house, and VanCleve's farther back on the slope of Missionary Ridge.

The fault of our position was this: that our army posted on it did not present a bar to the enemy which he was bound to remove before he could venture to move on Chattanooga. It

was a flank position, and did not cover the main Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, which was open to the enemy just beyond our left.

If the enemy, not wishing to fight us behind our barricades, had directed his columns to the north, beyond our left, we would have been obliged to leave that position and move across the ridge in a hurry, so as to catch up with our communications. It was so with the Russian position at Borodino in 1812; the left of that position was coming to the main road on Moscow, while the centre and right of the position was extending north of that road along the Moscow River. Napoleon, disregarding the balance of the position, moved several heavy columns against the left and beyond it, and all the Russian troops of the centre and right were rushing madly to support the left. So it would have happened to us, if Bragg, without fighting our centre and right, had directed his columns beyond our left. But, as at Borodino, Napoleon wanted to damage the Russian army, instead of obliging it to fall back, so it was here; Bragg wanted to fight our army, instead of compelling it to leave the position, and hence he did not care to make what would have been the proper movement. Still the falsity of our position indirectly led to the reverses which our right wing sustained, as will be later explained. That we took that position was a matter of necessity; we could not have any better nearer than Chattanooga, and we could not very well go there. Our enemy helped us; he expected to kill two birds with one stone—to destroy our army and take Chattanooga at the same time—and he failed.

When the memorable morning of Sunday, Sept. 20, 1863, came, a dense fog was hanging in the valley of Chickamauga. Thomas' wing was soon in shape, the troops closing up toward the left and the batteries were placed in position; there was no change in Baird's, Johnson's, or Palmer's locations, but Turchin's brigade, constituting the left of Reynold's division, closed up on Palmer's right, with its right a short distance east of the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road. Col. King's brigade, which was the right of Reynolds' division, was put fifty steps back, in echelon, on account of more favorable ground for its position, and faced the Chattanooga road. Brannan came up

into line and formed on the prolongation of Reynolds' right brigade. At the same time Gen. McCook was forming his wing; Lytle's brigade of Sheridan's division, was posted in a strong position in the rear of Glenn's house, with the two other brigades of Sheridan's to the right and rear of Lytle. Two small brigades of Davis' were put on the left and rear of this position in the reserve, the left connecting with Crittenden's divisions posted on the ridge. Col. Wilder reported to Gen. McCook that his two regiments, armed with Spencer rifles, were posted in the woods on the right of Negley, who still occupied his former position, and stood now to the left and front of Lytle's; and that the remainder of his command and artillery were posted on strong ground immediately to Sheridan's right.

Although our left wing was well protected with barricades, there were no continuous barricades on the front of our right wing, except in two places, where short lines of them had been put up by Wilder's men the previous day. On the other hand, while the left flank of the left wing, where Baird was, was hanging in the air, and the ground whereon the line of that wing formed was only slightly undulating, the ground on which the right wing was formed was more broken, and therefore stronger for defence. The shape of the field of Kelley's farm determined the shape of the line of our left wing. The barricades were put up through the woods in front of and about 150 yards from the field. Baird's division was posted around the northeast corner of the field; Starkweather's brigade stood on the right, and next to Johnson's division, facing east, and at the break of the line there were posted four guns, in such a position as to enfilade the line; Scribner's brigade stood upon the turn, facing partly east and partly north; and King's stood in echelon on the left, but could face north if needed. Except the four pieces mentioned, the balance of the artillery, much disabled, was held in reserve. All the other divisions had two brigades in front, formed in double lines, and one in reserve, if there were three brigades, and in double lines where there were but two. This arrangement shortened the front of the left wing too much, and proffered to the enemy the possibility of enveloping our extreme left during his assault. Such a formation would have been more proper in an open field than

behind barricades, where we could place our front brigades in one line and thus double the length of the formation. It would also be just as effective, as but one line could fire, and in each division we would have had half of the troops in reserve.

It was agreed that Negley's division should be sent early in the morning to the extreme left, and be placed to the rear and left of Baird's line, to secure that flank from being turned; but it was daylight, and Negley was not relieved. Gen. Thomas sent Capt. Willard of his staff, to urge Gen. Negley to move; but at the time Negley was prepared to withdraw, his skirmishers were engaged by the enemy, who was apparently mustering a strong force in front of him.

Gen. Rosecrans ordered Beatty's brigade to go to Thomas, and Negley was ordered to follow it when relieved, which Gen. Crittenden was directed to do with Wood's division. Reaching the left, Gen. John Beatty formed his brigade to the left of Baird and north of Kelley's field, and soon received an order from Gen. Thomas, through Capt. Gaw, to move farther to the left to McDannel's, and stating that Gen. Negley was expected to support him. Beatty succeeded in placing his two left regiments at McDannel's, but the movement of his other two regiments was resisted by the enemy, who was beginning the attack.

Negley's division ought to have been relieved early in the morning, and the whole of it sent to the left, which would have obviated much difficulty that subsequently arose. When sharp skirmishing commenced in front of our left, Thomas again sent for the balance of Negley's division. This time, Stanley's brigade moved to the left, and Negley himself went with it, expecting that Sirwell's brigade, the last one of his division, and the artillery would be relieved at once and would follow him. On his way to, and before he reached the extreme left, Negley received an order from Gen. Thomas,* through Capt. Gaw, chief topographical officer of his staff, to mass as much artillery as he could spare from his lines, strongly supported by infantry, and to place that artillery beyond the extreme left in a position on the slopes of Missionary Ridge, so as to sweep

* Report of Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, Septemer 30, 1863.

the ground beyond Baird's left, and thus to secure it from the enemy's renewed assaults.

At this time our commanders commenced to feel the falsity of the position occupied and perceived danger to its extreme left. Had this order been given earlier and could have been carried out in time, it would have saved us a great deal of successive trouble and mortification. But it was then too late. Negley's last brigade was not yet relieved; the time was 9.45 a.m.,* and the battle was raging furiously on our left.

Gen. Bragg ordered Hindman and Breckinridge to cross the river during the evening of the 19th. The first joined Hood's forces and the latter reached his position in the rear of Cleburne's division about 11 p.m. During the night Gen. Gist, with his brigade convoying a large ammunition train from Ringgold to the front, joined Walker; and toward morning two brigades of McLaw's division of Longstreet's corps, under Gen. Kershaw, also joined Hood. Gen. Longstreet himself reached Bragg's headquarters at 11 p.m. The rebel army was divided into two wings. The right wing, consisting of Breckinridge's, Cleburne's, Gist's and Liddell's of Walker's corps, and Cheatham's divisions, was put under command of Lieut.-Gen. Polk. The left wing, consisting of Hood's and McLaw's under Hood, of Stewart's and Preston's under Buckner, and of Hindman's and B. R. Johnson's divisions, was put under command of Lieut.-Gen. Longstreet.

In his report Bragg says: "Polk was ordered to assail the enemy on our extreme right at daydawn on the 20th, and to take up the attack in succession rapidly to the left. The left wing to await the attack by the right, take it up promptly when made, and the whole line was then to be pushed vigorously and persistently against the enemy throughout its extent."†

The above is so plain that anyone can perceive that Gen. Bragg had no plan at all, and that his order condensed meant simply, "just go ahead and pitch in." But there was one phrase used in the order by Bragg which was assuredly said without any mental reservation or occult significance, but which

* Gen. W. S. Rosecrans' report.

† Gen. Bragg's report of December 28, 1863.

nevertheless, led to his good fortune and to our discomfiture, and that was the order for the left wing to wait until the attack by the right wing was made. Such a mere chance would appear a strange reason for such results, but that it was so will be demonstrated further in the narrative.

Breckinridge formed his division on the prolongation and on the right of Cleburne's line. Both Breckinridge and Cleburne received orders from Polk to attack soon after sunrise, but Gen. Hill, their corps-commander, came and delayed the movement. In his report,* Hill says that the principal reason for delay was that the men of one of his divisions had to get their cooked rations, and secondly, that he was ignorant of the order to attack at daylight, that the Yankees' position was not reconnoitered, that their own line was not adjusted and part of it was at right angles to the rest, and some of the troops were mixed up with those of the left wing. Gen. Bragg was bound to commence the battle at daylight, mainly to prevent our men working on the barricades in the morning; but Polk and Hill disobeyed the orders,† and the attack was delayed until 9.30 a. m.

In reading the reports of Gens. Bragg and Hill, it is a curious and interesting study to note how both these officers rejoiced when they discovered by reconnoitering shortly before the attack, that the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road was entirely uncovered beyond our left, not even a detachment of our cavalry being there to make an attempt to guard it. In being jubilant over this discovery they unwittingly showed how limited their knowledge of generalship was, otherwise they would have surmised that such must have been the case. Hill even boasts that he had perceived the practicability of out-flanking the Yankees during the fight of the preceding evening; but he had evidently kept the knowledge to himself and was now going to utilize it by carrying out the idea.

In forming his division, Gen. Breckinridge had Helm's brigade on the left, Stovall's in the center, and Adams' on the

* Report of Lieut.-Gen. D. H. Hill, C.-S. Army, commanding corps of operations July 19 to September 20 (1863), with correspondence.

† Bragg relieved both Polk and Hill from their commands in October for this delay.

right. His division and that of Cleburne, with Polk's on the right, Wood's in the center, and Deshler's on the left, were formed in a single line. Cheatham was first ordered to participate in the attack, but when he tried to form his line on the left of Cleburne he found Stewart's division of the left wing in his front. Asking for orders, he was directed by Bragg to stand in the reserve. Walker was first ordered to support Cheatham, but when between 9 and 10 a.m., Cheatham did not go into the attack, Walker was directed to form in the rear of Breckinridge.

In the meantime Hill ordered his line to advance. There ensued considerable sharp skirmishing lasting for half an hour, or until 9.30 a.m., when Breckinridge advanced, and then the battle opened by Helm's brigade with intense fury. The two regiments of the left of Helm's command with part of another regiment, encountered the left of our line of barricades, where Baird's division was stationed, and were met by direct musketry in their front, and were also enfiladed by the battery of four guns. They were literally mowed down, and recoiled from the devastating hail of bullets, but with undaunted heroism and invincible resolution they twice renewed the assault, but were each time beaten back with great slaughter. The right of Helm's brigade passed beyond our works and, with Stovall, fell on the One-hundred-and-fourth Illinois and Fifteenth Kentucky, which with Bridges' battery, were on Beatty's right, while his left regiments, the Eighty-eighth and Forty-second Indiana, were driven west by Adams. Lieut. Bishop of Bridges' battery was killed and his section of guns captured, the balance of the battery escaping. The One-hundred-and-fourth Illinois and Fifteenth Kentucky changed front and, assisted by the battery, resisted the enemy in the rear of Baird until the attack ceased.

Cleburne, about 10 a.m., received orders to advance, when Breckinridge was already in motion. Trying to dress on Breckinridge, his line got confused and Polk's and Wood's brigades fell under a heavy fire of our artillery. When the rebels advanced to within short-canister range of our line a hurricane of bullets and shells fired by our line swept the woods filled with the enemy. Polk's brigade and one regiment

of Wood's were checked within 175 yards of our line, and the rest halted with them.

During this advance of Cleburne, part of Wood's brigade passed over Bate's brigade of Stewart's division and Deshler's was entirely in the rear of the troops of the left wing. Wood's left now attempted to advance across an old field by Poe's house, but was driven back by oblique fire opened on both its flanks with the loss of 500 men. Cleburne withdrew Wood's brigade to the rear, and moved Deshler's to the right so as to connect it with Polk's, but Polk's left was driven back and the connection was impossible to be made under fire. In this movement Gen. Deshler was killed by a shell striking him in the breast, when the brigade withdrew. In his report, Gen. Cleburne remarks: "finding it a useless sacrifice of life for Polk to retain his position, I ordered him to fall back with the rest of his line."

This attack of the enemy shows how short our line behind the breastworks was, when the front of four of our divisions was fully covered by only two and a-half deployed brigades of the enemy. While the left of Helm's was opposite Baird, the left of Wood's was opposite Reynolds, as the oblique cross-fire on the left of Wood's could come only from Turchin's and King's brigades of Reynold's division, posted in echelon right by Poe's field. On the other hand, it shows how senseless it is to send to the assault of a line of troops behind breastworks only one thin line of troops, unsupported by any reserves. Those regiments of Helm's brigade that struck Baird's front were terribly slaughtered. Gen. Helm was killed, Col. Hewitt of the Second Kentucky killed, Cols. Nuckols of the Fourth and Caldwell of the Ninth Kentucky severely wounded, and many more officers and almost half of the men lost. This first assault of the enemy on our left wing lasted one hour; then there was a lull continuing for some time and presaging another outbreak of the storm.

When Helm's brigade was withdrawn, a crowd of our skirmishers occupied that space and, notwithstanding some strenuous efforts of the enemy to drive them to the breastworks, they held their position. Hill ordered Gist's brigade under Col. Colquitt to fill up the gap, and Gist was ordered to support

it with Wilson's and Ector's brigades of his division (formerly Walker's). Walthall's brigade of Liddell's division was ordered to support Gist on his left.

And now Hill was going to carry out that plan of out-flanking the Yankees, the practicablitity of which he discovered during Cleburne's advance the previous evening. He and Breckinridge decided to move in the rear of our left. When Helm's brigade met with disaster, Stovall and Adams brushed away Beatty's line of our troops with their brigades; Stovall stopped at the Chattanooga road, and Adams crossed the road at Glenn's farm and, advancing beyond, halted in its open field. And now Breckinridge ordered both to change front to the left, perpendicularly to their former line, to advance southward and attack.

But during the first attack Gen. Thomas sent for Negley's troops, and Stanley's brigade was directed to the left; besides, he ordered the reserve brigade of Palmer under Col. Grose, to move to the left and form in the rear of Baird's. Then, anticipating the enemy's attack in the rear, Thomas sent to Rosecrans asking for more reënforcements; and a reserve brigade of Brannan, under Col. Vanderveer, also moved quickly to the left. Thus from various sources, troops were hastening to the left to defeat the rebel move into the rear of our wing.

Gen. Beatty, after his first defeat, lost his Eighty-eighth and Forty-second Indiana. They were thrown west, and after considerable roving through the woods, joined Negley near Rossville. When Col. Stanley came with his brigade, Gen. Beatty added his two remaining regiments to the three of Stanley and formed this command on the left side of and at right angles to the road. The rebels moved to attack. Stovall's brigade furiously charged Baird's left; our men were driven from the barricades; the rebels were filling the field. Adams' brigade was pushing along the road in the direction of Kelley's house, and it seemed as if our left was going to pieces. But Grose's brigade, joined by part of Baird's troops, faced about, wheeled to the right, and met Stovall's men with deadly fire. Encouraged by Gen. Baird and other officers, our men rushed with a shout upon the enemy, drove him beyond the line of works in confusion and pursued for quite a distance. Our line was reëstablished and the enemy, beaten, retired.

Adams' brigade was still advancing, when it met Stanley's brigade and a portion of Beatty's, which, by a well-directed fire, checked its advance, and then shouting, impetuously charged the enemy and drove his line for nearly half a mile, capturing a number of prisoners. In the *melée*, the rebel commander, Gen. Adams was wounded and captured by the Nineteenth Illinois, surrendering to Capt. James V. Guthrie of that regiment.

Breckenridge withdrew Adams' and Stovall's brigades behind Walker's troops. Then Gen. Hill ordered Gen. Gist to attack our works on the left with his own brigade, under Col. Colquitt, —supported by Wilson's and Ector's—and Gen. Liddell with his own brigade, under Col. Govan, to move in the rear of our works and attack.

After Col. Stanley had pursued the enemy with his brigade he fell back to his previous position and looked for reënforcements. Gen. Beatty found three regiments—belonging, as he says in his report, to some brigade in the woods, probably Col. Dick's brigade—brought them to the front and formed in supporting distance in the rear of Stanley. It was agreed that if the enemy again engaged Stanley he would meet the attack and then fall back on this reënforcement.

Meanwhile, Gist moved to the attack. Colquitt advanced with his brigade, struck the left flank of Baird's line, being met with a murderous fire in front and flank, could stand but a short time, and was compelled to retire, having sustained severe loss. Colquitt was mortally wounded, and all the field-officers but two were killed or missing, as were one-third of the men. Walthall on the left of Colquitt could not get near our lines, and the supporting brigades of Wilson and Ector, each reduced to less than 500 men, could do but little toward the support of Colquitt.

Gen. Liddell was advancing with Govan's to the rear of our line. Stanley was attacked and obliged to fall back on his support; but the support was gone.* Yet Col. Dick of Van Cleve's division says in his report† that he supported Stanley, although when Stanley's brigade broke and ran over his line, his

* Col. T. R. Stanley's report, September 28, 1863.

† Report of Col. Geo. F. Dick, September 28, 1863.

own brigade was disordered, but rallied and resisted the enemy for some time, and, being overpowered, was obliged to withdraw.

The rebels advancing still farther, ran against Vanderveer's brigade, which was well prepared for their reception. Lying on the ground, they allowed the rebels to approach to within 100 yards, when the first line, consisting of the Second Minnesota and the Eighty-seventh Indiana, arose and delivered a volley; the second line, comprising the Thirty-fifth and the Ninth Ohio, supported by the Fifteenth Ohio of Willich's brigade, passed quickly to the front; the whole brigade charged at the double-quick, while Goodspeed's battery of Willich's command, opened fire, and the Forty-ninth Ohio and the Fifth Kentucky of Berry's brigade rapidly advanced on the flanks of the rebels. The enemy was routed and driven from the field several hundred yards into the woods beyond. Afterward, Gen. Willich, with the Thirty-second Indiana, pursued the enemy over a mile, until he met rebel cavalry, when he returned.

Thus terminated what was intended to be a master-stroke of the military genius of the rebel Gen. Hill—outflanking the Yankees. Reasoning about their failure, both Hill and Breckinridge came to the conclusion that if their assault had been supported by strong reserves it would have succeeded. They should have arrived at that conclusion before the attack. When the French attacked Fort Malakoff at Sebastopol, only a few thousand zouaves participated in the assault itself, but there were 40,000 reserves packed in the trenches ready to support them.

Walker's and Cheatham's troops being so badly beaten and having sustained such severe losses the previous day that Bragg did not use Cheatham in the assault on our left; and after the assault, Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions were in no better condition than the others. In fact we were here stronger than the enemy, and remained unmolested until evening, the time of our withdrawal from the position. But it was otherwise on our right.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ATTACK ON OUR RIGHT AND ITS ROUT.

SIRWELL'S brigade of Negley's division and artillery withdrew, and the space opposite in the line was filled up by Wood's two brigades of Crittenden's corps, to which Barnes' brigade of VanCleve was added. Wood's left rested on Brannan's right. Davis, with his two brigades in two lines, stood on the right of Wood, occupying a short line of barricades, and being supported on his right and rear by Laiboldt's brigade of Sheridan's division. The balance of that division and Wilder's troops remained in the same places as before, but VanCleve's two brigades were put closer to the line and formed in the rear of Wood's division as a reserve.

These changes were being made when the battle on the left was in progress, and here on the entire front reigned perfect calm, as if there were no enemy in existence. This quietude in front of our right, connected with the fierceness of the assaults of the enemy on our left and the reiterated demands for reënforcements from Gen. Thomas, made Gen. Rosecrans solicitous. Understanding the position of his army to be strategically faulty, he thought that Bragg was general enough to see it also, and that perhaps he was moving the troops of his left beyond our left or toward Chattanooga. He clearly shows his impressions in his report and in the orders he issued. In his report he says: "The battle in the meanwhile roared with increasing fury and approached from the left to the centre. Two aids arrived successively within a few minutes from Gen. Thomas asking for reënforcements. The first was directed to say that Gen. Negley had already gone and should be near at hand at that time, and that Brannan's reserve brigade was available. The other was directed to say that Gen. VanCleve would at once be sent to his assistance, which was accordingly done."

This order for VanCleve, Gen. Crittenden in his report* of October 1, 1863, acknowledges as received and acted upon immediately. But almost simultaneously with it, Rosecrans sent communication to McCook in the following words: "September 20, 10.10 a.m., Gen. Thomas is being heavily pressed on the left. The general commanding directs you to make immediate dispositions to withdraw the right so as to spare as much force as possible to reënforce Thomas. *The left must be held at all hazards, even if the right is withdrawn wholly back to the present left.* Select a good position back this way and be ready to start reënforcements to Thomas at a moment's warning. J. A. Garfield." In his report of October 1, 1863,† Gen. McCook says that "within five minutes after the receipt of the above order and instructions given to carry it out, the following was received: 'September 20, 10.30 a.m. The general commanding directs you to send two brigades of Gen. Sheridan's division at once and with all possible despatch to support Gen. Thomas, and send the third brigade as soon as the lines can be drawn sufficiently. March them as rapidly as you can without exhausting the men. Report in person to these headquarters as soon as your orders are given in regard to Sheridan's movement. Have you any news from Col. Post? J. A. Garfield.'" This order was executed at once. Two brigades of Sheridan's division—Lytle's and Walworth's—were taken from the extreme right and moved at the double-quick to the support of Gen. Thomas.

Thus the alarming reports of Gen. Thomas of the insecurity of our left, the possibility of concentration of the enemy's forces beyond our left, and an entire inactivity of the enemy against our right induced Gen. Rosecrans to make a movement, always dangerous to execute in the face of the enemy, but doubly dangerous at such a late hour and without any certainty as to whether one-half of the rebel army stood formed in front of our right wing or had withdrawn from it. It was an error to give too much credit to the enemy's strategical skill, of which he was not possessed, yet it was a justifiable error, as Bragg *could* have concentrated his army beyond our left if

* Maj.-Gen. T. L. Crittenden's report, October 1, 1863.

† Maj.-Gen. A. McD. McCook's report, October 1, 1863.

he could only see the advantage of doing so, particularly as he was on the offensive and therefore at liberty to choose his point of attack, or to change his front any way he pleased, without the slightest risk of endangering his own communications.

But this simultaneous movement of four of our brigades to the left, might have been perhaps accomplished or stopped on the way, in case of an attack by the enemy, without much detriment to the formation of the army, provided our front line, behind which the execution of the movements commenced, stood solid to meet the attack, should it have come. But fate willed it differently, as if to put the mettle of the Army of the Cumberland to trial by a crucial test of unexampled calamity.

Capt. Kellogg, an *aide-de-camp* of Gen. Thomas, coming to Gen. Rosecrans with another request for reënforcements for the left, reported at the same time that "Brannan's division was out of line, and that Reynolds' right was exposed."* Galloping along the line and being in a hurry to reach Gen. Rosecrans, Kellogg stopped to hear the statement from Gen. Reynolds that his flank was in the air and exposed.† Accepting it as a fact, Kellogg reported it to the general commanding. But there was no break in the line. There was an echelon between Turchin's and King's brigades, as before mentioned, but no break, and Brannan's division stood in line with King's brigade of Reynolds. Pressed so much with business, Rosecrans credited the report and ordered his *aide-de-camp*, Maj. Bond, to write that order to Wood, which proved so fatal to us: "Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, Sept. 20, 10.45 a.m. Brig.-Gen. Wood, commanding division: The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him. Frank S. Bond, major and *aide-de-camp*."

In his report‡ of September 29, 1863, Gen. Wood explains how he understood that order. He says: "Reynolds' division was posted on the left of Brannan's division, which in turn was on the left of the position I was just quitting. I had consequently to pass my command in the rear of Brannan's division

* Report of Gen. Rosecrans.

† Personal statement of Capt. Kellogg to writer, at Chattanooga, Nov. 14, 1888.

‡ Report of Brig.-Gen. T. J. Wood, Sept. 29, 1863.

to close up on and go into the support of Reynolds." But it seems as if this explanation was not exactly correct. If there were no Brannan's division between Wood's and Reynolds' the order would read all right. Gen. Wood being in the same line with Reynolds, by simply moving his division to the left *in the line* would have closed up on Reynolds and supported him. But when Brannan's division stood between Wood's and Reynolds', such an order was a puzzle; it could not be executed.

On the other hand, if Gen. Wood stood at a distance in the rear of Reynolds and received such an order, the order would be all right again. He would have to move his division forward and put it behind Reynolds' at a supporting distance. But the way the things stood at that time that order contradicted itself. The first part of it meant for Gen. Wood to move his division to the left *in the line* and join Reynolds, and the second meant to move it *out of the line* and place it in the rear of Reynolds. According to the phraseology accepted in military language the order had no sense; one part of it was contradicting the other part. Why then not to ascertain the meaning of it from the person who wrote the order before moving?

In his report Gen. Wood says that when he moved into the position and sent out his skirmishers to cover his front, he "had quite a sharp affair with him," (meaning the enemy), and Col. Bartleson was shot. He also says: "Although I had not been seriously engaged at any time during the morning, I was well satisfied the enemy was in considerable force in my immediate front, consequently I was extremely vigilant."

Now, Gen. Crittenden says in his report: "In a few moments I received orders to move Gen. VanCleve's division with the utmost despatch, not exhausting the troops, to the support of Gen. Thomas' left. I gave the order immediately to Gen. VanCleve, and its execution at once began. *At this moment* I received a message from Gen. Wood, that it was useless to bring artillery into the woods. The chief of artillery to this corps was ordered to put the batteries back on the ridge," etc. Then further, Crittenden says: "I now received a message from Gen. Wood, informing me that he had received an order direct from headquarters of the department to move at once to the

support of Gen. Reynolds." The above shows that Gen. Wood knew of the movement of VanCleve's two brigades to the left before he received his order, because he advised his corps-commander to leave the artillery behind. Then again Wood says in his report that he received his order about 11 a.m., and that Gen. McCook was with him at the time, who, a little before this, ordered Gen. Sheridan to move two brigades to the left, and Gen. Wood certainly knew about that also.

In view of all these facts: that Gen. Wood knew that the enemy was in force in his front, that as many as four of our brigades had been ordered to the left and had already commenced to move before he received his order, that the movement had to be made right behind and under cover of the front line in which he stood with his division; and also, being an old and experienced officer of the regular army, he ought to have known how dangerous such a movement was in the face of the enemy, and how important it was to preserve the solidity of the front line until that movement had been accomplished. If that order was as plain as day, saying that he should move out of the line and place his division in the rear of Reynolds, he never would have been considered as being derelict in his duties, if he had postponed the execution of that order until the movement of the rear brigades had been accomplished.

But such a doubtful order as that was, and an order which was opening the gap in the front line and obliging every brigade and division of the line of the whole wing to move, in order to close it; an order too, which bore on its face the contradiction in terms, certainly ought not to have been executed until the real wish of the general commanding could have been ascertained, which could not have taken but a few minutes' time to do. Unfortunately Gen. Wood, construing the order in the way above mentioned, hastily faced his division about, moved it a short distance to the rear, leaving a wide gap in the line, and then turning to the right, continued his movement along and behind the line in the direction of our left.

The idea of implicitly obeying orders by such officers as commanders of divisions, without reasoning about them is absurd. A division in the army is not a small factor of its strength. Very often one division has enabled large armies to

achieve a victory, or saved them from defeat. Desaix, with his division, won the battle of Marengo, when everything indicated that the battle was lost; Macmahon, coming with his division on the flank of the enemy at Magenta, compelled the Austrians to retreat; Bosquet, with his division, gained the battle of Alma, and another time at Inkerman, during the night-attack of the Russian army, saved with his division the British from utter destruction; and also here, in the Chickamauga battle—as will be shown later—a division of Granger's corps under Steedman, saved our right from grave reverses, and perhaps saved our whole army from disastrous defeat. And thus, if a division-commander wisely rectifies an order, erroneous on its face, he ought to be thanked for it, and not reprimanded or court-martialed. Martinetism nowadays has ceased to win victories; and all seem to realize that the military service, like any other intelligent service, requires reason, tact, and knowledge.

Early in the morning, Gen. Longstreet, in command of the left wing of the rebel army, commenced to form his line of battle. Stewart's division was put on the right of the wing, with its right resting near Cleburne's left; it was facing our two brigades of Reynolds' division and part of Brannan's. Brown's brigade was on the left, Bate's on the right, its right sharply refused as Cleburne's line was far behind, and Clayton's in the rear of Brown's. Barricades were put up in front of Brown. On the left of Stewart's was formed the main column of attack. B. R. Johnson's division in front, with McNair's brigade on the right, Johnson's with the First and Fiftieth Tennessee regiments consolidated, and Seventh Texas of Gregg's brigade, on the left, and the rest of Gregg's, under Col. Sugg, formed the second line. Immediately in the rear of Johnson's division were formed three small brigades—Law's, Robertson's, and Benning's—of Hood's division in one line, under command of Gen. Law. The whole column was put under command of Gen. Hood, to which, soon after the action commenced, were added the brigades of Kershaw and Humphrey of McLaw's division of Longstreet's corps, which had arrived during the night. This column stood opposite Wood's division.

To the left of this column formed Hindman's division, with Deas' and Manigault's brigades in the front line, and Ander-

son's in the second. Preston's division of Buckner's corps with its three brigades of Gracie, Kelly, and Trigg was held in reserve. It is evident from this formation of the attacking columns of the rebel left wing that Longstreet's experience in these matters was as much larger than Polk's or Hill's, as his columns of attack were stronger than Cleburne's and Breckinridge's single lines.

At 11 a.m., just when Gen. Wood moved out of the line, when VanCleve's two brigades were crowding on Wood's division moving to our left, and when Sheridan's two brigades started at double-quick from our extreme right to go to our extreme left, Longstreet moved his divisions to attack. Stewart moved forward his brigades. For several hundred yards both lines pressed on under the most terrible fire; when, taken in front and in flank by Reynolds' brigades and by Brannan, the right of Brown's fell back in confusion; his left continuing to advance with the other two brigades, after passing the cornfield by Poe's house, they were met by such musketry and canister from our front that they broke and after sustaining severe losses, fell back to their former position. After this attack, Stewart's division did not participate in any action until evening; it had enough.

The enemy's main column of attack—that next to Stewart—Hood's column, struck our line at the time when almost every brigade composing it was on the move. Moving toward our left, Wood's division had not time to get beyond the opening, when the fiery wedge of the two rebel divisions was driven into it. Buell's brigade of Wood's division had not time to clear the gap and, being struck in flank, broke in confusion, and Brannan's right was forced to bend to the rear. Davis' rear brigade moved to the front, trying to close the gap, but had not time, as both his brigades were taken in flank and assailed in front by the enemy and routed. Laiboldt's brigade of Sheridan's division, from a column of regiments in which it stood, formed to the front, but the enemy's attack was so precipitous, and Davis' men were rushing through its ranks with such force that Laiboldt's brigade also broke without firing a shot.

A battery of artillery was stampeded and ran over Sam. Beatty's brigade, which was deployed and was lying close to

Brannan's line, and broke it; quite a number of men being injured by horses and gun-carriages. Brannan's front was forced back, his right brigade—Connell's—being most pressed by the enemy, broke with considerable disorder, and later the most of it rallied. For some time this division held the enemy in check; but on seeing the confusion in the rear, the line broken, and the enemy moving to his right and gaining the valley, Brannan, taking up all sorts of stragglers, swung his right back and, moving about half a mile to the rear, took position on a ridge. When Brannan was obliged to fall back he carried with his line more than one-half of Reynolds' second brigade under Col. King, that stood on his left.

When this main attacking-column of the enemy pierced our lines, its front division, under Gen. B. R. Johnson, continued to press our retreating crowds right to the west, while Hood, with three brigades of his own division, on reaching open fields, wheeled to the right and pursued our broken commands to the northwest. At this juncture, Hood was severely wounded and at the same time Gen. Kershaw of McLaw's division, with his own and Humphrey's brigades, joined Hood. Being rank-ing officer in these two divisions, Gen. Kershaw assumed the command of all five brigades of Longstreet's corps.

While this was going on at the left of and opposite the break in our lines, Sheridan's two brigades that started toward our extreme left and Wilder's command were attacked by the rebel division of Gen. Hindman, with Deas' and Manigault's brigades in front and Anderson's in the second line. Gen. Sheridan formed his brigades of Lytle and Bradley, the last commanded by Col. Walworth, to the front under a heavy fire of the advancing enemy, and after a stubborn resistance, the rebels drove our brigades nearly to the Cove road,* a distance of about 300 yards. At this point our men again rallied and charging the enemy, drove Manigault's brigade back with terrible slaughter, capturing the colors of the Twenty-fourth Alabama and a number of prisoners. Then Anderson's brigade pushed in front of Manigault's and with Deas' brigade drove our brigades again back to the Cove road. During this engagement, Gen. Lytle and many other officers were killed.

* In his report of September 30, 1863, Gen. Sheridan calls it, by mistake, the Lafayette road.

Retreating west to the spurs of Missionary Ridge, Sheridan again formed his brigades, but the enemy had abandoned pursuit Manigault, taken in flank by Wilder's men and pressed in front by Sheridan's, was driven back, sent for reënforcements, and when Trigg's brigade of Preston's division joined him, the Union troops had retired. In this advance of the enemy, Gen Hindman reports as captured,* seventeen cannon (excluding the ten guns found abandoned in a gorge in front of his position west of the Crawfish-Spring road), 1100 prisoners, including three colonels, five or six standards, several caissons, some mules and horses, and nine ordnance-wagons with 165,000 rounds of ammunition.

In his report of September 30, 1863, Gen. Sheridan gives the total strength of his division on the morning of September 19, as about 4000 bayonets, and says further of the struggle on the 20th: "The division gave up its ground after a sanguinary contest, with a loss of ninety-six of its gallant officers and 1421 of its brave men."

Thus the enemy's main column of attack, consisting of two divisions, and favored by the movement of our four brigades and the gap produced in our line by the withdrawal of Wood's division, broke our lines in the centre, separating two of our divisions, Davis' and Sheridan's, from the balance of the army and broke and crowded three and a-half of our other divisions, Brannan's, VanCleve's, Wood's, and a part of one brigade of Reynolds, to the left and rear of the break.

B. R. Johnson, advancing through the woods west of the Chattanooga road, emerged upon the fields around Dyer's house. His left, consisting of Johnson's brigade, was passing on both sides of that house, Gregg's brigade on the right and McNair's bearing still more to the right but somewhat in the rear. Several batteries that were moved in this direction by Gen. Negley and supported by Sirwell's brigade of his division, as also some batteries that belonged to Crittenden's corps, were placed on the elevations opposite the front and both flanks of the enemy's division, now advancing across the fields. In advancing, the enemy suffered severely from the fire of our artillery, and on their approach most of our batteries were

* Report of Maj.-Gen. T. C. Hindman, C.S., Atlanta, Ga., October 25, 1863.

withdrawn, but Gregg's brigade of the enemy captured nine pieces in the northwest corner of the field stretching north from Dyer's house.

In this advance, the rebel Gen. McNair was wounded, when Col. Colman of the Thirty-ninth North-Carolina took command of his brigade. This brigade fell back for want of ammunition and support and formed afterward on the left of Robertson's brigade of Hood's division. Johnson now moved across the field and occupied a ridge running nearly north and south, from the crest of which the ground slopes abruptly into a corn-field and cove lying south of Vidito's house. West of this cove is a range of Missionary Ridge, while north of it, a spur of that ridge spreads out to the east. Along the base of the above-mentioned range passes Crawfish-Spring road through a gorge, and leads over Missionary Ridge to McFarland's Gap and through it to Rossville. Along this road a line of telegraph wires extended from Chattanooga to the headquarters of Gen. Rosecrans, and at the gorge a train of our wagons filled the road, while a number of caissons and a battery of artillery for defence of the train occupied the ground near Vidito's house.

This position was occupied by the enemy without much resistance on our side, although a line of breastworks of rails had been built on the crest, and a large number of our knapsacks, piled up here, were captured. It was noon. The enemy's skirmishers were thrown forward and Everett's battery opened fire on our train. The consternation and stampede of our teamsters had no bounds. The enemy's skirmishers were advancing, firing; the horses were unhitched and ran off, and three cannon and thirty wagons of ammunition were left in the hands of the enemy.

While the right wing, and a portion of the left wing, of our army were crumbling under a pressure of the enemy's columns; while hundreds of killed and thousands of wounded Union soldiers were marking our former line, and were lying scattered through the woods and open fields in its rear; while our cannon, ammunition trains, and ambulances of half an army were falling into the hands of the enemy; while our prisoners in droves were hurried through the rebel lines; while the enemy was

shouting with joy at the victory in easy reach; while skulkers and cowards from our own troops were hurrying back toward the mountains and Chattanooga; and while Sheridan and Davis were cut off and separated from the bulk of the army; the bravest and steadiest men of the commands, broken on the left of that fatal gap, pursued by the enemy's bullets and shells, in a silent, hurried, but steady stream, augmented on its way by stragglers of various commands, moved to the northwest, led by Gen. Brannan, and increasing more and more in numbers as they neared a rough, steep, and narrow ridge, running almost at right angles with our original position, occupied the middle part of that ridge, where they made a stand and were bound to fight to the last.

That place was a wooded and irregular spur of Missionary Ridge, whose commencement was north of Vidito's farm, and south of which—and opposite thereto across the cove—was another but much lower spur, whereon the rebel Gen. B. R. Johnson took position with his division. Our ridge, running nearly east and west, had the contour of a flattened crescent, with its concavity turned to the south or toward the enemy. It was about three-quarters of a mile long, its general elevation being from 100 to 150 feet, but its greatest acclivities were at the east and west ends. The southern slope of the ridge was in some places of easy ascent, the ground being of a species of terraced formation; but in other places was quite rough and difficult. At the west end particularly, where it descends toward the cove in small foot-hills and gulches, or short ravines, the ascent was much more difficult.

The top of this ridge, which consisted of a few points and recesses, was in places very narrow, and from its shape was admirably adapted for defence. The troops could mount on the elevations, fire at the enemy, and, falling back a few steps, were perfectly protected from the enemy's fire by a natural breastwork, while they reloaded. And the case was similar with the artillery; after being loaded, the piece was run forward by hand a few steps, fired, and its recoil would send it back far enough for the artillerists to reload it in complete safety. The rebels called this ridge Horseshoe Ridge.

The enemy by his very success had become disorganized and

scattered, and it took over an hour's time for him to form a line and approach our position on the ridge. During this time, the number of our troops was constantly increasing and rough barricades were put up along the top of the ridge.

Gen. Wood, after leaving that famous gap in the line and losing a good part of Buell's brigade, which had not time to clear the gap before the enemy's attack, was riding at the head of the column—which consisted of Barnes' brigade of Van Cleve's division—when he met Gen. Thomas, whom he informed that he was ordered to support Reynolds. Thomas said Reynolds was not in need of support, but that Baird should be supported, and directed Wood to take his division to the extreme left, taking the responsibility of changing the order on himself. Thereupon a staff-officer conducted Barnes and his command to Gen. Baird. Meantime, Wood returning to his other brigades, saw the whole valley inundated by the rebels, and at once surmised that the flood must have come through the gate he had himself opened in the line. The disaster caused him to forget to lead his other brigades to the extreme left, and he commenced to look around for expedient methods to resist the flood. He then discovered that he had but one brigade, Harker's, and that Buell's brigade was gone. So he directed his course toward the ridge where Brannan was, and seeing the enemy advancing through the field north of Dyer's house, the north end of which reaches the east end of Horseshoe Ridge, Gen. Wood formed Harker's brigade along the north fence of that field nearest to the ridge and opened fire on the enemy's force, which halted.

But, as he says in his report,* he and most of his command were under an optical delusion whereby they mistook the rebels for our own men for some time, until the advancing force commenced firing, when the charm vanished; then, threatened on its right by the enemy, the brigade fell back and occupied the eastern end of Horseshoe Ridge.

* Report of Brig.-Gen. T. J. Wood, September 29, 1863.

CHAPTER X.

BETWEEN THE ACTS.

LET us now see what forces were gathered on Horseshoe Ridge for the coming struggle, the parallel of which scarcely exists in the annals of history.

When Gen. Brannan moved toward the ridge, he had the Fourth and Tenth Kentucky and the Fourteenth Ohio of Croxton's brigade, and although the Seventy-fourth and Tenth Indiana had separated from that brigade during the enemy's attack and joined Reynolds,* yet there is no reasonable doubt but that many of their men, in straggling squads, went with Brannan. Beside that, the Sixty-eighth and One-hundred-and-first Indiana of King's brigade, Reynolds' division, and stragglers of the Seventy-fifth Indiana and One-hundred-and-fifth Ohio of the same brigade, also went to the ridge with Brannan.† After the rout when Col. King joined Gen. Turchin, the former's brigade was very small, comprising but a few hundred men. On the morning of the 19th, Croxton had 2279 men; the losses on both days were 926 men, thus it may reasonably be estimated that in all the above-noted regiments there were about 1400 muskets.

Again, Col. Connell in his report of September 26, 1863, says that on the road to Rossville, Lieut.-Col. Lister of the Thirty-first Ohio, Maj. Butterfield of the Seventeenth Ohio, and Adjt. Hunter of the Eighty-second Indiana, collected in all about 350 stragglers of his brigade; but as he had, on the morning of the 19th, 1338 officers and men, and during the two days lost 441 officers and men, it may be safely assumed that on the afternoon of the 20th there were on the ridge about 600 muskets of his brigade. Lieut.-Col. Ward of the Seventeenth Ohio, and Col. Hunter of the Eighty-second Indiana, were with these men on the ridge.

* Report of Col. C. W. Chapman, September 27, 1863.

† Gen. Brannan in his report says that Gen. Thomas had sent him the Sixty-eighth and One-hundred-and-first Indiana regiments, but this is a mistake, as they joined Brannan of their own accord.

There was also Vanderveer's brigade of Brannan's division in its full organization on the ridge. Col. Vanderveer, after driving Govan's brigade of the enemy away from the extreme left of the army and resting in the woods for some time, learned that his division, with Gen. Brannan, was fighting on Horseshoe Ridge. He moved cautiously through the woods and joined Brannan at about 2.30 p.m., just in the nick of time to relieve our line of exhausted men, immediately after the first assault that the enemy made on that position. In his report he gives the aggregate strength of his brigade on the morning of the 19th as 1783, and his losses during the two days 802. Then it may be assumed that he had over 1000 officers and men on the ridge.

Col. Buell of Wood's division, with the Fifty-eighth Indiana under Lieut.-Col. Embree and with a number of stragglers from other regiments of his brigade, also formed with Brannan's command. If their strength be placed at 700 men then, the number of troops under Brannan's immediate command on the ridge, including the Twenty-first Ohio of Negley's division, amounted to about 4000 men.

Col. Stanley, of Negley's division, after his first successful engagement against Adams' brigade of the enemy on the extreme left, having been again attacked by the enemy just before Col. Vanderveer engaged them, had his brigade somewhat scattered. But when the action ceased, he reformed his brigade and being at that time nearer to Horseshoe Ridge than to Baird's left, which was reënforced by Barnes' brigade sent there by Gen. Wood, joined the forces on the ridge with his three regiments, the Nineteenth Illinois, the Eighteenth Ohio, and the Eleventh Michigan, taking position on the left of Brannan, between him and Wood, where there were two sections of Battery I, Fourth U.-S. Artillery. Although this brigade was light, yet it may safely be estimated at 600 strong.

Gen. Wood's forces comprised Harker's brigade of his own division, consisting of the Third Kentucky and the Sixty-fourth, Sixty-fifth, and One-hundred-and-twenty-fifth Ohio, also a portion of VanCleve's division, consisting of a part of the Ninth Kentucky under Col. Cram, and the whole of the Seventeenth Kentucky under Col. Stout, both of Sam. Beatty's

brigade, with a number of stragglers from other regiments of that brigade; also the Forty-fourth Indiana of Dick's brigade, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Aldrich, the total number amounting to something over 2000.

Thus the whole force on the ridge amounted to about 6500 officers and men.

When Gen. Thomas, through Capt. Gaw, ordered Gen. Negley to put his artillery in position beyond his extreme left, there apparently was a misunderstanding on the side of Negley or a want of explicitness, while giving the order, on the part of Gaw, because in his report of September 26, 1863, Negley says that he was with Stanley's brigade, which met a heavy force of the enemy on our extreme left, and that, while there, he "received orders through Capt. Gaw, to mass all the artillery at hand on a high ridge *facing the south.*" The order was to mass the artillery on a ridge facing the east, beyond our left. So there certainly was an error somewhere. But beside that, as we mentioned before, this order was given too late. The enemy, under Breckinridge, was attacking the rear of our left; most of Negley's artillery was behind, while Sirwell's brigade was also on the move to the left.

Nevertheless, Gen. Negley, as he says in his report, posted Bridges' battery of his own, and Battery I, Fourth U.-S. Artillery, of Brannan's division, then in hand, in position on a ridge facing eastward, which opened on the enemy, "causing him to fall back, thus temporarily relieving the left wing." This ridge was the east end of Horseshoe Ridge, the configuration of which was such that it admitted the use of artillery from it eastward, and also, by changing front, southward.

Finding the ground here unfavorable for posting much of the artillery, Negley went back toward the center of our line, in the rear of which his other two batteries of Schultz and Marshall had been left, and posted them in position on a ridge southeast of Vidito's farm, some distance back and west of the line, where they were joined by Bridges' battery and Sirwell's brigade of Negley, the last acting as support to the artillery; while Lieut. Frank G. Smith, with his Battery I, Fourth U.-S. Artillery, consisting of four guns, supported by some stragglers from the left wing, remained on Horseshoe Ridge the rest of the day,

occupying the highest ground near its east end, and largely contributing to the successive repulse of the enemy's assaults on that position. The rebel commanders, in their reports, call the eminence on which Battery I was placed Battery Hill. Stanley's brigade of Negley's division, under Col. Stoughton, Col. Stanley having been disabled by slight contusion, supported this battery during the whole afternoon.

Soon after came the crash on our centre and right, the lines were broken, and B. R. Johnson's rebel division was pushing west toward the position where stood Negley's batteries and their support. Col. Sirwell in his report of September 27, 1863, says: "Whilst in this position, which was a good one, with open fields in front, my men rapidly threw up fine breastworks of logs and rails; but we had no chance to try their defensive qualities, for the sharp, quick firing of skirmishers in our rear made us face about and hasten up the hill immediately behind us." Now this last hill evidently was north of Vidito's farm, beyond the cove, and on the extreme right of Brannan's position on Horseshoe Ridge. Because "here," Sirwell says, "I was solicited by Gen. Brannan to leave a regiment to support one of his batteries. I detached the Twenty-first Ohio for that purpose." In another place, Col. Sirwell mentions that this regiment was at the time 500 strong. And here probably was held a conference between Gens. Negley and Brannan, the result of which Brannan in his report thus states: "Gen. Negley, who had a portion of his command intact, having pledged himself to hold my right and rear." Further in his report, Brannan also says: "Gen. Negley, so far from holding my right, as he had promised, retired with extraordinary deliberation to Rossville at an early period of the day, taking with him a portion of my division (as will be seen by the report of Col. Connell, commanding First brigade), and leaving me open to attack from the right," etc. But this imputation, founded on the report of Col. Connell, which in turn was apparently founded on hearsay and not on positive orders, is hardly proper to consider.

On the other hand, Negley says that at 2 p.m. he found out that our right and centre had given way; that he applied to Gen. Rosecrans for a brigade, but he could give him no help;

that then Brannan applied to him for support, and he ordered the Twenty-first Ohio to his assistance; that he rode forward to the crest of the ridge, over which troops were retiring, to get a position for his artillery, but was met by a strong column of the enemy, who pressed forward between him and the troops to his left, leaving him *but one regiment, the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, and a part of another*, with the artillery in his charge, its ammunition nearly exhausted, and the ammunition-train away. Then information reached him that the enemy's cavalry was moving from the right to his rear, and a column of infantry on his front and left. Finally he says: "Finding it impossible to organize any of the passing troops, and unable to communicate with Gen. Thomas, and being informed by a staff-officer that Gens. Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden had left the field, *I deemed it vitally important to secure the safety of the artillery*, which appeared to be threatened with immediate capture by a large force of the enemy, who was pressing forward on my front and right." And so he withdrew to McFarland's Gap, two and three-quarter miles from the right of Brannan's position.

It appears that Gen. Negley was mistaken in regard to there being only one regiment left him. Col. Sirwell, in command of the brigade, reports that after he detached the Twenty-first Ohio to support a battery belonging to Brannan, "taking the Seventy-fourth Ohio to another point to protect another battery, when I returned I could not find my other two regiments [meaning the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania and Thirty-seventh Indiana] where I had left them, but soon ascertained that by order of Gen. Negley they had been taken to the Rossville road to take up a new line and gather up all the stragglers. The battery the Seventy-fourth was supporting having left, the regiment was brought back and joined to the others on the Rossville road." But Negley was correct in saying that the enemy was advancing toward him, because B. R. Johnson, the commander of a rebel division which occupied Negley's previous position, in his report acknowledges that he found there a line of breastworks, and that at a few minutes of 2 p.m. he commenced movements for the assault on the right of Brannan's position.

But, reasoning upon the whole thing, the conclusion becomes unavoidable that Gen. Negley labored under difficulties, knowing the need of saving not only his own but as much as possible of other artillery whose commanders applied to him for protection; that being certain of the rout of our right, and learning that the commander of the army and two commanders of army corps had left the field, and deeming it, as he says, *vitally important to save the artillery*, which he thought, as the enemy advanced, was threatened with immediate capture, considered it prudent to withdraw to McFarland's Gap.

Negley was too far from the centre of Horseshoe Ridge to know what was going on there, and could not judge of the general position. What he saw around himself was nothing but rout and disorder. He did not know but what our left wing was also routed, and perhaps at that time was retreating to Rossville by the main road. Had he been ordered by Gen. Thomas to support Brannan, he certainly would have remained on the ridge to the last as the other troops did; but to decide for himself under such distressing circumstances to stay on the ridge, which, as far as he could see, was unoccupied, when there were eight batteries of artillery on his hands to take care of, was more than could have been reasonably asked of him.

All this digression is made for the reason that Gen. Negley, at the time, was blamed for his conduct. Remembering what blunders and omissions have been made by some regular-army officers, it seems as if Gen. Negley, who was only a volunteer officer, by saving eight batteries of artillery, at the time when fifty guns had been lost in the rout, and gathering and organizing several thousands of stragglers at McFarland's Gap, who were all in the ranks again the next day, ought rather to have been praised than blamed for what he had done during the Chickamauga battle.*

Not alone Gen. Negley, but even Gen. Rosecrans was not sure, when he saw the demoralization of the right and centre, that the left could possibly avoid being enveloped therewith also. When the rebel assault was made, Gen. Rosecrans was

* Complaints and accusations against Gen. Negley may be found in the reports of Gen. John Beatty, who commanded a brigade in Negley's division, and Gens. J. M. Brannan and T. J. Wood, commanding divisions.

standing behind Davis' troops, and immediately started toward Sheridan to direct his movements, but he was too late, and was carried west by the tide of our fugitives. He attempted to get to the left, where Thomas was, as he says in his report, "by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our line, but found the routed troops far toward the left, and hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, *I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground*, and started for Rossville. On consultation and further reflection, I determined to send Gen. Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga," etc.

It is to be regretted that Gen. Rosecrans could not remain at Rossville or, what would have been still more desirable, at McFarland's Gap, and have despatched some one else, to Chattanooga to carry out the needful orders. By remaining at McFarland's Gap he could easily communicate with Thomas, as there were several roads leading from the gap to our position, and he could also have directed many troops, that were collected and organized there, to his support.

According to Gen. Rosecrans' statement, he, on consultation with Gen. Garfield, desired him to go to Chattanooga and attend to all measures necessary to resistance in case the army should be forced to retreat there, enumerating those measures; but Garfield said that he felt he would not be able to carry those measures out; whereupon Rosecrans ordered Garfield to Rossville, and endeavor to communicate with Gen. Thomas, while he himself went to Chattanooga.

Negley says in his report that when he passed McFarland's Gap he there found Col. Parkhurst with the Ninth Michigan—the provost-guard of Gen. Thomas—who was collecting and organizing the stragglers; that Parkhurst said that Gen. Crittenden ordered him, with all the troops, to fall back to Chattanooga; that he (Negley) opposed it, and said that all the troops ought to be organized and sent to the front; that there were quite a number of general staff-officers who helped Negley; that the gap was cleared of the artillery and transportation, and that the scattered troops were formed in battalions; that he then learned that Gen. Sheridan was coming up with 1500 men; and that he suggested to Sheridan the expediency of going to the support of Gen. Thomas, and also said that he

(Negley) would join him with all the troops he had collected; that he rode forward to try and communicate with Gen. Thomas, but found the enemy's cavalry in possession of the road; that when he returned he held a consultation with Gens. Davis and Sheridan, and Col. Arthur C. Ducat, inspector-general of the army. He further says: "It was determined as advisable to proceed to Rossville, to prevent the enemy from obtaining possession of the cross-roads, and from there Gen. Sheridan would move to the support of Gen. Thomas *via* Lafayette road." Gen. Davis in his report says that his command was joined by several detached battalions and commands, making in all a force of between 2500 and 3000 men.

Then at McFarland's Gap, about the hour of 3 p.m., were gathered 1500 men with Sheridan; not less than 2500 with Davis; Negley's three regiments of Sirwell's brigade, and the whole of Beatty's brigade, which had reached there or Rossville after the engagement on the extreme left, making at least 2200 men; Parkhurst's Ninth Michigan, probably 500 men; Col. Connell's 350 men, and the stragglers collected by Gen. Negley of other commands, of the number of whom we have no reliable information, but supposing them to have been only 1000 men, then the whole amount of troops there made an organized force of 8000 men, with any quantity of artillery.

And there that number of troops stood idle, with their commanders coolly deliberating what was best to be done, while within three miles of them on Horseshoe Ridge, was a body of Union soldiers less numerous than they, who were engaged in a death-struggle with one-half of the rebel army. There might have been some palliation for this indecision to move to the front, if there had been no possibility of reaching our field of battle, but there were three or four plain roads, by which afterward the whole army, in the dark night, retired to Rossville—and the distance separating the idlers and the fighters was but three miles. And there was where Gen. Rosecrans' presence would have been of incalculable advantage to his struggling army.

Remembering the activity and energy of Gen. Sheridan in the battle of Missionary Ridge, and his display of these qualities subsequently in the Army of the Potomac, it is surprising

why, as the senior officer, he did not assume the command of those troops and have handled them as he was eminently able to do. By taking the Crawfish-Spring road, he could have reached Vidito's house, and there have fallen upon the left flank of Longstreet's troops when they were out of breath from their exertions, and have then knocked the last of the Southern dash out of them.

But no! the whole crowd moved toward Rossville. Lieut.-Col. Thurston, Gen. McCook's assistant adjutant-general, after communicating with Gen. Thomas, caught up with the retiring column and said that Thomas would like to have Gens. Davis and Sheridan move up and support Brannan's right. Davis faced his column about and moved through McFarland's Gap, but Sheridan said he preferred to go by the Lafayette road, while Negley stopped at Rossville; but neither Davis nor Sheridan could reach the field of battle early enough to participate in the fight, and returned to Rossville with the other troops.

But there was one wonderful peregrination made by a brigade of VanCleve's division during and after the rout, which is deserving of especial mention. It was performed by Col. Dick's brigade, and he says in his report* that he was on the left of Sam Beatty's brigade when his own and that of Beatty moved close to Brannan's lines just before the rout occurred; that he then received orders to move, on double-quick, by the left flank to the support of *some* artillery, *said to be* in position in the woods; that he thus moved for 500 or 600 yards and *seeing no artillery*, but seeing Col. Vanderveer's brigade, he formed in the rear of it. Then he saw Col. Stanley's brigade on the left of Vanderveer hard pressed, and he went to its support. Col. Stanley mentions in his report that there were three regiments that were *going* to support him, but when he fell back the support was gone. The probability is that it was Dick's brigade.

Stanley talks about that support somewhat disparagingly, but perhaps he was in a hurry himself and did not see the support, because Col. Dick positively says that Stanley's line gave way and retreated in disorder over his command lying on

* Report of Col. Geo. F. Dick, September 28, 1863.

the ground; that his line was somewhat confused, but recovering, it gave the enemy a galling fire for more than fifteen minutes. He was then overwhelmed by a greater force of the enemy, and fell back in disorder, and that Capt. Gunsenhauser of the Forty-fourth Indiana was killed; he then reports that there the rebel Brig.-Gen. Adams of Texas was wounded and captured.

Then he again rallied a portion of his command 500 yards to the rear, while Lieut.-Col. Aldrich of the Forty-fourth Indiana, rallied the remainder in another part of the field and went to support Gen. Wood. Then he remained with what he had of his men in support of a battery on some hill for an hour; then marched to the left to reform, but this did not take long, and then went to support Brannan. He then states that he held the enemy in check until they had succeeded in planting a battery, still farther to his right on a ridge, commanding his position and enfilading his line; then the enemy threw a fresh line of infantry upon his exposed flank, which compelled him to again fall back. Then he saw the greater part of the army falling back and he himself fell back through the woods, gathering stragglers. Having gone nearly a mile, he struck the Chattanooga road, where his command was again attacked by the enemy's cavalry. Still he continued to march on that road another mile, and, halting in a large field, collected nearly 600 men of the division; met Lieut.-Col. Loder of Gen. Crittenden's staff, who directed him to march to Chattanooga; but on nearing Rossville, he learned that Gen. VanCleve had established his headquarters there, so he reported to him and went into camp.

This report shows that Dick's brigade was not in the rout, and that Col. Dick performed many feats during the afternoon of the 20th with which the world would be unacquainted were it not for his individual report, as none of those who could testify to these various deeds mentions anything about him. Lieut.-Col. Aldrich under Gen. Wood, was doing well, and received especial mention; but, of Col. Dick's engagements, no mention is made by either Cols. Stanley or Vanderveer, nor by Gens. Baird or Brannan. It is a sad report of how it is possible for a whole brigade to straggle around, waste its strength, and accomplish nothing.

Gen. John Beatty, after losing his brigade on the extreme left, which fact he ascribes to the orders given by Maj. Lowrie, A.A.G. of Negley's division to his scattered regiments without his knowledge, joined Stanley's command and remained with it during the whole afternoon on Horseshoe Ridge. His energetic activity and bravery animated and encouraged the defenders of that position, and thereby he alone compensated considerably for the absence of his brigade. Col. M. B. Walker of the Thirty-first Ohio, being under arrest, had no command, acted on the staff of Gen. Brannan, according to his report, and did good service by rallying and encouraging the men.

But how many officers and squads of men there were whose presence and brilliant fighting have not been acknowledged by any of the reports, who certainly contributed greatly to the general success, is not now and never will be known. One reason for such species of fighting lies in the character and independent spirit of an American volunteer, preferring rather to fight single-handed and on his own account, than to be merely a cipher among the thousands. This spontaneous rally on Horseshoe Ridge was an opportunity for just such independent spirits to join the crowd and to fight in their own way and not under subordination and strict orders. And they fought splendidly. This occasion was only one out of many others that happened during our war, and these for a thinking man, have a great significance. They effectually demonstrate that the discipline and management of an American volunteer must be radically different from the strict, narrow, iron-clad martinetism of European armies, which would turn sensible men into unreasoning automatons; and also that those who take the discipline of the European soldiery for the model to be imitated in our volunteer army, can never be either successful or popular commanders.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ASSAULTS ON HORSESHOE RIDGE. STEEDMAN'S ADVANCE.

AFTER our line was broken and the enemy's force pushed west beyond Dyer's house and to the cove at Vidito's farm, on the Crawfish-Spring-and-Rossville road, Gen. Hood wheeled partially to the right and pursued our broken troops in a northwesterly direction. Law's and Robertson's brigades were in the line, and Benning's in the rear of Law's. Crossing the field, north of Dyer's house, they met considerable resistance from our men, supported by a battery; but Benning's brigade coming into line, the enemy drove our force from the position and captured the battery. At this encounter Gen. Hood was severely wounded, a minie-ball breaking his thigh, the command devolving on Gen. Kershaw.

After a little while our men charged the rebels, trying to reoccupy the position and retake the battery, when Kershaw coming with two brigades of McLaw's division, his own consisting of six regiments of South-Carolina troops, and Humphrey's brigade of four regiments of Mississippi troops, our men withdrew still farther. This encounter was with our column under Brannan, consisting of his brigade and straggling commands of Reynolds, Wood, and Sam Beatty, which, after reaching Horseshoe Ridge, occupied the middle part of it.

Hood's brigades falling back, Kershaw changed front to the right and advanced north across the field, at the other end of which, as we before described, was Gen. Wood with Harker's brigade; Humphrey's brigade was ordered to come up on the right of Kershaw's. Kershaw attacked Wood, and sending the Second South-Corolina, his left regiment, around our right, compelled our force to retire and occupy the east end of the ridge; but the enemy was obliged to halt under a heavy fire from our artillery, already stationed on the ridge. Humphrey's brigade joined Kershaw's on the right; and Col. Oates with the Fifteenth Alabama of Law's brigade, joined Kershaw's of

his own volition, acting without orders. There Gen. Kershaw was preparing to make an assault.

Gen. B. R. Johnson with his division on the extreme left of the enemy's lines, was also preparing to assault our position. Trying to get reënforcements, Gen. Johnson rode about half a mile toward the right and rear and was informed that Kershaw was preparing to attack; and while trying to find his brigade, McNair's, which was left behind for want of ammunition, met Gens. Hindman and Anderson. Explaining to them what he wanted, he was promised by Hindman, whose division was now disengaged, that Deas' brigade would be ordered to his support on the left, while Anderson with his brigade would fill the gap between his division and that of Kershaw. Returning to his position, Johnson ordered three pieces of Dent's battery of Hindman's division, that he put on a knoll in Vidito's field, to fire in the rear of the eminence 600 yards to the right, on which Kershaw was advancing.

Having been in this position over an hour, Johnson resolved to press forward before the promised support reached him, and commenced to form his line in continuation of the north end of the field, Gregg's being on the right and Johnson's on the left, extending through this cornfield south of Vidito's house and to the Crawfish-Spring road. Receiving information that the Union forces occupied the ridge beyond Vidito's field, and west of the Crawfish-Spring road, he ordered skirmishers to be thrown from the left brigade in that direction to protect his left flank. The advance commenced about the time Deas' brigade formed, facing west, on the ridge just left by Johnson's brigades. Gen. Deas was directed to move straight to his front until his right reached the position of Johnson's left, then wheel to the right, sweeping the ridge west of the road, and come up and form on the left of Johnson's line.

But before Gen. Johnson moved forward, Gen. Kershaw made the assault, his own brigade being on the left and Humphrey's on the right. Humphrey advanced and engaged Wood's command, while the left of Kershaw's, consisting of the Second and Third South-Carolina and James' battalion, being posted opposite the section of our artillery, dashed at Stanley's brigade, and, after a most determined struggle, in some places

gained the crest of the hill within a few yards of our lines. But the enemy was baffled in his efforts; those of his troops who reached the crest were driven down the hill or killed, and the whole of Kershaw's force was repulsed with slaughter and followed some distance down the slope. Gen. Humphrey reported that he could not advance on account of his right flank being exposed, and he was ordered not to advance but to make dispositions to secure the right flank of Kershaw's forces.

Soon after the repulse of Kershaw, the rebel Gen. B. R. Johnson with his two brigades advanced, his left passing over our wagons, caissons, and some cannon, captured before by the enemy, and the line reached the brow of the secondary spurs or foot-hills, north of Vidito's house. Four of Dent's and three of Everett's guns were placed in position on the spur occupied by Johnson's brigade and two of Dent's upon the hill with Gregg's. The artillery opened, and at 2 p.m. the line again advanced toward the crest of the ridge under a very severe fire from our men. The left of the enemy found a position where they could hold our troops in check; part of our force advanced on that flank of the enemy along a secondary spur which united at the elevation, at the west end of the main ridge, with that upon which the left of Johnson was fighting, but was held in check by the oblique fire of the enemy.

Gregg's brigade gained the crest of the ridge after a sharp contest, driving our defenders down the northern slope by their volume of firing; but our men rallied and, charging in return on the scattering rebels who had no support on the right, drove them from the crest down the slope by which they ascended. There Lieut.-Col. Tillman of the Forty-first Tennessee regiment of Gregg's brigade was severely wounded. When Gregg's brigade fell back, Johnson's, under our flank-fire, was also obliged to fall back.

Anderson's brigade of Hindman's division, before Johnson moved to the assault, filled up the space between his right and Kershaw's forces. When Johnson moved in assault, Gen. Anderson also moved, and soon was covered with a shower of bullets from the ridge. The rebel brigade pressed on and a portion of two of his regiments gained the crest of the ridge and planted

colors there, "but," he says* in his report, "the position was a hot one;" his troops were impetuously driven down the hill, but rallied and after sustaining firing for some time, finally fell back to the position previously occupied.

Thus the triumphant ardor of the rebels in breaking our lines, chasing our routed troops, capturing men, cannon, and trains, was very much cooled down by these assaults, in which they sustained fearful losses. In place of walking over our—as it seemed to them—beaten and demoralized fugitives, they met at Horseshoe Ridge a wall of adamant, on which stood men whose courage and determination bordered on the sublime, and whose patriotism spurned death itself.

Bushrod R. Johnson, although commander only of a brigade and now in command of a temporary division, was one of the best, if not the best, general in Bragg's army. He saw that our line was weak on our right, and now commenced making preparations to turn it. Hindman, receiving a slight contusion in the neck from a piece of shell, placed Johnson in command of the left wing, consisting of his own and Johnson's divisions. Manigault's brigade of Hindman's division came up and advanced through Vidito's corn-field, and Deas swept the ridge west of the road. Both formed on the left and in continuation of Johnson's line. McNair's brigade joined Johnson and formed in the rear of Johnson's brigade. The line of the brigades, commencing from the left, was: Deas', Manigault's, Johnson's, Gregg's, and Anderson's, with McNair's behind Johnson's. Deas' occupied the brow of the steep spur which forms the north side of the gorge through which the Crawfish-Spring road passes Missionary Ridge; Manigault's stretched across the ravine, between the two western spurs of Horseshoe Ridge, and extended up the side of this adjacent spur to the right, on which Johnson's and McNair's, with seven pieces of artillery, were posted; Gregg's was formed on a spur of some greater length, extending more toward the east and separated in part from the main ridge by a hollow with a piece of table-land at its head to the west; Anderson's formed in two lines on the right, the front line extending up the slope of the spur on which Gregg's was formed on the left, and across the hollow

* Report of Brig.-Gen. Patton Anderson, C.S., October 6, 1863.

on the right. The section of Dent's battery was moved to the hollow on the right, ready to be run up by hand on the main ridge as soon as it should be carried. Kershaw was on the right but not connected with this line.

Thus the enemy was preparing a skilful movement of two divisions, by which he expected to turn the right of our force on Horseshoe Ridge and, with the front attack of Kershaw's division, sweep it from the ridge.

Our three brigades of the reserve corps, under Gen. Granger, were posted on the Chattanooga-and-Ringgold road—Dan. McCook's, at McAffee church; and Whittaker's and Mitchell's, under Gen. Steedman, at the Red-House bridge. Alarmed by the fierceness of the conflict on the battle-field, at 11.30 a.m., Granger ordered Gen. Steedman to move with his brigades to the battle-field and report to Gen. Thomas. Steedman moved at once and, after marching five miles with the enemy's cavalry hanging on his left flank and shelling his troops for two miles of the distance, reached the ridge and reported to Gen. Thomas at 1.30 p.m. He first received orders to form on the left of Wood's division and was getting into position, when Thomas, probably learning of the enemy's preparations to assault Brannan's right, directed Gen. Granger, who had reported to him, to send Steedman to support Brannan's right, and to put Dan. McCook's brigade, with a battery of artillery, on the heights west of McDannel's.

The enemy's left, consisting of B. R. Johnson's division and two brigades of Hindman's, was instructed to attack, moving in a sort of a wheel to the right, the right of Johnson's being a pivot, while Anderson's, Kershaw's, and Humphrey's brigades should attack to the front. The enemy's batteries opened a rapid fire on the crest of the ridge, and, the infantry advancing, a fearful roll of musketry broke out on both sides along the whole of our position. Deas' and Manigault's brigades were reaching the heights and assailing the right of Brannan, while Johnson's, Gregg's, and McNair's supported those brigades on the right and pressed on, climbing to the crest; Anderson and Kershaw were dashing at the hill directly in their front.

The smoke was so dense that only the rows of flashes from

their guns marked the situation of the contending lines, but they showed that the enemy was gaining ground, and it looked as though our heroes were going to be swept from the ridge.

But Steedman's batteries were in position, his brigades were ready; Whittaker's brigade—supported on the left by the Eighty-ninth Ohio of Turchin's, and the Twenty-second Michigan of Dooolittle's brigade, both temporarily attached—impetuously charged Deas' and Manigault's brigades; Mitchell's brigade, coming up on Whittaker's left, joined in the charge. Whittaker was knocked off his horse and stunned, and Steedman's horse was killed under him. Bruised and hatless, Steedman, seeing one of his regiments wavering, seized its flag and placing himself at the head of the regiment, led it into the fight. The whole of our line, shouting vehemently, rushed upon the enemy. The shock was irresistible, and the rebel wave stopped, vacillated, and then rolled back down the steep slope which they had so valiantly and successfully climbed but half an hour before.

The rebels were driven back to their guns on their left; Anderson's disordered brigade was pursued by our men down the slope of the ridge, when Kershaw's men rushed to its rescue; Anderson's men promptly rallied and opened fire, and our line commenced to fall back, when the South Carolinians of Kershaw dashed after them. The Second South-Carolina regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Gaillard, gained the crest, but was soon obliged to retire with the others.

Such was the rebel attack upon our extreme right. It lasted but half an hour, but in the intensity and ferocity of the struggle, and the wonderful bravery of our soldiers, it could not have been surpassed. All three of Hindman's brigades sustained such losses in their repulse and were so seriously demoralized that they were not used again that day.*

Gen. Granger, in his report of September 30, 1863, speaking of the attack of Steedman's brigades, says: "the slaughter of both friend and foe was frightful. Gen. Whittaker, while rushing forward at the head of his brigade, was knocked off his horse by a musket-ball, and was for a short time rendered unfit for duty, while two of his staff-officers were killed and two mortally wounded. Gen. Steedman's horse was killed

* Report of Brig.-Gen. B. R. Johnson, C.S., October 24, 1863.

and he was severely bruised, yet he was able to remain on duty during the day. This attack was made by our troops, very few of whom had ever been in an action before, against a division of old soldiers who largely outnumbered them. Yet with resolution and energy they drove the enemy from this position, occupied it themselves, and afterward held the ground they had gained with such terrible losses. The victory was dearly won, but to this army it was a priceless one."

Rebel Gen. B. R. Johnson, speaking in his report of this repulse on their left, says: "The retreat on this hill was precipitate, and called for all the exertions I could command to prevent many of the troops from abandoning it. The officers, however, joined with every energy and zeal in the effort to stay the retreat, and by appeals, commands, and *physical efforts*, all save a few, who persisted in skulking behind trees or lying idly on the ground, were brought up to our lines in support of the artillery. In the meantime, our batteries were promptly opened and gallantly served amid a shower of the enemy's bullets, and, together with the best and the bravest of our infantry, who promptly rallied on our artillery, poured such a volume of fire upon the advancing foe that his onward progress was effectually stayed."

This candid account of one of our ablest enemies, unmistakably demonstrates what an irresistable attack Steedman's two full brigades and one demi-brigade made on the five brigades of the enemy's turning troops. Deas' and Manigault's brigades, which were on the extreme left of the enemy's line, were completely broken, and retired to the rear, remaining there till the end of the day. Johnson says that about 5 p.m., he sent his acting *aide-de-camp*, Lieut. Geo. Marchbanks, to request Brig.-Gens. Deas and Manigault to bring up their brigades to his support, but "Deas replied that on consultation with Brig.-Gen. Manigault, they had decided that it would not be safe to put their commands in the same position without the support of fresh troops." This shows how badly the enemy was beaten and demoralized in that assault, and that a few thousands of fresh troops on our side, thrown at this time against his left would have driven him away from the ridge.

And now when this last carefully-prepared and spiritedly-

executed assault proved futile, showing that our position on Horseshoe Ridge was virtually impregnable, Gen. Longstreet decided to still continue the assaults and maintain the disgraceful slaughter of his brave men for no valuable object whatever. If he had possessed the discriminating eye of a talented general, he could have long since discovered the weak place in our formation, which, had it been attacked, by the combined assault of his own and Gen. Polk's forces would have inflicted more harm on our army than all the assaults on Horseshoe Ridge after 3 p.m., could have possibly accomplished.

When our centre was broken and Brannan had to fall back, carrying with him most of the second brigade under Col. King of Reynolds' division, the balance of that brigade also fell back some distance to the rear, but was reformed with some stragglers from Croxton's by Gen. Reynolds, who was with that brigade during the enemy's attack on our centre.

Our left wing, that had remained intact after the enemy's attack upon and during the breaking of our centre and right, consisted of Baird's, Johnson's, and Palmer's divisions, and Turchin's brigade of Reynolds' division. Gen. Turchin with his brigade thus stood on the extreme right of our present left wing, with his right flank in air. The fighting on his right was going farther and farther to the right and rear, therefore it became necessary for him to change his front to the right rear and face south, which was done. Gen. Reynolds, joining him with what there remained of the second brigade—perhaps several hundred men—formed this detachment as support to the right and rear of Turchin's brigade in echelon. Reynolds' present force stood east of the Chattanooga road, and between his right and the eastern hill of Horseshoe Ridge, on which Wood's forces were, was an interval of not less than half a mile, wholly unoccupied by any of our troops.

The front of our army, after the rout, was composed of two lines, one running east and west, passing along Horseshoe Ridge, across this half-mile interval, and along Reynolds' present front to its left; and the other, an almost north-and-south line, commencing at Reynolds' left or Palmer's right, and continuing along the front of Palmer's, Johnson's, and

Baird's divisions. These two lines intersected each other at almost a right angle, probably at an angle of about 115°, the north-and-south line bending to the west near its north end, where stood Baird's division.

Now, there stood two lines of our army formed at almost a right angle to each other, both strongly protected by barricades, one wholly impregnable, the other nearly so, separated from each other by a half-a-mile-long interval entirely unoccupied. Where was, then, the weakest place in our position? A blind, but thoroughly-posted, soldier would have known where it was, but the rebel chieftain did not. This hole Gen. Thomas was thinking of patching with Steedman's division, but Steedman was needed on the extreme right, so the interval remained open all the time, inviting the enemy to wedge in and tear our army asunder. What is still more curious, that opposite to, and fronting this interval, the greater part of Stewart's division stood, and behind it, the whole of Preston's division—the strongest division in Bragg's whole army. They stood there until 3.30 p.m., doing absolutely nothing; Stewart's, because it was worsted in the forenoon attack; and Preston's, because Longstreet had till now kept it in the reserve.

Gen. Longstreet in his report, says: "It was evident that with this position [meaning the position on Horseshoe Ridge] gained, I should be master of the field. I therefore ordered Gen. Buckner to move Preston forward." It is evident that he considered that the key to our whole position was on that ridge; but the *tactical key* of the position changes its place during a long-continued battle with the changes made in the line of battle. Except that, the key of a position is a single point by gaining which a great advantage is gained. Half of the front of an army can not be considered as the key of the position. If the taking of the position on the ridge would have given Longstreet the mastership of the field, so likewise the taking of the barricades of our left wing by Polk would have given him the mastership of that field.

But as both fronts were virtually impregnable, the key to the mastership of the field ought to have been looked for somewhere else, and it was right there in the open half-mile

space between the wings. This was the key to our last position, the key to our final destruction. If Longstreet, instead of ordering Preston to attack Horseshoe Ridge, had supported him by Stewart and, say, by Cheatham who until that time had not been used during the day, and wedged those three divisions into this space between our two wings, while the other rebel troops took the offensive at the same time all along the lines, it is frightful to contemplate what would have become of our decimated army. Fortunately for us such a move by the enemy was not undertaken.

Thus it was decided by Longstreet to lead a new victim in the shape of Preston's division to be slaughtered at Horseshoe Ridge, to get the mastership of our field, and the slaughter of the innocents commenced. We say "of the innocents" advisedly, as it was the first time that that fine division was to participate in a great battle.*

At 3.30 p.m., Gen. Preston received orders to move to Dyers' field to support Kershaw, and leaving Trigg's brigade with Gen. Buckner in his former position, he moved with two other brigades, Gracie's, consisting of five regiments, (one was left on the Chickamauga with the trains), and Kelly's, of four regiments, and formed them in the rear of Kershaw's forces—Gracie on the right, Kelly on the left—thus facing Battery Hill with our forces to the right and left of it on Horseshoe Ridge.

And then, soon after 4 p.m., the fiercest and the bloodiest assault commenced, in which Gracie, supported by half of the forces of Kershaw on the right, Kelly with part of Anderson's in the centre, and the whole of Johnson's division on the left of the line participated. Gracie moved through Kershaw's ranks toward the ridge over a hollow, and was met by a fearful volume of artillery and musketry fire from our men; but the rebels advanced without firing a shot until they reached a sort of a narrow terrace, when they opened fire, still advancing, and almost reaching the summit. So did Kelly's brigade, which approached close to our lines. With a distance in some places of not over thirty or forty steps, the unsheltered rebel line stood opposite our protected line, delivering a rapid fire and answered by our volleys for over an hour.

* Report of Brig.-Gen. W. Preston, C.-S. Army, October 31, 1863.

Only new troops could accomplish such a wonderful feat. Lieut.-Col. Fulkerson, commanding the Sixty-third Tennessee; Lieut.-Col. Jolly, commanding the Forty-third Alabama; Lieut.-Col. Holt, commanding the First-Alabama battalion, and Lieut.-Col. Hall of the Second-Alabama battalion, all of Gracie's brigade, were severely wounded, and many brave officers and men fell. The brigade carried into action 2003 officers and men, and in the space of an hour lost 698, killed and wounded. So it was in Kelly's brigade; out of 852, the loss in killed and wounded was 303. Of Kershaw's command, the Second, Eighth, and Fifteenth South-Carolina participated with Gracie's brigade, while the Seventh Mississippi of Anderson's brigade, supported Kelly. The loss in Kershaw's brigade was 504.

While this was going on the right of the rebel line, the brigades of Johnson's division on the left, advanced several times, and were in turn forced to yield a portion of the ground gained, and, although finally ordered by the division-commander to advance as far as possible, then hold their position and never retreat, yet it is presumed they never carried out that order, as his lines never reached the summit of the ridge until our troops left it.

But, notwithstanding such an unparalled assault, our heroes on the ridge stood firm. Their firing was cool and deliberate, almost automatic; only occasionally when a daring color-bearer of the enemy reached our breastworks and planted the rebel stars-and-bars on it, there would be an excitement and a rush to cut it down, which always succeeded, sometimes the bearer of the flag himself being struck down. Sometimes to save his flag he would throw it flying down the hill before escaping himself. Rebel Gen. Preston in his report mentions that the Second-Alabama battalion of Gracie's brigade in the assault, out of 239 men, lost 169 killed and wounded, and that its colors were pierced by bullets in eighty-three places, and were "presented to his Excellency the President, who promoted the brave standard-bearer, Robert W. Hirth, for conspicuous courage."

It was not so much the rebel attacks as the lack of ammunition that troubled our heroes on the ridge. During the

rout and disorder, all of the ammunition-train that was not captured moved away, and our fighters on the ridge had to empty the cartridge-boxes of their dead and wounded comrades. Steedman brought some extra ammunition with his brigades, which was distributed to Brannan's troops and others, but it gave only about ten cartridges apiece, which were soon consumed, and then the men fixed bayonets, and were preparing to use them in repelling the assaults.

During this time and while the fighting at the ridge was at its highest pitch, it was decided by the division-commanders of our left to send a brigade to the ridge. It appeared that Hazen's men had nearly forty rounds of ammunition per man, and his brigade was designated for the purpose. Gen. Hazen moved at double-quick to the scene of action, and rushed into the fight at once at the east end of the ridge, sending the Ninth-Indiana regiment to Brannan. Between 4 and 5 p.m., the ammunition-train of Gen. Thomas being brought to the lines, the commanders were notified to distribute the ammunition. About the same time, or a little earlier, Gen. Garfield succeeded in reaching Gen. Thomas, and became a witness of the fight during the severest assaults of the enemy on Horseshoe Ridge. Gen. Thomas also received an order from Gen. Rosecrans to assume command of all the troops, to withdraw to Rossville, and occupy a position at that place.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SECOND ASSAULT ON OUR LEFT. TURCHIN'S CHARGE TO THE REAR. CAPTURE OF THREE REGIMENTS.

BUT while all this conflict and destruction was being carried on in the front of and upon Horseshoe Ridge, Gen. Bragg ordered an assault to be made upon the troops of our left wing, who had been quietly lying behind their barricades during the greater part of the afternoon; and while Thomas was sending orders to various commanders, preparing them for withdrawal, commencing with the troops of Gen. Reynolds, Bragg was completing the arrangements for his right to make another assault upon our left wing.

In his report of December 28, 1863, Gen. Bragg says: "About 2 p.m., passing along the line to our left, I found we had been checked in our progress by encountering a strong position, strengthened by works, and obstinately defended. *Unable* to afford assistance from any other part of the field, *written orders* were immediately despatched to Lieut.-Gen. Polk to again assault the enemy in his front with his whole force, and to persist until he should dislodge him from his position. Directing the operations on our left to be continued, I moved again to the right and soon despatched a staff-officer to Gen. Polk, urging a prompt and vigorous execution of my written orders."

Bragg was evidently a great stickler for red-tape business, and his orders for important movements were always given in black and white so as to place him in the right beyond any controversy when his orders were not strictly obeyed by his subordinate commanders. But in almost every instance during this campaign he was disappointed, because the combinations he was making refused to assume the practical shape in the way he had conceived them. Was it his own fault or the fault of his subordinates? It looks as if there were something wanting on both sides. He had not that capacity of a mathematician, so necessary for the commander-in-chief, which

calculates everything to a nicety, in order to put the troops into action during a certain time and at a certain place, the various distances to be made by various columns, the number of roads, their direction and condition for the passage of artillery and trains, the various eventualities to be encountered while moving, and a great many other details, all of which determine the promptness and punctuality of several columns in concentrating. In his failures to destroy our army corps when widely separated after crossing the mountains, he clearly showed that he was lacking in that needful capacity for concentrating his troops.

On the other hand, it is also clear that he was unpopular among his subordinates of the highest rank; that they even doubted his capacity for commanding an army. And without unbounded confidence in the ability of the commander-in-chief, perfect harmony of the operations of the parts of an army is impossible, and no army regulations can remedy it. Having issued his written orders to Polk soon after 2 p.m., Bragg was later obliged to send one of his staff-officers to urge Gen. Polk to prompt, vigorous, and immediate action; and still he could not have those troops of his right wing ready for action until 5 p.m., when we were all ready to withdraw.

Gen. Hill was forming the rebel troops for the assault. Breckinridge was again designated at his own request to pass through Walker's troops to the front and attack our extreme left; while Cleburne, supported by Jackson's and Maney's brigades of Cheatham's division, who filled the space between Breckinridge and Cleburne, were to attack in front. Stewart was to participate in the attack on the left of Cleburne, while Liddell's division of two brigades of Walker's corps was to move beyond the extreme left of our line, take possession of the Chattanooga road, and, forming across it, be ready to coöperate with the front attack by cutting off the retreat of our troops when driven from the works, or to attack them in the rear. Gist's division, posted on the left of Liddell's, was ordered to coöperate with the last, in its attack.

In his report of October 10, 1863, Gen. Liddell says: "About 6 p.m.,* Lieut.-Gen. Hill ordered me to move straight forward

* Probably 5 p.m.

and occupy the Chattanooga road. I requested Gen. Hill to support me on the left, as I was satisfied from personal observation during Col. Govan's attack [meaning before noon] that I would be enfiladed. This he said he would give me, and I moved off at once. The line had passed some little distance beyond the Chattanooga road, meeting with little or no resistance to that point, when, as expected, it was enfiladed by batteries on both flanks, while a battery in front played upon it across a waste field. I immediately placed seven pieces of artillery on a high point on the right of Walthall's brigade, which held the right wing [meaning of his division] to engage the enemy's batteries and draw the fire, if possible, from the infantry. My line was parallel with the enemy's works [meaning, probably, works of our extreme left], and in his rear, upon his left flank, nearly half a mile. Here I had halted and ordered the men to lie down, no enemy just then appearing in front. There was a wide open field in front and on my left."

When Walthall's and Govan's brigades of Liddell's division assumed this position across the Chattanooga road, numbers of their skirmishers filled up the woods south of McDannel's fields on the west side of the road between Kelley's and Snodgrass' fields. At the northwest corner of Kelley's field Willich's brigade of Johnson's division was lying, and his battery opened fire on Liddell's front. Dan. McCook's brigade of the reserve corps, with a battery was posted on the heights west of McDannel's fields, and that battery engaged Swett's battery, commanded by Lieut. Shannon, of Liddell's division. Probably from this battery of Liddell's, Reynolds' troops, facing south, were receiving occasional cannon-shots from the rear just before leaving their position.

At 5.30 p.m., Gen. Reynolds was notified, through Capt. Barker of Thomas' staff, to commence the withdrawal. Gen. Turchin moved his brigade in two lines by the right flank to the rear along the Chattanooga road, Col. Robinson, now commanding the detachment of King's brigade, (Col. E. A. King having been killed during the afternoon by a stray bullet), moving in the rear. Gen. Thomas, leaving his position in the rear of Gen. Wood on the ridge to meet Reynolds and point out to him the position where he wished him to form his

command to cover the retreat of the other troops of our left, was passing through open woods bordering on the Chattanooga road toward Reynolds' former position, when he was informed by some of our soldiers who had been hunting for water, that there was a large rebel force in those woods drawn up in line and advancing toward him. Of course Thomas did not know what force it was, and what was behind it. These were the skirmishers of Liddell's division of the enemy, which formed across the Chattanooga road beyond our extreme left, preparing to move to the rear of our line, and were supported by a battery.

Reynolds was told what was in the woods and was ordered to form Turchin's brigade at right angles to the road, which was done, and the lines stood again in their previous formation facing south. Gen. Thomas was standing on the left with Gen. Garfield and the staff, and Gen. Turchin, not clearly understanding what was wanted, approached Thomas and asked him where the enemy was, when he was answered, "Right there in the woods." Having no time to reform or countermarch,* Turchin faced his brigade about, which was in two lines, and marching by the rear rank, met the enemy in the woods. Some shots were exchanged and then the brigade impetuously charged upon the enemy, drove the skirmishers out of the woods, and, undaunted by the volley received from the enemy, took in flank the left rebel brigade of Govan, struck at the centre of Walthall's brigade, and drove them away beyond our left and to the right of the Chattanooga road, cleanly clearing the rear of our lines from the enemy, and capturing nearly 300 prisoners and two pieces of artillery of the battery that was in the position on the right of the rebel division and could not escape with all its guns from our rapid advance.

Gen. Liddell, continuing his report, says: "The enemy soon after this, apparently left his works and pressed upon the rear of my left flank, while his batteries enfiladed me. Soon

* The detailed accounts given here and in Chapter VI. of the engagements, in which Turchin's brigade participated, were of a matter that occurred under Gen. Turchin's individual observation and with his participation. In other parts of his narrative he has collated the facts from official letters, recitals, and reports.—PUBLISHERS.

afterward, a cloud of skirmishers [taking our brigade, which, from the rapid motion, assumed an irregular formation, for a cloud of skirmishers] suddenly appeared from the woods, encircling my front and right wing. From this combination of attacks my command *was forced to withdraw to avoid being captured.* A part of my skirmishers were, nevertheless, captured, together with Col. [Junius I.] Scales, Thirtieth Mississippi regiment, Wathall's brigade."

Lieut. Shannon, commanding Liddell's battery, in his report* says: "The infantry thus compelled to give way, I was ordered to retire with the battery, which was done as expeditiously as possible; but on reaching the foot of the hill east of McDannel's house, a line of Union skirmishers being within thirty yards of us, killed one off-wheel horse in the leading gun, thereby causing the piece to upset and breaking the pole. The rest of the battery passed the disabled piece before the enemy had time to reload. They, however, closed upon the disabled gun, quickly capturing Lieut. [W. P.] McDonald and several wounded men." But there apparently was another piece, "one lost by Capt. [W. H.] Fowler near the same spot."

In contrast, with the candid statement of the rebel Gen. Liddell of our attack on his division and his retreat, may be placed the reticence of his brigade commanders, Gen. Walthall and Col. Govan, as to our infantry having driven them from their position, and attributing to our artillery the main cause of their withdrawal. Farther, Gen. Stovall, commanding a brigade in Breckinridge's division, in his report of October 3, 1863, says: "About that hour [4 p.m.] I was ordered to move my brigade to the extreme right of the line; again formed nearly parallel to the Chattanooga road. This latter movement was ordered that we might form the part of a support to the brigades of Brig.-Gens. Liddell and Walthall. *They were soon driven in,* but were immediately reformed," etc.

Gen. Thomas, in his report, says about this attack: "This movement was made with the utmost promptitude, and facing to the right, whilst on the march, Turchin threw his brigade

* Report of H. Shannon, first lieutenant, commanding Swett's battery, October 5, 1863.

upon the rebel force, routing them and driving them in utter confusion entirely beyond Baird's left. In this splendid advance more than 200 prisoners were captured and sent to the rear." This praise is very good, but if Gen. Thomas knew at the time he wrote this report, the size of the enemy's force thus driven away, which was about double ours, and knew with what intent that force was advancing, he would, no doubt, have given still more praise to the brave men of Turchin's brigade.

That force was supported by Gist's division and had the intention of taking our divisions in flank and rear at the time when they were to be attacked by the whole line of the rebel right in front, and as the time of the withdrawal of our three left divisions from the breastworks exactly coincided with the time of the beginning of the enemy's assault, the falling on their flank of Liddell's and Gist's divisions at the time they were withdrawing, would have caused a fearful loss. After this clearing of the rear by Turchin's brigade, when Palmer first, then Johnson, and finally Baird were withdrawing their divisions, there was now no enemy on their flank or rear to interfere with them; still they sustained some losses, being greatly pressed in front at the time, particularly Baird's division, which suffered most, as there were rebel troops attacking it in front and partly in flank; but should the enemy's front attack have been combined with an attack of Liddell's and Gist's on their flank and rear after they left the intrenchments, Baird's division being the last to retreat, would probably have been annihilated.

Gen. Reynolds, in his report of September 23, 1863, says: "*The division* was faced about and a charge ordered and executed *in two lines* at double-quick through the rebel lines, dispersing them and capturing more than two hundred prisoners, under a fire of infantry in front and artillery in flank." This statement of the division-commander is *incorrect.* If a detachment of a few hundred men, among whom were stragglers of other commands, can be called a brigade, then Gen. Reynolds in the charge had a division of two brigades; and if not, then there was only one brigade and a small detachment of another. He says that the charge was "executed in two

lines;" when Turchin's brigade alone had two lines. Where then was that detachment which Reynolds persists in calling a brigade? Gen. Thomas plainly answers this question in his report, and says: "Col. Robinson, commanding the second brigade, Reynolds' division, followed closely upon Turchin, and I posted him [Robinson] on the road leading through the ridge to hold the ground, whilst the troops on our right and left passed by."

It is clear, then, that Reynolds' so-called second brigade of his division not only was not in the charge, but was taken by Thomas away in another direction at the beginning of the movement and never saw the enemy attacked by Turchin's brigade. This is not said in disparagement of the men who belonged to the second brigade of Reynolds, and who had as much hard fighting as the rest, but it is said to show that some of our division-commanders did not state the truth in their reports, and acted with marked unfairness to those parts of their commands whose services were more distinguished than those of some others. In fact, Reynolds not only did not see that the detachment of his second brigade was not in the charge, but he, riding behind the extreme right of the line of Turchin's brigade, did not look anywhere, and did not even see what Turchin's brigade was doing.

During the advance, there were a few of our men in charge of a crowd of rebel prisoners, who were sheltered behind a small log-shanty from the fire of the rebel battery that was playing on our right as we advanced, and not knowing which way to take those prisoners, Gen. Turchin stopped for a moment to direct them, when a solid shot from that rebel battery struck his horse square on the flank; and before he could disengage himself from the fallen animal, the brigade had rapidly advanced and, no staff-officer being near, Turchin was obliged to run behind the brigade through a stubble-field, endeavoring by motioning with his arms to direct the officers of his command to turn to the left, and thus to again join our troops posted on the ridge. Some of the officers understood what was required, and the brigade in sections was turned to the left toward the ridge, except that part—of perhaps 150 men—which was on the extreme right of the brigade, and where the division-commander was. A man of the Ninty-second Ohio brought a capt-

ured artillery-horse with saddle on to Turchin, who then joined his brigade, and formed it on the left of Dan. McCook's brigade on the ridge, ready for action. Reynolds, at this time, did not know what became of Turchin or of his brigade.

Looking neither to the sides nor the rear, Gen. Reynolds passed a clump of timber, skirting the left side of the Chattanooga road, and there saw a body of rebels in front and a larger one on the flank. It was Forrest's dismounted cavalry. Reynolds now found that he was in a tight place and that the balance of the brigade had disappeared. He even imagined that the troops on the ridge were not ours, but rebel. The command halted, and the division-commander was discussing the chances of escape and the possibility of a surrender while our troops on the ridge were in view. Finally, the coming of some of our soldiers from McCook's brigade, loaded with canteens, to find water, broke the spell and showed the way for the detachment to reach the balance of the brigade on the ridge.

Speaking of this incident, Reynolds says in his report: "I understand that this movement was *intended to open the way to Rossville for the army, and did not then know of any other road to that point.* I therefore *pressed* right on, expecting *the whole division to do the same,* until the rebel lines and batteries were cleared and *the road opened,* and found myself with only about 150 of the third brigade, under Col. Lane, Eleventh Ohio, near the field-hospital of the Fourteenth corps. The remainder of the *division* proceeded to the high grounds on the left by order of Gen. Thomas," etc.

A major-general declaring that he did not know that there were any other roads leading from our position to Rossville, except the Lafayette-and-Chattanooga road, while fighting two days in a position which covered those *other roads* to Rossville and Chattanooga, shows one of two things: either that he was grossly ignorant of military matters, or that he was inexcusably indifferent to what surely interested not only the major-generals but also every intelligent private in the army, namely, how our army could reach Chattanooga. Was it possible for our army to retreat by the main Chattanooga road when it was on its flank and in possession of the enemy, as Reynolds himself

at last found out? He continually refers to his division and the order of Gen. Thomas, when his second brigade and Gen. Thomas were a mile away. It is a remarkable report.

After the divisions of our left wing were withdrawn, the troops were also taken away from Horseshoe Ridge, the whole army falling back to Rossville. It is impossible to remove an army from its position in the presence of the enemy without sustaining some losses. In this case, it was especially impracticable, as the enemy was still continuing his assaults on our right upon the ridge, and had just commenced his last assault on our left, it still being daylight, when we were withdrawing. Our right withdrew when it was dark, but on the left it was done at sunset. Baird's division was the last to withdraw, and while crossing Kelley's field many men were struck down or captured, particularly from the brigade of regulars. Willich with his brigade was acting as rear-guard for the left wing.

A capture was made on our right worthy of being recorded. The Twenty-first Ohio of Negley's division was entrusted to Brannan and posted on his right. When Steedman came with his two brigades, the Eighty-ninth Ohio and the Twenty-second Michigan—temporarily brigaded and commanded by Col. Le-Favor of the latter—went into action and occupied the position on the left of Steedman, thus joining the Twenty-first Ohio on its right. Steedman was the first to withdraw from the ridge, but for some reason, those three regiments did not accompany him, but remained with Brannan on the right of Vanderveer's brigade. Kelly's rebel brigade that was storming the ridge in front of them was getting out of ammunition, hence Col. Kelly desired to be either relieved or reënforced; and in compliance therewith, Trigg's brigade of three regiments came up, one regiment being sent to Gracie's support on Kelly's right.

Col. Kelly in his report of September 25, 1863, says that after exchanging fire with the enemy for about one and a-half hours, he transferred the Fifty-eighth North-Carolina regiment to his left, and moved forward, swinging the front to the right, when he heard the cry "we surrender." That he stepped up to the front and wanted the Union troops to lay down their arms, but that they fired on him and broke his command, which he rallied, and then met Col. Trigg, and asked him to coöperate

with him in capturing a Union force in his front. Trigg agreed and formed his command on the left of Kelly with intention of swinging the left on the ridge and around to the right. At this time, Gen. Preston sent word to Kelly that he wanted to see him, and when Kelly returned he found that Trigg had captured the Union force, but that Col. H. Hawkins of the Fifth Kentucky of his own brigade, had also captured 249 prisoners, including two colonels, one lieutenant-colonel, and a number of company officers.

Col. Trigg, in his report of September 26, 1863, says: "When near the base of this ridge [meaning Horseshoe Ridge] I learned from Col. Kelly the precise locality of the enemy, and immediately determined, with him, to attempt the capture of that part of his force in my front, my position being particularly favorable for the attainment of this end. I immediately wheeled my brigade to the right, which brought me in rear of the enemy, and moved rapidly up the hill [probably from the other side of the ridge] to within twenty paces of his lines. This movement surprised him and resulted in the capture of the Twenty-second Michigan, the Eighty-ninth Ohio, and part of the Twenty-first Ohio regiments, five stands of colors, and over 1500 small arms of the latest and most approved pattern. Darkness having fallen and the enemy having withdrawn from his position on my left, no further movement was attempted."

Then he further states what men of his command captured the flags of these regiments: Serg. L. E. Timmons, Co. I, Seventh Florida, regimental flag of the Twenty-first Ohio; Private O. F. Honaker, Co. F, Fifty-fourth Virginia, regimental flag of the Twenty-second Michigan; Private Henderson Hylton, Co. A, Fifty-fourth Virginia, regimental flag of the Eighty-ninth Ohio. Beside these, there were captured two state-flags of the Twenty-second Michigan and Twenty-first Ohio.

Col. Vanderveer, in his report of September 25, 1863, says that Steedman was on his right and withdrew early in the evening. That by order of Brannan, he posted the Thirty-fifth Ohio perpendicularly to his front, as it was dark and it was suspected that the troops to his right were gone. That a rebel force appeared in the gloom in front of the Thirty-fifth Ohio

and an officer riding to within a few paces of the line, asked what regiment it was. In reply to "Thirty-fifth Ohio," the officer attempted to escape, when the regiment fired a volley that brought down horse and rider and put the force to flight. This evidently happened after the surrender of those three regiments which stood to the right of Vanderveer, and that the rebel force which approached the Thirty-fifth Ohio was a part of that rebel force that made the capture. Col. Carlton, of the Eighty-ninth Ohio, writes as follows: "We had sent Lieut. Drake, adjutant of the Twenty-second Michigan, to [Gen.] Granger [commanding reserve corps] for ammunition. Granger said he had no ammunition, and to 'tell Carlton and LeFavor they must use the bayonet, and hold their position at all hazards.' This was the last order we received. Drake, on returning to us, was fired on from both sides, that is, the rebels had a cross-fire in our rear; that was half-past four. I mention my name first as it was mentioned first in the message."

It is evident from these facts that the commanders, to whom had been assigned the temporary command of these three regiments, did not take proper means to inform them in time to withdraw. Such neglect ought to have been investigated, its source discovered, and the parties guilty of dereliction of duty held brave and patriotic men for no fault of their own, but because of the inexcusable neglect of others are too damnable facts to be passed over in silence; and an officer to whom, temporarily, are entrusted troops of another command, and who wantonly sacrifices them, while saving his own, is not worthy of the sacred trust put into his hands, and should be considered rather an unworthy wretch than a dignified member of a great army.

This episode was the most shameful that happened during the battle of Chickamauga, and only merits record that future generations may read the disgraceful occurrence and hold in abhorrence such acts of criminal neglect.

to a rigid accountability. There was no occasion whatever for the sacrifice of those fine regiments. They could have withdrawn just as easily as did Steedman's or Brannan's troops. The horrors of the southern prison-pens, in which men of the Eighty-ninth Ohio and others suffered, and the foul treatment by the barbarous keepers of those horrible dens of inhumanity and shame, which killed or ruined for life so many of those

Read between lines 22 and 23, page 155.

CHAPTER XIII.

WAS IT A REBEL VICTORY OR DEFEAT? OUR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND HIS LIEUTENANT. THE SOLDIER.

THE continuation of the enemy's assaults on our position on Horseshoe Ridge and the coincidence of time between the last assault made toward evening by the rebel lines on our left and our voluntary and deliberate withdrawal—first from our position on the left and then from the ridge—made the rebel troops believe they had at last driven us from our position by force of arms and by their reckless assaults. The triumphant shouts and yells of the enemy's pressing lines in taking possession of our works, against which they were hammering in vain during the day, extended far into the night; but their pursuit followed but a few hundred yards beyond our lines. The fronts of our wings being drawn up at a right angle to each other, the wings of the enemy's troops soon commenced to cross each other's advance. This dangerous interference, which threatened to produce frightful collisions in the darkness, prevented the enemy from pursuit.

It is laughable to read, in various reports of the rebel commanders, their exultations over having driven us from the field. Apparently, the idea that we might voluntarily leave the field of battle, never crossed their minds. Cleburne claims that Polk's brigade of his division took possession of the northwest angle of the works on our left; Breckenridge claims that, this time, he did not fail to take the extreme left wing of our works; Longstreet says that "by a flank movement and another advance the heights were gained." So at last he was the master of the coveted field, only with that difference that now there was no enemy on the field. Even Forrest claims:* "terminating on the right flank the battle of Chickamauga." But all those exultations over driving the foe from the field were only the product of Southern imagination.

On our side, we simply withdrew about four miles toward

* Report of Brig.-Gen. N. B. Forrest, C.-S. Army, October 22, 1863.

Chattanooga to gather our stragglers and to assume a new position. But, as we before remarked, the position at Rossville is faulty. We occupied on September 21, with Gen. Thomas' corps, Rossville Gap and the heights adjoining it. Gen. Crittenden's corps was placed on Missionary Ridge north of the gap, and Gen. McCook's corps across the valley of Chattanooga. Gen. Thomas saw at once that the position was liable to be turned, and he so advised Gen. Rosecrans, and during the night the army was withdrawn to Chattanooga, the pickets joining it at daylight. By digging trenches, putting up batteries, and rearranging some of the rebel forts, our position in a few days was rendered unassailable.

Thus terminated the most arduous, the most complicated, and the bloodiest campaign in the West for the possession of Chattanooga, which a little over a year before, after the enemy was driven from Corinth, could have been occupied at but trifling cost.

The rebels harped and are still harping on the Chickamauga battle as a great victory. Gen. Bragg, in his order of the day of September 22, 1863, says: "It has pleased Almighty God to award the valor and endurance of our troops by giving to our arms a *complete victory* over the enemy's *superior numbers*." In his address to the Army of the Tennessee, the president of the Confederacy says: "Soldiers: a grateful country has recognized your arduous service and rejoiced over your *glorious victory on the field of Chickamauga*." Gen. Longstreet in his letter to rebel Secretary-of-War J. A. Seddon, September 26, 1863, calls it "*the most complete victory of the war*, except perhaps the first Manassas." [Bull Run.]

Now the question is: What is a complete victory? All military men agree on the definition of the expression "a complete victory," in that it is a victory which terminates war, or gives such preponderance in advantages to terminate war that the final success is undoubted; or that the victory terminates a campaign, or at least attains an important advantage for future operations. If the battle is fought and one side voluntarily withdraws, without being vigorously pursued, leaving the field of battle in the hands of the enemy, it is a *drawn battle*. If the battle is fought, resulting in slight preponderance

of captures, but without attaining any important object, it is a *negative victory*. To which of the above categories, then, belongs the battle of Chickamauga?

The battle of Marengo compelled the Austrians to conclude peace and give up Upper Italy. The battles of Jena and Auerstädt led to the conquest of Prussia. The battle of Sadowa crippled the Austrian army so as to compel Franz Joseph to beg for peace. The battle of Sedan led to the capture of one-third of the French army, and to the isolation of the other army at Metz, which led to its surrender. To what did the pretended *complete victory* at Chickamauga lead? To absolutely nothing advantageous to the enemy, except increasing the number of his guns, wagons, and ambulances, when he had not animals enough to draw his own.

The object of the battle was to destroy our army and take possession of Chattanooga. Was it accomplished? Our loss in men in round numbers was 16,000; the enemy's was 18,000; but out of 16,000 we lost 5000 in prisoners, while he lost only 1500 in prisoners. Then his number in killed and wounded exceeded ours by 5500, and as the number of infantry in the battle was nearly equal on both sides, which side, then, suffered most? Of course, the rebels. Our loss in guns and wagons had no tendency to cripple us, but the frightful loss of life in the army of the enemy was telling. Our object in the campaign was to take possession of Chattanooga, which was of paramount importance to us as a base for further operations toward the heart of the Confederacy. We attained our object completely. We had Chattanooga in our hands, and the enemy dared not approach our lines. Since its occupancy, immediately after the battle of Chickamauga, it was never afterward surrendered to the enemy. But what important object had been attained by the enemy by that *complete victory* of his? None; on the contrary, the battle of Chickamauga was the ruin of the rebel Army of Tennessee.

On the morning following the battle, Gen. Bragg stopped at the bivouac of Gen. Longstreet and asked him what was best to do next. Longstreet suggested * crossing the river above Chattanooga and making themselves sufficiently felt on

* Report of Lieut.-Gen. Jas. Longstreet, C.-S. Army, October —, 1863.

our rear so as to force our *evacuation of Chattanooga*, and indeed, force us back upon Nashville; but should they find their transportation inadequate for a continuance of such a movement, then to follow up the railroad to Knoxville, destroy Burnside, and from there threaten our railroad communication in the rear of Nashville.

Bragg listened very attentively, nodding his head, and afterward denounced Longstreet as an impracticable dreamer. He gives his answer to the scheme proposed, in his report of December 28, 1863, couched in these terse words: "The suggestion of a movement by our right immediately after the battle, to the north of the Tennessee and thence upon Nashville, requires notice *only because* it will find a place on the files of the Department. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of reënforcements just before the battle without a wagon or an artillery horse, and nearly, if not quite, a third of the artillery horses on the field had been lost. The railroad bridges, too, had been destroyed to a point south of Ringgold, and on all the road from Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmountable difficulties were added the entire absence of means to cross the river, except by fording at a few precarious points, too deep for artillery, and the well-known danger of sudden rises, by which all communication would be cut, a contingency which did actually happen a few days after the *visionary scheme* was proposed.

"But the most serious objection to the proposition was its *entire want of military propriety*. It abandoned to the enemy our entire line of communication, and laid open to him our depots of supplies, while it placed us with a greatly inferior force beyond a difficult, and at times impassable, river, in a country affording no subsistence to men or animals. It also left open to the enemy, at a distance of only ten miles, our battle-field, with thousands of our wounded and his own, and all the trophies and supplies we had won. All this was to be risked for what? To gain the enemy's rear and cut him off from his depot of supplies by the route over the mountains, when the very movement abandoned to his unmolested use the better and more practicable route of half the length, on

the south side of the river. It is hardly necessary to say the proposition *was not even entertained*, whatsoever may have been the inferences drawn from the subsequent movements."

To obtain a *complete victory*, as they thought, and not to know what to do afterward is, of itself, a sufficient proof that the battle, however bloody it might have been, was, after all, nothing but a *drawn battle*, and the victory was a *negative* one.

Thus, having nothing to do, Bragg squatted down with his army on the heights around Chattanooga, and inertly gazed on our men piling up breastworks and digging trenches. He came to the conclusion that if he sent his cavalry to intercept our communications over the mountains and destroyed some wagons and mules that this would starve us out and we would have to abandon Chattanooga. But this scheme did not work. His cavalry did some mischief, but was thoroughly whipped, chased over the mountains and through the whole of Middle Tennessee, and saved themselves by swimming the Tennessee River below Decatur.

While the rebel chiefs were pondering over what it was best to do, and before their commanders' reports of the battle were ready, 20,000 of our troops under Hooker came from the East and placed themselves along the railroad between Murfreesboro and Stevenson, ready to join us at Chattanooga, while Sherman with his corps, was also on his way from Memphis toward Chattanooga.

Pretty soon Longstreet went *to destroy* Burnside, as he thought, but hardly saved himself from destruction, while Bragg, left with 40,000 troops in front of Chattanooga, was swept from the heights of Missionary Ridge on November 25, losing as many prisoners as he took from us in Chickamauga battle, and almost as many guns. We mentioned before that Chickamauga ruined the rebel army of Tennessee, and it is a fact, just as Gettysburg ruined the rebel army of Virginia, as it never could recruit itself afterward. It amounted to only 40,000 under Joe Johnston, while Sherman had at the start of the Atlanta campaign, 95,000 against it, and it dwindled down to 30,000 under Hood, and finally was dispersed to the winds by Thomas at Nashville.

If there was a final victory on the battle-field of Chicka-

mauga, it rested on the standards of our own regiments, rather than on those of the rebels. After getting out of that bag, McLamore's Cove—where we gave the enemy the opportunity to strangle us, and which he tried to do, but did not know enough—we had in the woods, between Missionary Ridge and Chickamauga, plenty of elbow-room, and, in an uncultivated, Indian-fashion sort of battle on September 19, we damaged the enemy more than he hurt us. Then, on Sunday morning until 11 o'clock, we whipped the enemy on the left so badly that he did not touch us there until evening—until, in fact, we commenced to withdraw. Then the luck turned against us, and under most provoking circumstances and through sheer accident, the enemy broke our centre and routed the whole of our right wing and partially demoralized our centre, and for two hours had his own way, capturing several thousand prisoners, half of the artillery of that wing, and a great amount of small arms, wagons, and ambulances. But, under a shower of bullets and grape, the bravest of the routed commands—without organization or distinction between companies and regiments, some under strange commanders whom they never saw before, but who were their comrades in arms, with colors often not their own, but the colors of their common country—instinctively rallied on Horseshoe Ridge, took possession of it, clearly understanding that in holding that ridge they would stay the rebel victory, and by stubborn fighting might turn that victory into defeat and save their army from destruction.

Their bravery and contempt for danger approached the sublime, and their patriotic devotion to the flag determined them to die before giving up the position. Those 6000 men fought for a whole long hour 15,000 rebels, who attempted to scale the ridge and take possession of it. And when 6000 more rebel troops of Hindman's division extended the rebel left and, turning the right of our heroes, threatened at last to sweep them from the ridge, Steedman's division came up and, under fearful musketry that reverberated like thunder in the mountains and continued uninterruptedly for half an hour, the rebel attack was beaten back with such slaughter that Hindman's two brigades were entirely broken and could not be used for the rest of that day.

Then fresh rebel troops were sent in. Preston's division commenced the assault, supported by the rest of the enemy's line, and for an hour and a-half the rebel waves angrily surged against the ridge with unexampled bravery and determination worthy of a better cause; but in vain. And when our braves were out of ammunition they fixed bayonets with a jerk that had a deep significance in it, and many times the most reckless of the enemy, when they succeeded in reaching the barricades, were met by cold steel and clubbed muskets. And that sort of fighting lasted from 2 to 6 o'clock that afternoon. In front of that ridge and on its slopes, during those four long hours, were killed and wounded over 8000 rebels, just half of the entire loss of the enemy's infantry sustained during the two days' battle.

That ridge and the barricades on our left wing never would have been taken by the enemy if we had not voluntarily abandoned them. Many of our soldiers thought at the time, and are still thinking, that if we had stayed behind our works instead of withdrawing, and brought to the front some 10,000 stragglers and several batteries during the night, we would have whipped the rebel army the next day, and that would have perhaps happened.

From the rebel records, now quite complete, there is no doubt that the enemy's army, by its innumerable assaults made on our fortified lines on the second day of the battle, so terribly crippled itself as to be liable to be whipped the next day. On Sunday's afternoon after the rout, we fought the enemy with 20,000 troops, all told, and we could have drawn 15,000 more the next day, among which might have come Post's and Wagner's brigades, that had not participated in the battle.

But however it might have been, the battle of Chickamauga placed the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland, who may be considered as military representatives of our people, in bravery, intelligence, and patriotism, on the pinnacle of military fame and glory. After the rout, Gen. Brannan led the shattered commands to Horseshoe Ridge, placed them there, and then the soldiers took matters into their own hands and performed wonders. The honor of making the initiatory movement toward a stand on the ridge belongs to Brannan. Other com-

mands joined him there, and when the soldiers understood the situation they did not care how many rebels attacked them. With those slight barricades in front, they almost laughed at the foaming rebels trying in vain to take possession of the crest of the ridge; and when a reckless party of the enemy succeeded in making a lodgement on the crest, our men jumped over the barricades and, charging upon the intruders, drove them pell-mell down the ridge.

Constant success makes soldiers over-confident, while a reverse calls upon the latent resources of human character, and an extraordinary struggle under most adverse circumstances steels man's bravery into heroism. Gen. Grant never studied and never understood the battle of Chickamauga; if he had he would not have thought, before the battle of Missionary Ridge, that the Army of the Cumberland was so demoralized by defeat at Chickamauga and lying for so long time in the trenches that it would not fight; and he wanted Sherman to hurry up, so as to show to that army how to fight.

But before Sherman crossed the river, that army took possesion of the advanced rebel position, and stood half-way between their fortifications and the ridge; and when Sherman attacked the north end of the ridge and stuck there, the men of the Army of the Cumberland having a chance at their old rebel acquaintances, swept the ridge of the enemy in half an hour's time. So, the battle of Chickamauga, instead of demoralizing our men, served as a fiery furnace, in which their bravery was steeled and hardened so as to be proof against any danger and undaunted under any reverse, however appalling.

But the creation of such an army, as the Army of the Cumberland showed itself to be in the battle of Chickamauga, and the infusing of such a spirit into its men, as they manifested themselves, under the most trying circumstances, during that campaign and battle, required a commander-in-chief capable of doing so. Gen. Rosecrans, before he assumed the command of that army, was considered one of the most distinguished officers in the West, and came to the army immediately after Gen. Buell's unfortunate campaign, in which all was lost that was gained before through Tennessee and Kentucky. He reorganized the army, increased the cavalry, established depots

of supplies, and in a short time advanced from Nashville, as the base, against the rebel army under Bragg, lying at Murfreesboro.

By his personal bravery, shown during the battle of Stone River, his untiring energy and the success achieved, his kind treatment of soldiers, his splendid equipment, and particular care taken of the army, Rosecrans made himself exceedingly popular among his soldiers, who had unbounded confidence in him. His brilliant campaign of Tullahooma strengthened his hold on the army still more, and when the battle of Chickamauga came, the army was in the best of trim and its mettle unsurpassed. It is an historical fact that what Rosecrans gained he held, and that for which he fought he obtained.

He left to his successor a splendid army, and in a position to strike the Confederacy at its very heart; he achieved all that he undertook, and if he did not achieve more his commander-in-chief, Gen. Halleck, was responsible in refusing to reënforce him and in misleading him in regard to the strength of the enemy's army; he made the most difficult campaign of the late war, through the roughest and most mountainous part of the entire theatre of our operations; he skillfully extricated his army from great danger in the face of a much stronger enemy, and in the battle every blow of the enemy was returned with liberal interest. When at Chattanooga, he would have brought Hooker to his help and reopened the railroad on the south side of the Tennessee River, if he had stayed longer with the army. What was done afterward at Brown's ferry, was but the carrying out of Rosecrans' plan. Whatever failings he had will be forgotten, while the splendid service he performed, the country will gratefully remember and the name of Wm. S. Rosecrans will shine in history.

And Rosecrans had a splendid lieutenant, on whom he could implicitly rely. George H. Thomas was a man and a general; if he had an ambition, it was honorable and legitimate; and he never stooped to cross another man's path for the sake of profiting himself; he was ready to give everybody his due, and retain nothing for himself; he distinguished himself greatly in the battle of Chickamauga, particularly on the second day. During the existence of the Army of the Cum-

berland, Thomas always held the second place in it, before he was elevated to the first; he was the right-hand of Gen. Buell, and also the right-hand of Gen. Rosecrans. As he declined to supersede Buell, so he was determined to decline to supersede Rosecrans; but the latter, when relieved, persuaded Thomas to accept the command of the army.

The soldiers were so accustomed to seeing Rosecrans and Thomas together, and their respect for Thomas was so great, that when they saw Thomas in command and did not see Rosecrans, they were sure everything was going right. So when, on the second day, Rosecrans—being on the extreme right during the rout, and separated from and could not reach our left—finally decided that his presence in Chattanooga was indispensable in case the balance of the army was routed, and that in leaving Thomas with the army, he was sure that if anything could be done to stay the momentum of the rebel army, Thomas would do it.

Thomas managed five divisions in the morning, and also the whole of what remained of the army on the battle-field during the afternoon. He was present everywhere and inspired soldiers with confidence and determination to fight to the last. In the morning he showed himself as having the intuition of a capable and talented general by foreseeing the moves of the enemy and preparing means to defeat them. There was no general reserve to draw upon in cases of emergency, so he used reserves of various divisions, and they were put in place just in time to meet and fight the flanking enemy. And during that afternoon, when the heaviest musketry was rolling uninterruptedly, and the hours of the day appeared, to those who fought, inordinately long, Thomas watched the heroes fighting on the ridge. The soldiers were the rock, and Thomas—representing those soldiers—was properly nicknamed after them, as "the Rock of Chickamauga."

But the greatest hero during those long, anxious hours, and the savior of our army, was the soldier. On that ridge he was the captain, the general, and the grand private; and if at any time a monument should be reared up to the memory of the Army of the Cumberland, the soldier should be the crowning and dominating figure of it. No praise and no laurels can

recompense that self-abnegation, that patient endurance, that daring courage, that contempt of danger, illuminated with high intelligence and combined with the deepest patriotism and devotion to his country which preëminently distinguished our Northern soldier-volunteer.

CHAPTER XIV.

PARTICULAR LESSONS OF THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE AND SOME OF THE GENERAL LESSONS OF THE LATE WAR.

THE campaign and battle of Chickamauga, to a military student, present many valuable lessons to learn, and to a legislator some important suggestions to study.

First. A topographical map is the headlight of an army operating in an enemy's country. With a topographical map, all the routes, places for camps and bivouacs, and even the best positions to occupy, are seen at a glance. The information gathered from citizens or through scouts is also indispensable; but that only furnishes details of the description which a map can not show. With a topographical map, all the movements and concentration of troops can be perfectly planned, and all the distances separating various points can be known almost to a nicety. Without such maps, an army gropes in the dark, and that was the case with us. If it were not for the Union men and the negroes whom we met through the Southern States, we could hardly have advanced.

One of the principal duties of ambassadors at the foreign courts of Europe is to collect topographical maps of the countries to which they are accredited. Moltke whipped Austria and France by the liberal use of thorough topographical maps of those countries. It is as much a weapon for an army as the rifle and the cannon. We neither had topographical maps in the campaign of Chickamauga, nor in any other during our war, nor have we any now. Even in commercial or every-day life, to the navigator, the farmer, the miner, and the tourist the topographical map would give more information in a glance than could be derived by verbal instruction in a month. To spend some of the United-States-treasury surplus on geodetical surveys and in publishing topographical maps, would be of immense benefit to the people of our country, both in peace and in war.

Second. The scattering of various columns of troops at a distance from the enemy is necessary and useful, but to do it

in proximity to the enemy is dangerous. This maxim was plentifully illustrated by our advance over the mountains in widely-separated columns and our liability of being defeated in detail. Had Bragg been more enterprising, more daring, and more steadfast in carrying out his plans he would have had an easy victory, and we should not have taken Chattanooga.

Third. For a daring expedition (*coup de main*), choose rather a reckless and rash commander than one who is methodical and scientific. Hindman was not the man to attack Negley and Baird at Dug Gap, or Thomas at Stevens' Gap; still less was Polk a fit man to quickly and impetuously attack Crittenden.

Fourth. When an important movement is projected, on which the success of the campaign depends, the commander-in-chief, who planned it, must assume the command and carry it out, instead of giving written orders to his subalterns, as Bragg so often did during this campaign.

Fifth. Think twice before you adopt a plan, but when it is adopted, stick to it until it is carried out. Bragg's plan of striking Thomas at Stevens' Gap was a good one, but he only dared to go half-way. So it was with his attempt against Crittenden at Lee-and-Gordon's mill.

Sixth. Night movements are sometimes indispensable; such was our passing the army to the left in the night from September 18 to 19. But night attacks, such as Cleburne's on our left in the evening of the 19th, are to be avoided; they hardly ever attain the desired object, and result in a great deal of noise and very little execution.

Seventh. No army can be complete without the staff-officers being thoroughly educated and specially prepared for this important duty. It is universally acknowledged in Europe that an army without a corps of staff-officers of the highest military education can never be efficient. Some of the difficulties experienced from this deficiency were: that our troops could not find their proper places in the line, and no one was looking up their position; our orders for the day were not properly written; the verbal orders of the commanders were improperly transmitted in many cases, and were sometimes disfigured in transit; an order that was not perfectly clear could not be explained; no one had any special care in the retirement of troops, hence

many captures happened that were needless; our division-commanders had no real assistants; our commander-in-chief was helpless, for Gen. Rosecrans was compelled to go to Chattanooga because Gen. Garfield declared that he was unable to perform what Rosecrans wanted done there, and numberless other matters constantly occurred to make friction and stoppage in the army machinery on the field of battle. This was because our staff-officers were selected at random, and being utterly unprepared for their duties, encumbered rather than facilitated our operations.

But, although we could not have staff-officers possessed of the needful qualifications during our late war, because of the officers having been unexpectedly thrown into the struggle from civil life, should we not learn wisdom from experience and take the measures needful to have them in the future? Our generals may be indifferent to that necessity, even with the added light thrown upon the subject by the European campaigns, wherein the German staff played such an important part; should this be so, our enlightened legislators ought to pay proper heed to this want. It would be a humane as well as a highly-expedient measure to prevent, in future wars, such massacres of our citizen-soldiers as were sometimes occasioned by the incompetence of staff-officers in the wars of former years. In our case, Capt. Kellogg was the initiatory occasion of the rout of the army. McClellan, at the cost of the government, crossed Europe throughout its length and breadth and was even at Sevastopol, to study the organization of armies; yet he did not organize his divisions into army corps until some senators induced President Lincoln to order him to do it.

Almost all our assistant-adjutant-generals were mere clerks, instead of real military helpers to their generals, and because of the incapacity of their staff-officers, our major-generals had to run around like lieutenants to place their divisions in line, or to locate the reserves of their pickets. If any generals at this time should deny the importance of having a corps of highly-educated staff-officers in the army, they ought to be considered old fogies, and their opinion disregarded.

Eighth. A continuous formation of a deployed front in an uninterrupted line that crosses hill and dale, often disregarding the topographical sinuosities or changes of the ground, belongs

to the time of Frederick the Great, was afterward adopted by the British and transferred to America, but since the time of Napoleon, has been abandoned on the European continent. We often too strictly adhered to it. The lines in nature are never geometrically straight, and the sinuosities along the hills and valleys are curved. Add to them groves, fields, buildings, woods, and other objects of defense, and if you adopt your formation for defensive purposes to a so-varying ground, you never will have the line of your formation straight, but broken, consisting in salients, points, and recesses, which, if properly occupied, will make your position strong. Salients give a cross-fire in front of the intermediate spaces, and they would make it unpleasant for the enemy between them. On the other hand, they also protect each other by an oblique fire. If the flanks of such a formation are secure from turning, the position may be considered the best. That salient of our breastworks on the left, where Gen. Baird had a few guns planted so that they could enfilade the line, did a great deal of damage to the enemy. Then our Horseshoe Ridge, with its spurs and recesses making a broken front, proved to be impregnable. If we could have chosen our position on the spurs of Missionary Ridge at the start, that position, considered tactically, would have been difficult to assail.

Our front, in the afternoon of Sept. 20, assumed two lines perpendicular to each other, which naturally and artificially were made almost impregnable. The enemy, after the first unsuccessful assaults on them, saw that they were extremely difficult to take; and so they were, separately. Yet, they would have fallen to pieces, if their salient point had been attacked and forced, in which event both those lines could have been taken in flank and enfiladed with artillery. Therefore, to have one salient point on the position is not an advantage, and may sometime lead to its abandonment; but a number of salient points make the position strong. The loss of a position with but one salient point, did not happen at Chickamauga, but might have happened with an enemy of a different sort.

Ninth. Then we had no general reserve. Gen. Rosecrans intended to have two divisions of Crittenden's corps in reserve, but the line intended to be occupied proved so long

that one division was taken into line in the morning, and the other was on the move during the rebel attack on our centre. When we have to stand on the defensive, a strong reserve is indispensable. It is the means of repulsing the enemy in case he penetrates the line, and is necessary to patch up the breaks. If we had had two divisions by Dyer's farm standing in reserve, we could have met Hood's column after it broke our line and have forced it back. But, as we had no such reserve, the enemy, after breaking the line, had his own way. The disadvantage of being forced to stand on the defensive consists in this: that the attacking party can chose the point of attack, and that a reserve is not so indispensable to it as to the party standing on the defensive. It is true that there were other circumstances connected with this attack which put us at still greater disadvantage, but the want of a strong reserve was the main cause of the rout.

Tenth. The shifting of troops from one point of the line to another during the action is always dangerous. And here is another proof of the importance of having a reserve. If we had had a strong reserve it might have been sent to the extreme left, and a certain number of troops from the right might have been withdrawn from the line and placed in the reserve. When the enemy's attack came, three of our divisions were moving by the flank to the left; how, then, could they successfully resist the enemy's attack? It was impossible.

Eleventh. It is infinitely better to spend the whole night in toilsome marching in order to get into a good position, than to risk meeting the enemy in a faulty position. We did not have a proper position where we fought on the 19th, and could not find one between there and Chattanooga; but we had three good roads to retreat to Chattanooga, where the position was good, and the distance was but from eight to nine miles. Still it was thought preferable to fight on the 20th close to where night found us on the 19th, and it might have proved all right if our right wing had not been routed; and the right was routed just because the position, although good tactically, was faulty strategically. The road to Chattanooga on our left was open to the enemy, and no action being undertaken by the enemy against our right until almost noon, gave Rose-

crans the idea that the enemy was moving his army beyond his left, hence the shifting of troops to the left, and therefore the rout. If our position could have thoroughly covered the direct road to Chattanooga, nothing of the kind could have happened.

Twelfth. It is always better to use troops in the battle in their proper organization if possible; that is to say as an entire corps, division, brigade, or regiment. Mixing of parts of commands interferes with the highest usefulness of the troops. The regiments accustomed to act together when brigaded, rely on each other in the fight; a regiment, detached from its own brigade and attached to an unknown brigade, loses confidence when in the fight. Every brigade has its own reputation and the ties betwen the regiments formed on the battle-field are the strongest. So it is with divisions, and so it is with army corps. Unfortunatlely this rule can not be always preserved; but in the battle of Chickamauga too much of that sort of breaking and mixing up of the commands occurred. The circumstances were such as to compel this mixing up, and it was a great disadvantage.

For instance, on the first day, on our extreme left, were Brannans' and Baird's divisons of Thomas' corps, and Johnson's of McCook's corps. In the centre, Palmer's belonged to Crittenden's corps, while Reynolds' was of Thomas' corps; and even Reynolds' two brigades were separated by Palmer's division, so that the division-commander did not see one of his brigades during the fight in the afternoon. Then on the right, two brigades of Crittenden's and two of McCook's were fighting together for several hours, and toward evening they were joined by more of Crittenden's and more of McCook's brigades, all intermixed, while Negley's division, belonging to Thomas' corps, remained for the greater portion of that day away beyond our extreme right, separated from the balance of its corps by eight or nine miles. The cause, of such a mixture of commands, was the necessity of passing our centre and right behind and beyond our left. Many things might have been obviated, had there been good staff-officers to help the commander of the army. For instance, Negley's place might have been occupied by a division of McCook's corps. Then, when the fight on our extreme left commenced, instead of sending parts

of Crittenden's corps to help Thomas, the whole of McCook's corps might have been put between Thomas and Crittenden. The divisions of different army corps that were intermixed on the first day, remained so on the second day.

Thirteenth. It is pernicious usage to appoint separate commanders of wings. What was good in the last century is out of date now. For instance, our army consisted of three army corps; to make two wings it was necessary to break one of the corps, and what was to become of the commander of the broken corps? He did not know where to stay. On the second day, in our left wing under Thomas, were six divisions, four of his own and two of two other corps; while in our right wing, under McCook, were four divisions, two of his own and two of Crittenden's corps, and most of the cavalry. What could be the purpose, of such an artificial subdivision of the three corps into two wings, it is hard to conceive. There can be no convenience to the commander-in-chief in such a subdivision, and there must be some considerable inconvenience to commanders of the wings, as they are unacquainted with the troops of the corps that are not their own.

As it was on our side, so it was on the rebel side. Polk was commanding the right wing and Longstreet the left. Polk had only Cheatham's division of his own corps, the others were two divisions of Hill's corps and two divisions of Walker's corps, perfect strangers to him. Longstreet had two divisions of his own corps, two of Buckner's corps, one of Polk's corps, and one provisional not belonging to any corps in particular, a mixture worse than any. It is easy to understand why such a method may be advantageous when an army consists of a number of army corps; then if two or three armies are made from them, and commanders are appointed for each, it is more convenient for the commander-in-chief to communicate his orders to three instead of nine commandants. But where only three corps are present, and they are intermixed and divided into two, it only causes inconvenience, dissatisfaction, and confusion without the achievement of any useful or beneficial result.

Fourteenth. The battle of Chickamauga proved to the full satisfaction of our own and the enemy's soldiers that barricades —even of old rails and rotten logs—make a good protection

against the rifle. Where the ground is covered with such wood and underbrush as it was at Chickamauga, artillery has not much chance for use, particularly against such a high and wooded ridge as was Horseshoe Ridge, hence our barricades were safe. But should it have been in an open country, strong batteries concentrated against a point where the assault was intended to be made, would have demolished such barricades in a short time, and opened the way for the assaulting column. But could the barricades be made of freshly-fallen trees and covered on the outside with piled-up earth, field-artillery would not be able to do them much damage.

Fifteenth. The assault on our right, where the barricades were not continuous, although met by our troops under serious disadvantage, sufficiently proved that, with a determined enemy formed in a strong column of attack—as was Hood's column—a line of troops, unsupported by strong reserves, can not resist the pressure without being broken. On the other hand, the assault in single line, unsupported by reserves, as was Breckinridge's assault on our extreme left, and, in fact, all the rebel assaults made on the barricades of our left wing, scarcely ever succeed.

Sixteenth. When an enemy's army, in a rough and wooded region is lying behind barricades, to attack it in front is the same as a man seizing a mad bull by the horns. But there is hardly a position without some weak point; and that should be turned to account so as to oblige the enemy to abandon the barricades and fight us on equal terms. On the morning of the 20th, the danger for us was centering on our left. Bragg knew that we were working during the night and in the morning on our barricades. He was on the offensive and could shift his troops in any way he pleased, without any danger of our leaving our lines. His communications were along the Chattanooga-and-Atlanta railroad and his line of retreat was by Ringgold. He could move his columns north in the morning, pass by our extreme left, and direct them on Rossville. That movement alone would have compelled us to abandon our fortified position and move hurriedly toward Chattanooga; then he could fight us on equal terms, and perhaps would have succeeded in defeating our army and taking Chattanooga.

Seventeenth. The first time that the rifle was universally used by the armies was in our late war. There were only a few troops among the British and French, armed with the rifle during the Crimean war. The rifle compelled our armies and the rebel armies to extensively use barricades and trenches, and is an indication of what is coming, when the ordinary rifle will be replaced by a breech-loading, repeating, and self-acting rifle; and the time will come when those who dig the most and move the quickest will be the victors.

Eighteenth. The publication of the war records is of National importance, yet the appropriations granted by congress for the purpose are so insignificant that, during the twenty-six years since the end of the war, the published records do not reach the end of the year 1863. According to this rate of progress, when all the records are published the skeletons of all the survivors of the war will be mouldering in the grave. Yet those of them, who are able to write histories of campaigns and battles of that war, are the very men who never will see the records completed. It is surprising to see the indifference to this matter of our National legislators, when at least one-quarter of them consist of old soldiers. The German records of the great Franco-Prussian war were completed and published in six years after that war ended.

The one-sided memoirs and histories that flood our book-stores are often not worth the paper they are printed on, as their recitals and deductions are not founded on the official records of both contending armies. They will not, and can not, contribute to the later historian's proper data of the struggle, unless it be of some incidents or stories. They can not right the parties who may sometimes be wrongfully accused of dereliction of duty or of causing a defeat, because their writers do not know the circumstances that happened on the enemy's side which brought about that defeat. On the other hand, they can not pull down a false hero from a pedestal of unmerited glory, acquired from an imaginary victory, because those writers do not know what the other side was doing, and hence could not judge whether it was a victory.

But it may be said that the records are all in the war-office, and anybody can have access to them. True, but that is too expensive.

Nineteenth. The method of organizing an army and for keeping up its regiments to their full quotas was improper. There were no organized reserves in the states to fill up the old regiments as the campaigns were reducing their strength. It was left with the governors of states to manage the raising of the troops; and as the companies were organized in various parts of the states, it became impossible to recruit reduced companies in the field with men from the same neighborhood where those companies had been originally raised, as it would have required for each of those companies a recruiting party at home. The consequence was that every time new levees for troops were made on the States, new regiments were raised and a lot of officers commisioned, while the old regiments in the field were dwindling down to almost nothing.

Perhaps political considerations guided the governors in adopting this system of furnishing troops to the general Government, as all those who received commissions would, when the war closed, promote the political advancement of the dispensers of favors; or, not being instructed in the method of raising troops, they did not know any better. Whatever the reason may have been for such a policy, it acted unfavorably upon the troops in the field. There were times when there were more officers than corporals in some of the old regiments; and, while new regiments with green and inexperienced officers and men had every chance to be decimated in the first battle into which they were led, the old regiments, on account of their small numbers, were consolidated by two and three together, and thus were losing their identity, pride, and energy to fight the enemy. If the old regiments had been filled up with those men of whom new regiments were formed, the old fighters would have made of new recruits good soldiers in a short time, and many engagements which had been lost on account of inexperienced troops would have been turned into victories. This item alone is worthy of the serious consideration of our legislators.

The old maxim, "To preserve peace, be ready for war," is just as true in its application to republics as to monarchies. It is preposterous to think that there is no reason to expect any disturbances or war in the future. As the monarchies are liable

to have foreign wars on account of rivalry between their monarchs, so the extensive republics are liable to have internecine, if not foreign, wars on account of the rivalry of factions. There is a vulgar saying among the Russians that "Moujik would not cross himself until a thunder-bolt strikes," which may be justly applied to those who do not think of war until it commences to thunder.

Twentieth. The system generally adopted by the governors for the promotion of commissioned officers as vacancies occurred by seniority, was the most absurd that could have been conceived in an enlightened country. Not only was it absurd, but highly inconsistent, nay, deeply unjust. There were men among the officers and privates who were born soldiers and who performed wonders of bravery, daring, and presence of mind under the enemy's fire; yet none of them had any chance whatever to be promoted, on account of that absurd rule. On the other hand, there were officers entirely inefficient, although conscientious in doing their duty, who were steadily advancing in rank as fast as the enemy's bullets made vacancies among their superiors. The writer has in view several instances where his recommendations for promotion of some gallant officers and one soldier, endorsed by all superior commanders, were refused by the governors.

Twenty-first. Full power should be given commanders of armies to recommend for promotion soldiers for distinguished services, and it should be obligatory upon the governors of States to accept such recommendations unobjectionably, and to act upon them at once.

Twenty-second. The jealousy that, to a great extent, existed in our armies during the late war, between regular-army and volunteer officers, the imputations that were cast on the capability of volunteer officers to credibly occupy high positions in the army, and the assertions, not without reason, of their want of military knowledge to command large bodies of troops, particularly when such officers happened to be on detached service, and, consequently, had to exercise their own judgment in military actions, are notable facts and should not exist in an army. The regular-army officers were correct in their views; while the volunteer officers, after all their sacrifices in the service of

the country, after all their devotion, patriotism, and honorable wounds received, to be thus denied the promotion for the lack of military knowledge—while in general education, and often in a special knowledge, they knew themselves to be not only the equals, but the superiors of, the regular-army officers—could not but feel belittled and insulted. There could be no harmonious coöperation between these two sets of officers, each of which being correct in their views. The one striving to dominate the other produced a feud, which occasionally would break out and could not but have a demoralizing effect upon the soldiers, who generally sided with the volunteer officers. Such a state of things should not be tolerated in an army; it breeds contempt and overbearing on one side, hatred and bitterness on the other, particularly with men of strong passions and little equanimity of character.

The only remedy for that is to make all the officers of the army thoroughly-educated military men. Such an object could be attained by instituting two additional military academies, increasing the number of cadets at each to double what there is at West Point; make the admision to these academies free to all, subject to examinations in certain branches. This would give an opportunity to those who feel inclined to follow the military profession to receive a thorough military education. Such an education would not prevent those who received it from becoming useful members of society, in the various branches of business, when not on duty. Every officer, in consideration of receiving his education at the expense of the Government, should be obliged to serve a certain number of years in the army, and to remain as many or more years on reduced pay, liable to be called upon at any time, but free to engage in any business. The number of cadets from the various states should correspond with their population.

Twenty-third. The adoption of the above-stated measures for providing educated officers for the army would lead to the entire reorganization of our army. Any distinction between parts of an army, connected with a discrimination shown to one of those parts more than to another, must always be prejudicial to the service. The present "Royal" and "Imperial Guards," as they are organized in the European armies, are an example: they

are composed of the tallest soldiers and the richest and most aristocratic officers, receiving more privileges in promotion and pay than the bulk of the "Army of Line," and constitute senseless institutions. In actual campaigns the long-legged, heavy guards and grenadiers give out much sooner than the medium-sized soldiers of the "Army of Line," and their officers, being accustomed to luxuries, are in a far worse plight in a hard campaign than the officers of the "Army of Line;" so that actually, the troops of the "Guards" are inferior to the troops of the "Army," yet they enjoy more privileges; hence, the members of the "Army of Line" feel, not only contempt, but hatred toward them. The "Army of the Line" makes the conquests, while the "Guards" are always placed at the head of the army on parades and triumphant marches, as if they were the greatest heroes. These are notorious facts.

In this respect, as in many others, Napoleon I. showed his military tact and genius, far above those of ordinary kings and emperors, as his original guard consisted of officers and men, each of whom had really distinguished himself on many a battlefield. Such a guard, as was his "Old Guard," could not but be profoundly respected by his "Army of Line," as it was considered the key-stone of the structure of the French army, and as the most reliable reserve; and, when moved into an action, could have been slaughtered, but never routed or surrendered. They were all veterans, decorated with the Cross of the Legion of Honor, earned in the thickest, not of one, but of many battles, an undoubted sign of their extraordinary bravery and of bearing honorable scars. Such a guard had deep significance in that victorious army, and was respected by all the soldiers, who considered its membership as the highest honor. But the impression that is produced by the present "Guards" upon the soldiers of the "Armies of Line" in Europe is quite the reverse.

In this respect, our regular army may also be considered, during the war, as a privileged body of troops. Among a million of soldier-volunteers raised for war the number of our regular troops becomes insignificant, and would be melted away into little squads of drill-masters for the regiments of volunteers, while their privileges, as compared with the recompense

of volunteers, particularly the privileges of officers, are much greater. Yet, when we compare the general education and the social standing of one set of rank and file with the other, and their consequent usefulness in war, we find that the volunteer-soldier, as a general thing, stands far above the regular-army soldier. In consequence of this inequality of the moral standard and usefulness of troops, contempt for the regulars and dissatisfaction with the Government are generated among the volunteer-soldiers. To obviate this inequality of rights and privileges, and to establish an army in which jealousy and bad feeling of one of its parts to another, could not exist in the future, it would be necessary to reorganize our army system, and it would be obviously better to accomplish it in the time of peace.

To our notion, it would be better not to have any separate regular army, but to have the United-States army formed of the National Guards of States. The present National Guard would be the source from which details in various states could be made to replace the present regular army, for frontier or garrison duty, or expeditions; the length of the service for such details to be one year; the reliefs to be made in future every year, and in such a manner as to have on duty one-half of the troops already acquainted with the service. This would give an opportunity to many members of the National Guard to get practically acquainted with campaign and garrison duties. These details, combined with the National Guards remaining on duty in the states, in a few years would organize an embryo of a large body of experienced soldiers of all arms: infantry, cavalry, mounted infantry, artillery, and engineers. The obligatory service for all soldiers might be only two years. Reserves to be raised only in time of war.

It is clear, then, that the ready nucleus for our army in case of war would thus consist of those soldiers, who at the time would be on duty in the states, on the frontiers, and in the garrisons. Volunteers from those who had already seen service would first be invited to enlist; then all sorts of volunteers. In case the magnitude of war should require large levies of troops, the recruiting system could be used. In our opinion, the conscription system formerly used in France would be best

adapted to our country, as in that system the male population first liable to service would be the young and unmarried; then the young and married, according to the size of their families; the next contingents would be classified according to the age and the size of families. The drafting system, which was used during our late war, is the worst and most unjust of all recruiting systems, and should be discarded. The system of substitutes ought to be very much restricted, otherwise it would lead to demoralization and desertion, as we have seen in the late war. There is no place and no need for the Landwehr system in this country, and it ought not to be considered.

In order to keep uniformity in drill, equipment, and military discipline throughout the army, active, and in the states, *model* battalions, squadrons, and batteries should be instituted and stationed at Washington. These model troops should be formed of the most efficient and best-drilled squads, detailed every six months from each battalion of infantry, each regiment of cavalry, and each battery of artillery, with officers and sergeants, out of which the model battalions, regiments, and batteries may be organized. They should be officered with the best-informed, practical, and thoroughly-experienced officers, as commanders of regiments, battalions, and companies, who should impart to them the ever-changing details of the army, all changes introduced in drill, tactics, uniforms, and all other details, which thus communicated to the troops of the whole army every six months, would produce that uniformity in the regulations, organization, and tactics so essential to a well-organized army. All appointments to command troops in the active, garrison, or state service to be made by the president, by and with the consent of the senate. Other details and changes in the quartermaster and commissary departments of the army could be readily effected by the commission entrusted with the reorganization of the army.

The above is simply a skeleton-sketch of a project for what seems to the projector to be a necessity for bettering the military system of this republic, with a view of making it more just, more harmonious, and more efficient, in case a war-cloud should overshadow the land. It is, of course, susceptible of many modifications and improvements. The time for active

service, or for the service of the details of model troops, may be changed *ad libitum*. To recapitulate: educated officers and one United-States army, consisting of state troops; the total exclusion of any separate regular army; and the model troops to communicate all the new improvements and changes to the whole army every year, are the main features of the proposed system.

Twenty-fourth. A regiment of one battalion is a British relic of the last century, and was long ago discarded in European continental armies. Regiments ought to consist of not less than three, and better when of four, battalions, each battalion being 1000 strong. These battalions to consist of four companies, each 250 strong, subdivided into two platoons. Colonels to command the regiments, lieutenant-colonels and majors to command the battalions, and captains the companies. Four of such regiments would form a division. As the old brigades, consisting of regiments of one battalion each, have lost their significance, the rank of brigadier-general has been abolished in the European continental armies, and exists only in Great Britain. Two regiments in those armies are still considered as a brigade, but are commanded by the senior colonel.

A regiment of four battalions would be preferable to one consisting of but three, because in the formation of the line of battle two of its battalions would be placed in the first and two in the second line, while a regiment of three battalions would have to be placed entire in one line and supported by another entire regiment placed in the second line, which in practice is not so advantageous, because when battalions of the same regiment stand in both lines, their support of each other in battle is more reliable. Such an organization of the regiments is more judicious, because, even with the greatest losses sustained in a battle, there would still remain enough of soldiers in a regiment to be commanded by its colonel, while with our present regiments, if there should be a loss of one-half in a regiment of the ordinary campaign strength, which hardly ever exceeds 600 men, there would remain a number of men just large enough to be commanded by a captain. With these advantages in a military point of view, the system also combines economy, as there will be a lot of field-officers dispensed with, whose pay at present absorbs a large sum of money.

Twenty-fifth. We had too much sameness in uniforms, and there was no visible insignia to distinguish divisions and army corps. The uniform may be the same for all, but the adoption of different colors for collars, cuffs, and shoulder-straps would be the means of indicating the difference between divisions, while numbers on hats or caps may indicate the difference between the regiments of the same division, and a suitable badge pinned on the left breast may indicate the corps. These, apparently, trifles are of considerable importance for the men to find their commands, or to rally after a rout; and they are also of importance to the commanders to recognize the men of their own or of other commands. A variety of uniforms in cavalry regiments is still more important, as in action the cavalry scatters more than infantry. It is not necessary to have gaudy uniforms of hussars, uhlans, or cuirassiers, but simply to have some distinctive colors for head-gear, collars, cuffs, and shoulder-straps to recognize the commands to which men belong.

Then, in order that the corps-commanders and the commanders of armies may be enabled to recognize various troops in the line of battle or in action, there should be some outward signs in the commands. To attain this object, each battalion should be furnished, in addition to the United-States flag, a division-flag, to be of a different color for each division, as blue for the first, white for the second, and yellow for the third division in each corps, with a large corps-number, made of a different color and placed in the centre of the flag to indicate the number of the corps. Smaller numbers in the corners of this flag may indicate the numbers of the regiments, or even battalions. Flags and guidons for commanders of divisions and regiments may be also of the same color as the division-flags of the battalions. Thus there would be visible signs enough to recognize the commands from a distance.

Twenty-sixth. The covering of the head is one of the most important parts of the soldier's clothing, and a soft felt hat of medium size, in our opinion, is the most convenient and comfortable head-cover. It protects the face from the rain, the eyes from the sun, and is comfortable in sleeping on the bivouac. For usefulness and comfort a fatigue-cap can not

compare with it in the campaign, and a helmet is the worst of head-covers imaginable, unless it is furnished to the ambulance corps, as they could use it, in case of necessity, as a bucket to fetch water for the wounded.

With these remarks on what was observed, not only during the Chickamauga campaign, but also during the writer's service of over three years in the late war, we will close our book, hoping that our remarks, if correct, will not be passed over unnoticed, and may lead to the improvements in our army for the benefit of the future generations of this Republic.

APPENDIX.

DURING the campaign and battle of Chickamauga, Turchin's brigade consisted of the Eleventh, Thirty-sixth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninety-second Ohio, and Eighteenth Kentucky regiments of infantry, and was known as the third brigade of the fourth division of the fourteenth army corps of the Army of the Cumberland. The brigade was commanded by Brig.-Gen. John B. Turchin, the division by Maj.-Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds, and the corps by Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas. The Eighty-ninth Ohio having been temporarily detached from the brigade before the army moved on that campaign, came to the front with the reserve troops, and, having no opportunity to join its brigade, fought on the second day of the battle under Brig.-Gen. James B. Steedman of the reserve troops on the extreme right of the army, participating in the brilliant repulse of the most ferocious, determined, and persistent assault of the enemy on the extreme right of Gen. Brannan's troops on Horseshoe Ridge, and defending that position till evening.

As this work has been dedicated by the author to the members of his brigade, it has been deemed advisable to insert that part of the official reports referring to the distinguished services of that brigade in the battle of Chickamauga, which will, no doubt, be as interesting to general reader as well as those concerned; hence the following is inserted by the publishers:

REPORT OF BRIG.-GEN. JOHN B. TURCHIN:

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, FOURTH DIVISION,
FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Sept. 26, 1863.

SIR:—After holding the opening of Catlett's Gap for two days, with my brigade against the enemy, who tried to come out of it and occupy our position, I was relieved, in the evening of the 17th of September, by the second brigade, putting my brigade in the reserve.

On the 18th, I received orders to march, and the division moved in the evening by the Chickamauga-Cove road, and halted on the morning of the 19th to cook coffee at Osborne's house, north of Crawfish Springs.

At about 10 o'clock, on the 19th, the division moved toward Widow Glenn's house, northeast of which it was supposed to take position, but an order came from Gen. Thomas to move to McDannel's house, and the division moved by a cross-road, my brigade being at the head of the column.

While approaching McDannel's house, I received an order from the general commanding the division to face about and to return to Kelly's cross-roads, but, immediately after that, my assistant-adjutant-general, Capt. Curtis, brought me information that two of my regiments, the Ninety-second Ohio and the Eighteenth Kentucky, had been moved to the front already by Gen. Reynolds, and that he (Capt. Curtis) would take the balance of the brigade to the position.

While we were thus marching forward and backward, heavy fighting was going on in the front and on our right flank.

At 3 o'clock p.m., I succeeded in finding my two regiments that were engaged, and took position with the other two regiments that were with me (the Thirty-sixth and Eleventh Ohio) in the second line, having the Twenty-first Indiana battery on a low ridge at the right of the battalions. The position was in the woods, two regiments fighting in the hollow in front, supporting Gen. Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division; on my left was Gen. Willich's brigade of Johnson's division. I had hardly taken the position, when Gen. Hazen requested me to send one of my regiments to relieve one or two of his regiments that were fighting in front, as they were out of ammunition. I sent the Eleventh Ohio to the front. Shortly afterward, I relieved the Ninety-second Ohio with the Thirty-sixth Ohio, putting the former in reserve.

The enemy being repulsed in my front, the brigade of Gen. Willich advanced to the front and left, and the brigade of Gen. Hazen being withdrawn, my brigade was isolated from other troops. I decided to take to the right, and formed in two lines on the left of Gen. Cruft's brigade of Palmer's division. Shortly afterward, at about 4.30 p.m., the enemy came in heavy colunms

on our front, there was waving and indecision, and I ordered a charge. The brigade yelled, rushed forward, and drove the enemy back in confusion, taking some prisoners. The brigade of Gen. Cruft's charged with us. After consulting Gen. Cruft, we decided to fall back, to reform our line, on the original position. This being done, I received orders from the general commanding to join the second brigade which I subsequently did, and that closed the day.

The charge was executed by the whole brigade most gallantly. We routed, as we learned from the prisoners afterward, Law's brigade, Hood's division, Longstreet's corps, a crack brigade of the rebel army of Richmond.* The position on the first day was so bad and so wooded that my battery could fire only three shots during the day's fighting, and those were fired at the rebel stragglers after we made the charge.

On the morning of the 20th, I was ordered to shift my brigade to the left and move to the front to take the place of Gen. Hazen's brigade which moved to the left, the second brigade taking my place. I had the Thirty-sixth Ohio, Ninety-second Ohio, and a portion of the Eleventh Ohio in the first line, several companies of the latter and the Eighteenth Kentucky regiment being in the reserve.

At about 10 o'clock, we were attacked by the enemy, and for about one hour the infantry and the battery kept up a continual fire. The breastwork of rails and timber protected our men. The enemy suffered severely. At noon, and after until 2 o'clock (p.m.), there was a comparative lull in our front, while the battle raged on the right and left of the position of the army.

Receiving orders to change front and to abandon a portion of the fortifications, to complete the line with the second brigade, I directed my battery to move back and take place on the left of Capt. Harris' battery of the second brigade, and the Thirty-sixth Ohio regiment to support it, and was preparing to move other regiments when an order came from Gen. Thomas to hold the position. I moved the Thirty-sixth and the battery to their original positions, driving the enemy's sharpshooters back.

* This information was incorrect, as it was Brown's brigade of Stewart's division.

Shortly after, Gen. Reynolds came with the second brigade and informed me that two brigades of Brannan's division, on the right of the second brigade, gave way, and the second brigade was obliged to change front, and that I must change my front to the right. I reformed my brigade with the Thirty-sixth and Eleventh Ohio regiments in the first line and Ninety-second Ohio and Eighteenth Kentucky regiments in the second, four pieces of artillery in front and two in the reserve; the second brigade being placed in echelon on my right and rear.

The roar of the battle on our right and left advancing more and more to our rear, the time was coming to retreat. At last the order came for us to retreat by the right flank. The brigade moved, then halted and faced to the front; then orders came to move to the rear. The brigade faced about, made a few paces, and faced that position of the enemy that had out-flanked the left of our lines and was in the rear of Palmer's, Johnson's, and Baird's divisions. The command "forward" was given, some few shots were exchanged. I gave the order to charge. The brigade yelled, rushed forward, and broke to pieces the confronting columns of the rebels. They fled pell-mell. We took two hundred and fifty prisoners, charged up hill, and, notwithstanding the flank fire of the rebel battery and the front fire of the two pieces, the regiments rushed on and took the two pieces, but for want of time and the horses being disabled, could not get them away. I ordered the brigade to move by the left flank and joined Col. McCook's brigade of the reserve corps that was in position on our left.

As I learned afterward, Gen. Reynolds with about one hundred and fifty of my brigade, being on the extreme right and not noticing our movement to the left, was still moving on the main road. Some rebel troops were met but gave way, and the rest of the brigade joined us safely.

That charge relieved our troops of the left that were out-flanked and partially surrounded. The charge was made most gallantly. It showed that we have soldiers on whom we may rely in the most difficult circumstances. The Ninety-second Ohio regiment, having never been in action before, behaved most gallantly during these two days. All the other regiments have seen fight before and they did admirably. The officers

and men of the brigade did nobly. The manœuvres were executed with precision and order. We did not flinch one inch from our position during both days' fight. My brigade formed the salient point of the position on the second day; and, while on the right and left our troops were falling back, we held our ground until we charged to the rear.

Col. Lane and Maj. Higgins of the Eleventh Ohio regiment most gallantly directed the movements of their regiment. After Col. Jones of the Thirty-sixth Ohio was mortally wounded, Lieut.-Col. Deval commanded the regiment with great skill and bravery. Maj. Adney being wounded, Lieut.-Col. Deval was the only field-officer with the regiment. After Col. Fearing of the Ninety-second Ohio was wounded, Lieut.-Col. Putnam commanded the regiment, and, notwithstanding that he was wounded himself, remained faithfully with the regiment, nobly assisted by Maj. Golden and his brave and intrepid adjutant, Lieut. Turner.

Lieut.-Col. Milward of the Eighteenth Kentucky received a severe bruise from a horse that overran him, but remained on the field of battle until Sunday afternoon, when Capt. Heltimes took charge of the regiment. Maj. Wileman having been wounded in the first day's fight, Capt. Heltimes conducted the regiment in the last charge bravely and took a two-gun battery of the enemy, showing thereby his bravery and coolness.

In conclusion, I must mention the gallant conduct of my staff-officers on the battle-field. Capt. Curtis, my assistant-adjutant-general, was my right-hand during the two-days' battle. Capt. Price, Eleventh Ohio, brigade inspector, and Capt. Robbins, Eighteenth Kentucky, brigade provost marshal, acted as my *aides-de-camp* and assisted me gallantly.

Our loss during the two-days' fight is one officer and twenty-nine men killed, eighteen officers and two hundred and nine men wounded, and six officers and eighty men missing.*

The Eighty-ninth Ohio regiment having, unfortunately, been previously detached from the brigade, was, during the fight, serving in Gen. Steedman's division of the reserve corps. The

* In the report of Gen. Thomas, the loss in the Eleventh Ohio is shown 63; Thirty-sixth Ohio, 90; Ninety-second Ohio, 91; Eighteenth Kentucky, 85; Twenty-first Indiana battery, 12.

entire regiment, as I understand, was captured by the enemy, except about one hundred men and three officers who were detailed to guard some train. It was unfortunate for a brigade, that came out of the campaign so nobly, to lose one of its regiments by the fault of somebody else.*

The list of the casualties is herewith submitted. The reports of the regimental commanders will be forwarded as soon as received.

An approximate sketch of a portion of the battle-field and of the positions of my brigade is herewith forwarded.†

I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. TURCHIN,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

Maj. JOHN LEVERING,
Assistant-Adjutant-General,
Fourth Division, Fourteenth Army Corps.

REPORT OF MAJ.-GEN. J. J. REYNOLDS:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Sept. 23, 1863.‡

COLONEL:—I herewith submit a report of the operations of the fourth division, fourteenth army corps, in the battle of Chickamauga Creek, Ga., Sept. 19 and 20, 1863.

The division moved from Pond Spring about 4 p.m. on the 18th, and having marched all night, halted one hour for breakfast near Osborn's, and thence proceeded, by order of Gen. Thomas, commanding fourteenth corps, to take position in line of battle northeast of Glenn's house; while taking this position the division was ordered to advance immediately toward McDannel's and enter in the action then progressing on our left. I at once reported in person to the corps-commander, and, in accordance with his instructions, directed the third brigade (Turchin's) to take position southeast of Kelley's cross-roads. The second brigade (King's) was about leaving the main road

* In the report of Gen. Thomas, the loss of the Eighty-ninth Ohio is shown 252.

† Not found in the records office.

‡ The date shows that this report was written before the report of Gen. Turchin has been received, as the last is dated Sept. 26, 1863.

to take place on the right of the third, when I met Gen. Palmer in the road, who represented that his command had gained upon the enemy, but was nearly out of ammunition and in great need of assistance to enable him to hold what he had gained, at least until they could replenish ammunition. This, although not the precise position indicated to me for the second brigade, was very close to it, and appeared to be a place that it was essential to fill at once, and no other troops were in sight to take the position. Three regiments, under Col. E. A. King, were therefore ordered in at this point, leaving in my hands one regiment, Seventy-fifth Indiana, and Harris' battery. I had just arrived on the field, and found my division would occupy about the centre of our line. No reserve force being anywhere apparent, I determined to form one of Harris' battery and the Seventy-fifth Indiana, to which was shortly added Swallow's battery (which I found on the road unemployed), and the Ninety-second Illinois (temporarily dismounted). In a short time the Sixth Ohio came from the front and took position near Harris' battery to resupply ammunition. Gen. Palmer soon called also for the Seventy-fifth Indiana temporarily; it was ordered to go, the Sixth Ohio serving in the interim as support to the guns. The Sixth having been resupplied with ammunition, was subsequently ordered away, leaving the Ninety-second Illinois the only support for the batteries. The Seventy-fifth Indiana returned late in the day and in some disorder, having relieved an entire brigade and done efficient service. Calls for support had been made from the right, to which it was impossible for me to respond.

Gen. J. C. Davis arrived and inquired where troops were needed. I gave him the substance of my information, and he led his division in on our right. Finally a call came direct from Col. E. A. King, who had drifted further to the right, that he was hard pressed, and wanted his own regiment, the Seventy-fifth Indiana. This regiment had gone, but I ordered to him the Ninety-second Illinois, trusting to regiments returning to the road to resupply ammunition for support to the batteries, or that in case the force in front were driven back, of which I felt there was danger, I might rally them around the batteries and reëstablish the line. The two howitzers of the Ninety-

second Illinois were now added to the two batteries, and the Ninety-second started to King's support. Scarcely had it cleared the front of the guns when this regiment was struck in flank by our own forces retiring, followed closely by the enemy. I met our retiring regiments in person, pointed them to fourteen guns in position as evidence that the enemy must be thrown back, and by great exertion succeeded in reforming several regiments in rear of the batteries.

Battery H, fourth regiment artillery, commanded by Lieut. Russell, at this time came to our position, and was ordered into action on Harris' left. These batteries fired with terrible effect upon the enemy, his progress was checked, and our line for a time prevented from yielding any further. The enemy now shifted further to the right, where there was evidently an opening in our lines, and coming in on their right flank, our regiments again became disheartened and began to retire. The batteries following the regiments changed front and fired to the right, and the line was reformed along a fence nearly perpendicular to its former position, with the batteries in the edge of the woods, the enemy pushing still further to the right and rear. I rallied and formed into double line some ten or twelve other returning regiments, which came in from the left centre, and placing the front line under the immediate command of Col. Croxton, Tenth Kentucky, ordered them to swing around on the left flank as a pivot; this order was well executed by both lines in our rear, thus entirely cleared of the enemy. It was now nearly sundown, and operations on this part of the field ceased for the day.*

On the 20th, my division was posted at Kelley's cross-roads in echelon, the third brigade (Turchin's) in front, and immediately on Gen. Palmer's right; the second brigade (King's) slightly retired to secure good ground, and facing the main Rossville-and-Lafayette road. Two brigades of the third division, fourteenth army corps (Brannan's), were on my right; my division was formed in two lines, nearly one-half of the infantry being in reserve.† During the early morning of the

* It is evident from this part of the report of the first day's action that Gen. Reynolds did not know what Turchin's brigade was doing, as he does not even mention it.

† The second line is called "reserve."

20th, temporary breastworks were erected of such material as could be found at hand, and were of great benefit. The attack of the enemy on our position commenced about 10 o'clock, and was very heavy; he was successfully repulsed at all points in front of our position without calling upon the second line of infantry. About 11 o'clock the two brigades of the third division being heavily pressed in front and right flank, which had been left uncovered, began to yield. Col. Croxton reported this to me, and personal inspection verified the report. The One-hundred-and-fifth Ohio, Maj. Perkins commanding, and until this time lying in reserve, was ordered to face the enemy, and go at them with the bayonet; the order was gallantly executed; the enemy was thrown back, and the yielding regiments partially rallied, but the enemy returning with increased force, and turning their right, these regiments were borne back, the One-hundred-and-fifth Ohio with them.

The latter regiment carried off the field the rebel Gen. Adams, wounded, who had been previously captured by Capt. Guthrie's company of the Nineteenth Illinois. After all the troops had left the right of my division, and the enemy was silenced in front, a column of the enemy appeared in the main road, in the prolongation of the line of battle of the second brigade; at this same time a rebel battery was firing into the rear of this brigade. The position of the second brigade was therefore changed so as to throw its left nearer the right of the third brigade, and to face the enemy, who had taken position on our right and rear. At this time the division was out of ammunition, except such as was gathered from the boxes of the dead, and the enemy was between us and our ammunition train; but for this circumstance we could have maintained our position indefinitely. The ammunition train, by another route, got safely to Chattanooga. We remained in this position for some time, when orders were received from the corps-commander to prepare to change our position, and the division in a short time received an order to initiate a movement toward Rossville. This was done with the brigade still formed in two lines, and moving by flank in parallel columns, thus ready at a moment's notice to face in double line in either of the directions in which firing had lately been heard. Arriving at the

Rossville road the command was met by the corps-commander in person, and I was directed to form line perpendicular to the Rossville road. This done, Gen. Thomas pointed in the direction of Rossville and said: "There they are, clear them out." The division was faced about, and a charge ordered and executed in two lines, at double-quick through the rebel lines, dispersing them and capturing more than 200 prisoners, under a fire of infantry in front and artillery in flank.

I understand that this movement was intended to open the way to Rossville for the army, and did not then know of any other road to that point. I therefore pressed right on in the charge, expecting the whole division to do the same, until the rebel lines and batteries were cleared and the road opened, and found myself with only about 150 of the third brigade, under Col. Lane, Eleventh Ohio, near the field hospital of the fourteenth corps. The remainder of the division proceeded to the high grounds on the left, by order of Gen. Thomas; the third brigade was reformed by Brig.-Gen. Turchin, who had his horse shot under him in the charge; the second brigade was reformed by Col. M. S. Robinson, who succeeded to the command of that brigade after the death of Col. E. A. King; the advance party reformed the division on the ridge to the west of the road, and the whole division marched to Rossville by the valley road. The first brigade (Wilder's mounted infantry) was detached from the division by order of the department commander, except the Ninety-second Illinois, which was with the division on the 19th. The operations of this brigade will be reported separately.

The brigade-commanders, Brig.-Gen. J. B. Turchin and Col. E. A. King, handled their brigades with skill and judgment, and no instance of confusion or disorder occurred to the batteries; Harris' Nineteenth Indiana and Andrew's Twenty-first Indiana were skilfully and bravely managed and did fine execution; the Nineteenth battery on both days, and the Twenty-first battery more especially on the 20th. Capt. Harris was wounded on the 19th. His battery was ably commanded on the 20th by Lieut. Lackey. This battery lost two guns, one left on the field, the horses killed; the other disabled by the enemy's fire. Andrew's battery lost one gun, left from the

breaking of the harness. The untimely fall of Col. King renders it impracticable to obtain a connected report of the operations of the second brigade; the regiments were ably commanded, as follows: One-hundred-and-first Indiana, Lieut.-Col. Doan; Seventy-fifth Indiana, Col. Robinson; Sixty-eighth Indiana, Capt. Espy, wounded; One-hundred-and-fifth Ohio, Maj. Perkins, wounded.* The division staff were at their posts and discharged their duties promptly and faithfully. Maj. John Levering, assistant-adjutant-general, sick in ambulance; Maj. O. O. Herrick, medical director, in the hands of the enemy; Capt. F. F. Starkweather, assistant-quartermaster; Capt. J. C. Leech, commissary of subsistance; Capt. C. O. Howard, mustering officer, *aide-de-camp*, wounded in the hand; Capt. J. F. Floyd, One-hundred-and-first Ohio, *aide-de-camp;* Capt. P. B. Hanna, Seventy-second Indiana, provost marshal, (wounded); First-Lieut. J. W. Armstrong, Seventeenth Indiana, ordnance officer; Second-Lieut. W. P. Bainbridge, One-hundred-and-first Indiana, *aide-de-camp*, wounded in the arm; Serg. Daniel Bush, company D, One-hundred-and-first Indiana, orderly at headquarters, was badly wounded and has since died. Among the deaths, the country has to deplore the loss of Col. E. A. King, commanding second brigade, and Col. W. G. Jones, commanding Thirty-sixth Ohio, both superior officers. Herewith are submitted lists of casualties, from which it appears that the total loss of the division in killed and wounded and missing is (963) nine hundred and sixty-three.†

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. J. REYNOLDS,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding Division.

Lieut.-Col. FLYNT,
Asst.-Adjt.-Gen. and Chief of Staff.

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG.
Brevet-Major and *Aide-de-Camp.*

* All the regiments here enumerated belonged to King's brigade, and the report does not mention a single regimental-commander of Turchin's brigade.

† From this loss, 368 fell on King's brigade, and as all this loss was sustained on the first day of the battle and in the rout on the second day, it shows how insignificant the strength of this brigade was after the rout, as one-half of the remaining numbers went with Brannan to the ridge.

REPORT OF MAJ.-GEN. JOHN M. PALMER:*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Sept. 30, 1863.

CAPTAIN: * * * About noon [on the 19th], I received orders to move up my whole division to the assistance of our troops then engaged. I moved at once, and met Grose's brigade returning. After marching quickly for perhaps a mile and a-half, guided by the sounds of the firing, and forming lines to the right of the road, I ordered Hazen, who was on the left, to march in the direction of the firing, Cruft to keep well close up to him on his right, and Grose in reserve, reënforcing the right, and engage as soon as possible. At this moment I received a note from the general commanding the army, which led to a slight, but turned out to be a most advantageous, change of formation. He suggested an advance in echelon by brigades, refusing the right, keeping well closed on Thomas. This suggestion was adopted; the brigades, at about one hundred paces intervals, pushed forward and engaged the enemy almost simultaneously. At once the fight became fierce and obstinate. From the character of the ground, but few positions could be found for the effective use of the artillery. My batteries were used as well as was possible, but the work was confined mainly to the musket. Our men stood up squarely without faltering, and after a struggle of perhaps an hour, the enemy were driven from the ground and pursued for a considerable distance. The firing along the line ceased, and skirmishers were thrown forward, as the ammunition of the Sixth and Twenty-fourth Ohio volunteers was completely exhausted, and all efforts to get a supply to them had so far failed that they were ordered back to the open ground in the rear, with the hope that they would meet the ammunition which was known to be on the way, and be ready to assist in the checking of the enemy's force, (which was obstinately driving some troops, of what command I am unable to say); and passing the right, giving orders to close up the lines, I rode back to the open ground from which my command had marched upon the enemy.

* On the first day of the battle, Gen. Palmer had temporary command of the brigade and witnessed the fight.

I had hardly reached the road when some troops driven out of the woods crossed the road and were pursued to the edge of the road by the enemy. At that moment one brigade of Gen. Reynolds passed, going to the right, but as they seemed likely to go too far, I requested Col. Robinson of Seventy-fifth Indiana volunteers to meet the advancing enemy. He did so in fine style, and drove him back for a considerable distance. The officers and men of that regiment deserve great credit for their gallantry in this affair.

After Robinson's regiment had moved off under my orders, Gen. Reynolds suggested his withdrawal had left his battery without support. I then ordered Col. Anderson, with the Sixth Ohio volunteers, to fill his boxes and remain there until relieved, and returned to my own lines. Upon reaching them, I found my men resting, and every means was being used to fill the cartridge-boxes. Hazen had been relieved by Gen. Turchin, who had formed on Cruft's left, and he (Hazen) had retired to fill his boxes, and protect some artillery which was threatened from the rear. I then committed the error of directing Grose to move to the right, to engage in a severe fight going on in that direction. I only for the moment saw that our troops were hard pressed, and that mine were idle, but did not observe that one brigade was not enough to relieve them. While riding toward Cruft's brigade to order him to move to the right to support Grose, a heavy force came down upon him and Turchin. For ten minutes or more our men stood up under this fire, and then the enemy charged them and bore them back. Cruft, Turchin, and all their officers exerted themselves with distinguished courage to arrest the retreat, and I gave them what assistance I could. It seemed as if nothing would prevent a rout; but, as if by magic, the line straightened up, the men turning upon their pursuers with bayonet, and as quickly as they turned and fled, were in turn pursued. Many prisoners were brought to me at this point by soldiers for orders. I told them to break their muskets and let them go, and then go back to their places in the ranks. By this time the enemy had passed to their rear, and I felt much apprehension for Hazen. I rode in the direction of heavy firing, near the Rossville road, and found him with a part of his own brigade and a large con-

scription of stragglers and several pieces of artillery, resisting an attempt of the enemy to cross an open field in his front. His fire was too hot, and they abandoned the attempt. Very soon, other troops of Reynolds' division came up. Grose collected his troops, which were somewhat scattered. Cruft was ordered to fall back to this point, our lines were reformed, and the battle seemed over. * * *

I can only say, in conclusion, that I am satisfied with the conduct of Brig.-Gens. Cruft and Hazen and Col. William Grose, commanding brigades. They have earned a real title to my respect and confidence; while subordinates of all grades maintained the character for hardy courage and endurance which had been won by good service upon many fields.† * *

I am, very respectfully, etc.,

JOHN M. PALMER,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

Capt. P. P. OLDERSHAW,
Asst.-Adjt.-Gen.

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,
Brevet-Major and *Aide-de-Camp.*

REPORT OF MAJ.-GEN. GEO. H. THOMAS:‡

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Sept. 30, 1863.

GENERAL: * * * About the time that Wood took up his position, Gen. Gordon Granger appeared on my left flank at the head of Steedman's division of his corps. I immediately despatched a staff-officer, Capt. Johnson, Second Indiana cavalry, of Negley's division, to him with orders to push forward and take position on Brannan's right, which order was complied with, with the greatest promptness and alacrity, Steedman moving his division into position with almost as much precision as if on drill, and fighting his way to the crest of the hill on Brannan's right, moved forward his artillery and drove the enemy down the southern slope, inflicting on him a most terri-

† Of course nothing is said about Turchin or his brigade, as they belonged to another division, although they saved Palmer's own division from utter rout.

‡ On the second day of the battle, Gen. Thomas ordered and witnessed the brigade's charge to the rear.

ble loss in killed and wounded. This opportune arrival of fresh troops revived the flagging spirits of our men on the right, and inspired them with new ardor for the contest. Every assault of the enemy from that time until nightfall was repulsed in the most gallant style by the whole line. By this time the ammunition in the boxes of the men was reduced, on an average, to two or three rounds per man, and my ammunition trains having been unfortunately ordered to the rear by some unauthorized person, we should have been entirely without ammunition in a very short time had not a small supply come up with Gen. Steedman's command. This being distributed among the troops, gave them about ten rounds per man. Gen. Garfield, chief of staff of Gen. Rosecrans, reached this position about 4 p.m., in company with Lieut.-Col Thruston of McCook's staff and Capts. Gaw and Barker of my staff, who had been sent to the rear to bring back the ammunition, if possible. Gen. Garfield gave me the first reliable information that the right and centre of our own army had been driven, and of its condition at that time. I soon after received a despatch from Gen. Rosecrans, directing me to assume command of all the forces, and with Crittenden and McCook take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville, sending the unorganized forces to Chattanooga for reorganization, stating that he would examine the ground at Chattanooga, and then join me; also, that he had sent out rations and ammunition to meet me at Rossville. I determined to hold the position until nightfall, if possible, in the meantime sending Capts. Barker and Kellogg to distribute the ammunition — Maj. Lawrence, my chief of artillery, having been previously sent to notify the different commanders that ammunition would be supplied them shortly. As soon as they reported the distribution of the ammunition, I directed Capt. Willard to inform the division-commanders to prepare to withdraw their commands as soon as they received orders.

At 5.30 p.m., Capt. Barker, commanding my escort, was sent to notify Gen. Reynolds to commence the movement, and I left the position behind Gen. Wood's command to meet Reynolds and point out to him the position where I wished him to form line to cover the retirement of the other troops on the left. In

passing through an open woods bordering on the State road, and between my last and Reynolds' position, I was cautioned by a couple of soldiers, who had been to hunt water, that there was a large rebel force in these woods, drawn up in line and advancing toward me. Just at this time I saw the head of Reynolds' column approaching, and calling to the general himself, directed him to form line perpendicular to the State road, changing the head of his column to the left, with his right resting on that road, and to charge the enemy, who were then in his immediate front. This movement was made with the utmost promptitude, and facing to the right, whilst on the march, Turchin threw his brigade upon the rebel force, routing them, and driving them in utter confusion entirely beyond Baird's left. In this splendid advance more than 200 prisoners were captured and sent to the rear. Col. Robinson, commanding the second brigade, Reynolds' division, followed closely upon Turchin, and I posted him on the road leading through the ridge to hold the ground whilst the troops on our right and left passed by. In a few moments, Gen. Willich, commanding a brigade of Johnson's division, reported to me that his brigade was in position on a commanding piece of ground to the right of the ridge road. I directed him to report to Gen. Reynolds, and assist in covering the retirement of the troops. Turchin's brigade, after driving the enemy a mile and a-half, was reassembled, and took its position on the ridge road, with Robinson and Willich. These dispositions being made, I sent orders to Gens. Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from their positions. Johnson's and Baird's divisions were attacked at the moment of retiring, but by being prepared, retired without confusion, or any serious losses. Gen. Palmer was also attacked whilst retiring. Grose's brigade was thrown into some confusion, but Cruft's brigade came of in good style, both, however, with little loss. I then proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Gens. Garfield and Gordon Granger, and immediately prepared to place the troops in position at that point. * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,
Maj.-Gen. U.-S. Vols., Commanding.

Brig.-Gen. J. A. GARFIELD,
Chief of Staff, Department of Cumberland.

EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF MAJ.-GEN. WM. S. ROSECRANS:

"The fury of the conflict was nearly as great on the fronts of Brannan and Wood, being less furious toward the left. But a column of the enemy had made its way to near our left and to the right of Col. McCook's position. Apprised of this, Gen. Thomas directed Reynolds to move his division from its position, and pointing out the rebels, told him to go in there.

To save time, the troops of Reynolds were faced by the rear rank and moved with the bayonet at a double-quick, and with a shout walked over the rebels, capturing some 500.* This closed the battle on the 20th." * * *

REPORT OF BRIG.-GEN. JAMES B. STEEDMAN:†

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION RESERVE CORPS,
CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 26, 1863.

MAJOR:—I have the honor to report the part taken by my command in the late battle of Chickamauga Hills.

In obedience to the order of the major-general commanding the corps, my command, consisting of the first and second brigades of the first division of the reserve corps, the Twenty-second regiment Michigan volunteers, and the Eighty-ninth regiment, Ohio volunters, serving temporarily under my command, and the Eighteenth Ohio battery, and company M, Illinois artillery, marched from Bridgeport, Tenn., at 7 o'clock a.m., on the 13th, and reached Rossville, Ga., a distance of nearly forty miles, at 11 o'clock a.m. on the 14th. * * *

At half-past eleven o'clock [on the 20th], Gen. Granger becoming satisfied, from the heavy and receding sounds of artillery, that the enemy was pressing the left of our line severely, ordered me to move to the battle-field as rapidly as possible with two brigades of my command, Gen. Whittaker's and Col. Mitchell's. I moved at once, and after marching five

* It is a mistake in the number. It was between 250 and 300 prisoners.

† These extracts from Gen. Steedman's report refer to the troops under his command, on the second day of the battle, including the Eighty-ninth Ohio, temporarily detached from Turchin's brigade.

miles with the enemy's cavalry on my left flank, and shelling my troops for two miles of the distance, reached Maj.-Gen. Thomas and reported to him at half-past one o'clock, p.m.

Immediately after reaching Gen. Thomas, I received orders to move on the enemy on the left of Gen. Wood's division. After getting into position to execute this order, Maj.-Gen. Granger ordered me to move to the right of Gen. Brannan's division, which order was promptly executed, and the moment my troops were in position they moved on the enemy, and after a severe fight of about twenty-five minutes the enemy was driven from his position and my troops occupied the ridge from which they had forced the enemy. Slight skirmishing was kept up for about three-quarters of an hour, when the enemy attacked us furiously, and after severe fighting for about half an hour, we repulsed him. In a few moments he renewed the attack with increased force, and was again repulsed. Determined to get possession of the ridge, he immediately attacked us again, and for about an hour fought desperately, my troops maintaining their position against superior numbers until 6 o'clock, when, having expended our ammunition, the extra ammunition which I had with my command, 95,000 rounds, having been taken to supply Gen. Brannan's troops, who were out, my troops fell back under orders, slowly and in good order, after retiring to the second ridge in rear of the one on which they had fought, and resting half an hour. Finding the enemy did not attempt pursuit, all firing having ceased on both sides, they retired under orders to Rossville and occupied their former camp. The officers and men of my command behaved well, fought bravely, and I am proud to say did all that could have been expected of them to insure the success of our arms, to win and hold the bloody ground on which they fought. I beg leave to reassure the major-general commanding the corps of my confidence in the willingness and ability of the division to meet his highest expectations. Under other circumstances it might be proper for me to make a more elaborate and detailed report of the part taken by my command in the terrible conflict of Sunday, but as my troops fought under the eye of the major-general commanding the corps, I have deemed it proper to just briefly state in general terms the prominent features

of the engagement. I respectfully submit herewith a tabular statement of the killed, wounded, and missing in my command, together with statements of the losses in the quartermaster's and ordnance departments.

With esteem, respectfully submitted:

JAMES B. STEEDMAN,
Brig.-Gen. Commanding First Division Reserve Corps.

Maj. J. S. FULLERTON,
Asst.-Adjt.-Gen.

True copy:

S. C. KELLOGG,
Brevet-Major and *Aide-de-Camp.*

Anent the Capture of Three Regiments:—Twenty-first and Eighty-ninth Ohio and Twenty-second Michigan.

REFERRING to the statement made in the recital of the second day's battle (pages 153–5), regarding the capture of the Eighty-ninth and Twenty-first Ohio and Twenty-second Michigan regiments, which occurred late in the evening of September 20, on Horseshoe Ridge, in which it was stated that it was a needless sacrifice of those fine regiments, who so bravely stood their ground, and could have been withdrawn from the position as well as the other troops who occupied Horseshoe Ridge, had they received timely orders; that such orders never had been sent to them; and, through the dereliction of duty by others, they were captured and underwent the horrible treatment of the Southern prisons.

Such a statement is too serious to be made unsupported by substantial evidence, and, as the pages of the narrative should not be encumbered with such documents, they are herein appended:

EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS TO THE AUTHOR:

From Col. Caleb H. Carlton, late commander Eighty-ninth Ohio, dated "Fort Elliott, Texas, May 18, 1887":

* * "Col. LeFavor of the Twenty-second Michigan was senior to me in rank and commanded his regiment and mine as a brigade from the time I reported to [Gen.] Gordon Granger

on the north bank of the Tennessee River until we were captured. [Gen.] Steedman told me, when I met him at Chattanooga after I was exchanged, that he had claimed, and that Granger had admitted it, that the only order Granger gave to the division after it went in, 'caused Carlton and LeFavor to be captured.' We had sent Lieut. Drake, adjutant of Twenty-second to [Gen.] Granger for ammunition. Granger said he had no ammunition and to 'tell Carlton and LeFavor they must use bayonet and hold their position at all hazards.' This was the last order we received. Drake, on returning to us, was fired on from both sides, that is, the rebels had a crossfire in our rear. That was about half-past four. I mention my name first as it was mentioned first in the message." * * *

From Lieut.-Col. W. H. Glenn, late of the Eighty-Ninth Ohio, dated "Hillsboro, Ohio, June 10, 1887":

* * "Our forces were surrendered about dark—twilight—Eighty-ninth and Twenty-first Ohio and Twenty-second Michigan. We were in Whittaker's brigade and, I suppose, subject to his orders. We had been out of ammunition, and, sending order for ammunition, received instead word, as was then understood by at least some of us, as coming from 'Gen. Thomas'' command, that ammunition would be sent if possible, but to hold the point we occupied at the point of the bayonet. We understood at that time our forces were falling back and supposed that Gen. Whittaker had orders to hold that point, and, to do so, took his own brigade out and kept the three regiments that did not properly belong to him to fill the order.* We received no orders after the one to stay.

"There were captured of the Eighty-ninth thirteen commissioned officers and 170 men. I don't know how many in the other two regiments. The rebels had repeatedly charged us, I think three times that Sunday evening. After those three charges they put in their work at a more respectful distance, finding, as they stated to us after our surrender, that the

* The Twenty-first Ohio was put by Gen. Negley under Gen. Brannan's command, but, having been placed on the extreme right of Brannan's troops, it apparently, by its own volition, joined in the action the Eighty-ninth and Twenty-second.

Western Yankees did not run as well as those they had been used to charging in the East. At the time of our surrender we were ordered to fall in and report to Gen. Kelly,* a short distance from where we surrendered. As we approached Kelly, surrounded with his staff, he called to Col. Carlton (he and I were mounted): 'Carlton, I am glad to see you; but you have no cause to be ashamed of your work. Two-thirds of my brigade lie yonder dead, the result of those charges made on your command.' Col. Carlton did not recognize the man who was addressing him and so advised him. He then made himself known as Kelly of Arkansas, who graduated in the same class at West Point with Carlton. * * * It was an unfortunate thing for us that we did not reach our brigade in time for the fight, at least so I feel." * * *

It is evident from the above two letters that after receiving the order to use bayonet and hold their position at all hazards, no order for withdrawal came to the Eighty-ninth Ohio and Twenty-second Michigan. Col. Glenn's letter also shows how gallantly those regiments fought, as one of the commanders of the rebel brigades which effected that capture conspicuously testified thereto. It says also that the forces were surrendered about dark.

From Rev. E. S. Scott, late second-lieutenant Company G, and subsequently adjutant of the Eighty-ninth Ohio, dated "Logansport, Ind., June 9, 1887":

After describing the preliminary movements before Steedman's division reached the extreme right of Brannan's forces on Horseshoe Ridge, Lieut. Scott continues: "Soon the division was put in motion, and our regiment kept moving to the right with what seemed to me a great many changes of direction, till at length we ascended a hill in line of battle, supporting another line in front. The line in front went over the crest and down on the other side and immediately became heavily engaged; we stopped on the crest and laid down. In a few minutes the line in front, being, as I understand, the One-hundred-and-fifteenth Illinois, came falling back and retired over the Eighty-

* Col. J. H. Kelly, Eighth Arkansas Infantry, commanding Third brigade, Preston's Division.

ninth. As soon as they were passed we, of course, opened on the enemy, and the pursuit was checked. Gen. Steedman presently came along the front of the line on foot, calling to us to cease firing. Twenty-five were wounded in this part of the engagement in the regiment; the Colonel's horse was shot under him. Capt. Russel, Gen. Granger's adjutant-general, was killed just to the right of our regiment. Not three minutes before, he had delivered an order to Col. Carlton, saying 'that he thought Gen. Steedman had asked for us to hold that position, and that he had better stay there.'*

"The line that had fallen back over our regiment soon rallied and was moved off somewhere else, leaving us without any support in rear. Before long there was tremendous firing on our right and it was soon evident that the troops on our right were giving way. Soon the tide of battle swept over us again. We were, perhaps, a little too far back on the crest of the hill, and, through the thick underbrush in front, could not see the enemy till they were quite near us. The troops on our immediate right gave way, exposing our flank, so that our regiment changed front slightly to meet this enfilading fire on our right and rear. This was the last we saw of any of our troops on our right.

"We held this position for some time, when the rebels came with such force that we were obliged to retire still further, falling back slowly, till we reached a sort of hollow, where we stopped, our line now being at right angles with the crest of the hill and the right (my company) being, perhaps, half-way down the hill. The Twenty-second Michigan was on our left, more toward the top of the hill, and the Twenty-first Ohio on their left (I suppose). At last it soon became apparent that these three regiments were there together, apparently isolated from all other troops. By this time, half the Eighty-ninth was disabled or killed, and our ammunition gone. Several attempts were made to regain our position on the crest of the hill, but without success.

"The sun had now set.† A column of men had been seen

* This part of the narrtive evidently relates to the first attack of the division made upon the turning troops of the enemy and their repulse, while the next part describes the action during the rebel assaults of Preston's division.

† The sun in that region on September 20, sets at 6 o'clock and a few minutes.

to move along the hollow at the bottom of the hill we were on, but through the gathering darkness and smoke of battle we could not tell who they were. By this time, the firing had pretty nearly ceased.* Soon the column in the hollow came to a halt and we could hear the order 'front.' Just at this moment, the Twenty-first Ohio came down the hill and Col. Carlton told the major in command to go to our right, as he was afraid they were trying to flank us. They had no more than gotten in position when the column at the foot of the hill moved forward. It was impossible to tell who they were till they were within ten feet of us,† when, through the gloom, we could see that their uniforms were gray. It was too late then to do anything, even if we had had any ammunition (though we had 'fixed bayonets'), and in a moment Kelly's brigade had enveloped us.

"I have thus given you the story of the Eighty-ninth's share in that engagement from my point of view. It may possibly throw a little light upon the matter too. If so, I will be very glad. There was blundering or criminal negligence somewhere, and I am glad you are going to throw light on it. I have always been of the opinion that we were deliberately left there, since we were 'orphans,' away from our regular commands, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of other troops. I am convinced from what others have told me (e.g., Capt. McConnell of the Ninth Indiana, a resident of this place, at that time in Brannan's division,)‡ that that division was within pistol shot of our left when we were taken.§ Some body ought certainly to have known that. I have never ceased to regret that we were absent from our old brigade in that engagement." * *

This is a description of an intelligent and observing man, and its circumstantial account of that unfortunate capture bears truth upon its face. It shows that the surrender was made long after the sun set, and that at the time the action along the whole line of the army was over.

* This clearly proves that at this time the action of the day was over and most of our troops had retired. † Must have been dark enough.

‡ The Ninth Indiana was sent to Brannan toward evening by Gen. Hazen to whose brigade it belonged.

§ It was stated in the narrative that Brannan's troops had not retired at the time of the capture of the three regiments.

From Gen. John C. Smith, lieutenant-governor of Illinois, formerly major of the Ninty-sixth Illinois and on the staff of Gen. Steedman during the campaign and battle of Chickamauga, dated "Springfield, Ill., June 25, 1887":

* * * "Col. LeFavor, with Twenty-second Michigan and Eighty-ninth Ohio was attached to Whittaker's brigade, and acting under his orders. Gen. Whittaker having been wounded early in the afternoon, Col. Champion, Ninety-sixth Illinois, was commanding. The line, no part of Gen. Steedman's division, had not been withdrawn; neither did any of the commanders of the brigades, Col. Champion, Col. Mitchell, or Col. LeFavor, have any orders to withdraw at the time LeFavor made the bayonet charge and was captured. Capt. Moe, A.A.G., and myself had the order 'to hold position occupied until all troops on the left had passed to the rear,' etc., which order was fully complied with, as we did not fall back for one hour or more after that event.

"I remember as though but yesterday, that, as I was riding along the line encouraging the men, Col. LeFavor rode up to me, saying: 'Major, the enemy is pressing my line, and I am out of ammunition. What are your orders?' I answered: 'Fix bayonets, Colonel, and give them cold steel.' Looking me earnestly in the face, he replied: 'Are those your orders, sir?' I answered: 'They are.' This, as I have said, was about sundown. I saw LeFavor fix his bayonets and charge with the Twenty-second Michigan and Eighty-ninth, drive the enemy until enveloped by them, when he was captured. The charge was a gallant one and saved us from any more serious attack that evening. I thought the order a right one; Gen. Steedman thought so, when informed of it, and subsequent events prove that it was." * * *

This letter looks positive in its tone and contradicts the statements of the officers of the Eighty-ninth Ohio, and therefore requires some consideration. Under the circumstances the order given by Maj. Smith on his own responsibility to Col. LeFavor was correct, otherwise there would have been nothing to do for those regiments but to withdraw, and there is no reason to doubt that the major "saw LeFavor fix his bayonets and charge with the Twenty-second Michigan and Eighty-ninth

Ohio" after he gave the order, but did he stay on that part of the field long enough to see them enveloped and captured? And if not, how does he know that the capture was made during that identical charge? Admitting Gen. Smith's statement as being correct, we should acknowledge, then, that as the order for withdrawal was not yet given to any of the brigades of Steedman's division before LeFavor's command was captured, hence nobody is responsible for that capture, and, consequently, nobody has a right to grumble. But we refuse to admit it.

Gen. Smith says the charge he witnessed was made about sundown, while Col. Glenn says the surrender was made at about dark—twilight, and Lieut. Scott says it was so dark that at ten feet distance they could not recognize whether the troops surrounding them were Union or rebel. The order for withdrawal of our troops had been sent by Gen Thomas* to division commanders at 5.30 p.m., and the withdrawal ordered to commence from the center by Reynold's division, to which the writer of this belonged, and to continue successively toward the extreme flanks of our wings, which at that time stood nearly at a right angle to each other. The time that order was sent was about sundown, yet it was daylight. But when the time came about dark—twilight, then most of our troops had been already withdrawn from the position and the firing ceased, except some occasional shots. But let us see what our enemies said in regard to that capture.

We mentioned in the narrative that Gen. B. R. Johnson was one of the best, if not the best, officer in Bragg's army. His report of the action of his own troops and even that of his opponent's is remarkably clear, acurate, and impartial. After the attack of Steedman's division upon five rebel brigades being on the point of turning Brannan's position on Horseshoe Ridge and resulting in the breaking up of two brigades of Hindman's division and their withdrawal to the rear, B. R. Johnson, with his own, McNair's, and Gregg's brigades, supported on the right by Anderson's brigade of Hindman's division, was opposing and fighting Whittaker's and Mitchell's brigades of Steedman during the rest of the afternoon of September 20 until our troops withdrew. The time of the enemy's attack, made tow-

* Maj.-Gen. Geo. H. Thomas' report, Sept. 30, 1863.

ard evening on our left wing, coincided with the time of our withdrawal, hence the rebel officers thought at the time that they had driven us out of our positions, while we were withdrawing from them voluntarily. When the rebel right wing assaulted our left wing, their left wing also pressed forward on the whole line of our right wing on Horseshoe Ridge. In his report* of this action, Gen. Johnson says: "Over three hours passed in this conflict, in which officers and men toiled on and manifested more perseverance, determination, and endurance than I have ever before witnessed on any field. We had now slowly driven the enemy on the left up the gradual ascent about half a mile to the coveted crest of the ridge, where they made the last desperate resistance, and our lines gradually grew stronger and stronger under the animating hope of victory so nearly within our grasp. It was finally nearly sunset when a simultaneous advance swept along our whole lines, and with a shout we drove the enemy from the ridge and pursued them far down the northern slope to the bottom of the deep hollow beyond. We had now completely flanked and passed to the rear of the position of the enemy on the ridge to our right, and I am convinced we thus aided in finally carrying the heights south of Snodgrass' house."

It is evident from the above that, at nearly sunset, the rebels under Gen, B. R. Johnson pressed Whittaker's and Mitchell's brigades of Steedman's, which were withdrawing, thinking they were driving them out of their position. But where at that time were the regiments under Col. LeFavor? Were they not captured? No. Here is what the same Johnson continues to say: "About the time the ridge was carried, Col. Trigg of Preston's division, reported to me with a part of his brigade. I sent Capt. [F. B.] Ferry of the Seventeenth Tennessee regiment, who was wounded, on horseback to place Trigg's command on our right, and it relieved Gregg's brigade, which was out of ammunition.

"I now proceeded to reform my line,† which in the pursuit, I

* Report of Brig.-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson, C.-S. Army, commanding provisional division, Oct. 24, 1863.

† Gen. Johnson was doing this beyond, or on the north side of Horseshoe Ridge, in the bottom.

regret to say, was entirely broken, owing in part to the peculiar conformation of the ground over which we passed. I still hoped to follow up the retreating foe. After I ordered McNair's and Johnson's brigades to form on Trigg's, this brigade suddenly disappeared—called away, no doubt, to coöperate with Kelly's brigade in capturing the two regiments of Gen. Granger's corps, which surrendered to them about dark. I felt now that it would be unsafe to advance, disconnected as my command was, and it being now dark (nearly 8 p.m.), I withdrew it some 250 yards to a good position near the top of the ridge." * *

Now, here is a positive official statement of the rebel general officer who opposed Steedman's brigades, that at nearly sunset those brigades left their position and he occupied the ridge, and that the two regiments of Gen. Granger's corps surrendered to Cols. Kelly and Trigg about dark, adding: "it being now dark, (nearly 8 p.m.)"

Where was Gen. Steedman at the time of that surrender? He answers it himself in his report, dated Chattanooga, Sept. 26, 1863, in the following words: "Determined to get possession of the Ridge, he [the enemy] immediately attacked us again, and for about an hour fought desperately, my troops maintaining their position against superior numbers until 6 o'clock, when, having expended our ammunition, the extra ammunition which I had with my command, 95,000 rounds, having been taken to supply Gen. Brannan's troops, who were out, my troops fell back under orders, after retiring to the second ridge in rear of the one on which they had fought, and resting half an hour. Finding the enemy did not attempt pursuit, all firing having ceased on both sides, they retired under orders to Rossville and occupied their former camp." * *

Now, then, at 6 p.m., Gen. Steedman withdrew his division to the second ridge in rear of the one on which he fought, and was resting there half an hour before moving farther, while the Eighty-ninth Ohio and Twenty-second Michigan, who were temporarily attached to his division, were left behind without any orders to retire, facing with "fixed bayonets," but empty barrels, the two rebel brigades of Kelly and Trigg, surrounding them with their muskets loaded. The above plainly shows that the order to withdraw was given to Whittaker's and Mitchell's

brigades before the surrender of LeFavor's command and not after it, as Gen. Smith asserts. There were no orders sent to LeFavor to withdraw. Gen. Wood withdrew at 7 p.m.,* and Col. Vanderveer states in his report of Sept. 25, 1863, that Brannan's troops withdrew also at 7 p.m., while Gen. Steedman withdrew one hour earlier, although his position was on the extreme right, being the farthest from the center, which was contrary to the order of withdrawal; and it is difficult to perceive the justness of Gen. Smith's assertion that the order of withdrawal was fully complied by Gen. Steedman. The early withdrawal of Steedman's brigades brought disaster on the regiments under Col. LeFavor, and might have brought disaster to Brannan's and Wood's troops still remaining on the ridge, as was clearly intimated in the report of the rebel Col. Trigg, who participated in that capture.†

Having thus abundantly demonstrated that the Eighty-ninth Ohio and Twenty-second Michigan, after asking for the ammunition and receiving an order to defend the position with bayonet, remained and fought on that position until dark; that at the time Gen. Steedman's brigades of Whittaker and Mitchell were ordered to withdraw, no orders had been sent to Col. LeFavor to withdraw; that at the time, between 4 and 5 p.m., when other troops were supplied with the ammunition, these regiments were entirely neglected and no information was given them that there was ammunition at hand; that as these two regiments have been neglected by the authorities under whose command they were temporarily serving, that the same neglect was shown to the Twenty-first Ohio by the authorities under whose orders that regiment served; that failing to supply the command with the ammunition during the battle, when there was plenty of it, and failing to give orders to withdraw when other troops of the same command were withdrawing was a criminal neglect of duty; that at the time of Gen. Steedman's withdrawal there was not the slightest hindrance to those three regiments to also withdraw; that these regiments have done their duty to their government and their country faithfully and

* Report of Brig.-Gen. T. J. Wood, Sept. 29, 1863.

† Report of R. C. Trigg, colonel commanding brigade, Preston's Division, Buckner's Corps.

well; that the horrors of the Southern prisons were the reward to the captured men for their unexampled devotion, bravery, and patriotism; and that those who were in authority over them at the time are responsible for their capture and amenable to the charge of criminal neglect of duty, be they high or low, major-generals or privates.

Having produced the witnesses and all the facts bearing upon that unfortunate capture, which never has been investigated, and having preferred the charge, we leave it to the public to pronounce the verdict.

JOHN B. TURCHIN,
Late Brig.-Gen. U.-S. Vols.

July 30, 1887.

Army of the Cumberland, Organization of, during the Battle of Chickamauga, Ga., Sept. 19 and 20, 1863.

GEN. WM. STARK ROSECRANS, Commanding.

Department Headquarters.

1st Battalion Ohio Sharpshooters, Capt. Gershom M. Barber.
Provost Guard, 10th Ohio Infantry, Col. Jos. W. Burke and Lt.-Col. Wm. M. Ward.
Escort, 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Col. Wm. J. Palmer.

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE HENRY THOMAS, Commanding.

Provost Guard, 9th Michigan Infantry,* Col. John G. Parkhurst.
Escort, 1st Ohio Cavalry, Company L, Capt. John D. Barker.

First Division.

Brig.-Gen. ABSALOM BAIRD, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Col. BENJAMIN F. SCRIBNER, Commanding.

38th Indiana, Lieut.-Col. Daniel F. Griffin.
94th Ohio, Maj. Rue P. Hutchins.
2d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Obadiah C. Maxwell, Maj. Wm. T. Beatty, and Capt. James Warnock.
33d Ohio, Col. Oscar F. Moore.
10th Wisconsin, Lieut.-Col. John H. Ely and Capt. Jacob W. Roby.

Second Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. JOHN C. STARKWEATHER, Commanding.

1st Wisconsin, Lieut.-Col. Geo. B. Bingham.
21st Wisconsin, Lieut.-Col. Harrison C. Hobart and Capt. Chas. H. Walker.
24th Illinois, Col. Geza Mihalotzy,† Maj. George A. Guenther,‡ and Capt. August Mauff.
79th Pennsylvania, Col. Henry A. Hambright.

Third Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. JOHN H. KING, Commanding.

15th U.S., 1st Battalion, Capt. Albert B. Dod.
16th U.S., 1st Battalion, Maj. Sidney Coolidge and Capt. Robert E. A. Crofton.
18th U.S., 1st Battalion, Capt. George W. Smith.
18th U.S., 2d Battalion, Capt. Henry Haymond..
19th U.S., 1st Battalion, Maj. Samuel K. Dawson and Capt. Edmund L. Smith.

Artillery.—1st Michigan Light, Battery A (1st brigade), Lieuts. Geo. W. Van Pelt and Almerick W. Wilber.
Indiana Light, 4th Battery (2d brigade), Lieuts. David Flansburg and Henry J. Willits.
5th U.S., Battery H (3d brigade), Lieuts. Howard M. Burnham and Joshua A. Fessenden.

* Not engaged, on provost duty and train-guard.
† Wounded on the 19th. ‡ Wounded on the 20th.

Second Division.

Maj.-Gen. JAMES S. NEGLEY, Commanding

First Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. JOHN BEATTY, Commanding.
42d Indiana, Lieut.-Col. Wm. T. B. McIntire.
88th Indiana, Col. George Humphrey.
104th Illinois, Lieut.-Col. Douglas Hapeman.
15th Kentucky, Col. Marion C. Taylor.
3d Ohio,* Capt. Leroy S. Bell.

Second Brigade.—Cols. TIMOTHY R. STANLEY† and WM. L. STOUGHTON.
18th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Grosvenor.
19th Illinois, Lieut.-Col. Alex. W. Raffen and Capt. Presley Neville Guthrie.
11th Michigan, Col. Wm. L. Stoughton and Lieut.-Col. Melvin Mudge.
69th Ohio,* Col. Marshall T. Moore.

Third Brigade.—Col. WILLIAM SIRWELL, Commanding.
78th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Archibald Blakeley.
21st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Dwella M. Stoughton, Maj. Arnold McMahan, and Capt. Chas. H. Vantine.
74th Ohio, Col. Josiah Given and Capt. Joseph Fisher.
37th Indiana, Col. James S. Hull and Lieut.-Col. Wm. D. Ward.

Artillery.—Illinois Light, Bridges' Battery‡ (1st brigade), Capt. Lyman Bridges.
1st Ohio Light, Battery M (2d brigade), Capt. Frederick Schultz.
1st Ohio Light, Battery G (3d brigade), Capt. Alex. Marshall.

Third Division.

Brig.-Gen. JOHN M. BRANNAN, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Col. JOHN M. CONNELL, Commanding.
17th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Durbin Ward.
31st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frederick W. Lister.
38th Ohio,§ Col. Edward H. Phelps.
82d Indiana, Col. Morton C. Hunter.

Second Brigade.—Cols. JOHN T. CROXTON† and WM. H. HAYS, Commanding.
4th Kentucky, Lieut.-Col. P. Burgess Hunt and Maj. Robert M. Kelly.
10th Kentucky, Col. Wm. H. Hays and Maj. Gabriel C. Wharton.
10th Indiana, Col. Wm. B. Carroll and Lieut.-Col. Marsh B. Taylor.
74th Indiana, Col. Charles W. Chapman and Lieut.-Col. Myron Baker.
14th Ohio, Col. Henry D. Kingsbury.

Third Brigade.—Col. FERDINAND VANDERVEER, Commanding.
9th Ohio, Col. Gustave Kæmmerling.
35th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Henry V. N. Boynton.
2d Minnesota, Col. James George.
87th Indiana, Col. Newell Gleason.

Artillery.—1st Michigan Light, Battery D (1st brigade), Capt. Josiah W. Church.
1st Ohio Light, Battery C (2d brigade), Lieut. Marco B. Gary.
4th U.S., Battery I (3d brigade), Lieut. Frank G. Smith.

* Not in the battle. † Wounded on the 20th. § Not in the battle, train-guard.

‡ Bridges' Battery was organized from Co. G of the 19th Illinois Volunteers, with additions of recruits; the officers of that company became those of the battery.

Fourth Division.

Maj.-Gen. JOSEPH J. REYNOLDS, Commanding.

First Brigade.*—Col. JOHN T. WILDER, Commanding.

17th Indiana, Maj. Wm. T. Jones.
72d Indiana, Col. Abram O. Miller.
92d Illinois, Col. Smith D. Atkins.
98th Illinois, Col. John J. Funkhouser and Lieut.-Col. Edward Kitchell.
123d Illinois, Col. James Monroe.

Second Brigade.—Cols. EDWARD A. KING† and MILTON S. ROBINSON.

68th Indiana, Capt. Harvey J. Espy.
75th Indiana, Col. Milton S. Robinson and Lieut.-Col. Wm. O'Brien.
101st Indiana, Lieut.-Col. Thomas Doan.
80th Illinois,‡ Col. Andrew F. Rogers.
105th Ohio, Maj. Geo. T. Perkins.

Third Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. JOHN BASIL TURCHIN, Commanding.

11th Ohio, Col. Philander P. Lane.
36th Ohio, Col. Wm. G. Jones§ and Lieut.-Col. Hiram F. Devol.
89th Ohio,‖ Col. Caleb H. Carlton.
92d Ohio, Col. Benjamin D. Fearing¶ and Lieut.-Col. Douglas Putnam, jr.
18th Kentucky, Lieut.-Col. H. Kavanaugh Milward and Capt. John B. Heltemes.

Artillery.—Indiana Light, 18th Battery** (1st brigade), Capt. Eli Lilly.
Indiana Light, 19th Battery (2d brigade), Capt. Samuel J. Harris and Lieut. Robert G. Lackey.
Indiana Light, 21st Battery (3d brigade), Capt. Wm. W. Andrew.

TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. ALEXANDER MCDOWELL MCCOOK, Commanding.

General Headquarters.

Provost Guard, 81st Indiana Infantry, Co. H, Capt. Wm. J. Richards.
Escort, 2d Kentucky Cavalry, Co. I. Lieut. George W. L. Batman.

First Division.

Brig.-Gen. JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Commanding.

First Brigade.††—Col. P. SIDNEY POST, Commanding.

22d Indiana, Col. Michael Gooding.
59th Illinois, Lieut.-Col. Joshua C. Winters.
74th Illinois, Col. Jason Marsh.
75th Illinois, Col. John E. Bennett and Lieut.-Col. Wm. M. Kilgour.

* Mounted brigade, was always on detached duty.
† Killed on the 20th, afternoon; Col. Milton S. Robinson of the 75th Indiana succeeding.
‡ On duty in Nashville, Tenn.
§ Killed on the 19th; Lieut.-Col. Hiram F. Devol succeeding.
‖ Was detached, and acted with Steedman's division of the Reserve Corps.
¶ Wounded on the 19th; Lieut.-Col. Douglas Putnam, jr., succeeding.
** Acted with Wilder's mounted brigade.
†† Was left at Stevens' gap with trains. On Sept. 20, acted with cavalry on the right.

Second Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. WM. P. CARLIN, Commanding.

21st Illinois, Col. John W. S. Alexander and Capt. Chester K. Knight.
38th Illinois, Lieut.-Col. Daniel H. Gilmer and Capt. Willis G. Whitehurst.
81st Indiana, Capt. Nevil B. Boone* and Maj. Jas. E. Calloway.
101st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John Messer, Maj. Bedan B. McDonald, and Capt. Leonard D. Smith.

Third Brigade.—Col. HANS C. HEG† and Col. JOHN A. MARTIN, Commanding.

15th Wisconsin, Lieut.-Col. Ole C. Johnson.
25th Illinois, Maj. Samuel D. Wall and Capt. Wesford Taggart.
35th Illinois, Lieut.-Col. William P. Chandler.
8th Kansas, Col. John A. Martin and Lieut.-Col. James L. Abernethy.

Artillery.—Wisconsin Light, 5th Battery‡ (1st brigade), Capt. George Q. Gardner.
Minnesota Light, 2d Battery§ (2d brigade), Lieuts. Albert Woodbury and Richard L. Dawley.
Wisconsin Light, 8th Battery (3d brigade), Lieut. John D. McLean.

Second Division.

Brig.-Gen. RICHARD W. JOHNSON, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. AUGUST WILLICH‖ and Col. C. T. HOTCHKISS.

49th Ohio, Maj. Samuel F. Gray and Capt. Luther M. Strong.
39th Indiana,¶ Col. Thomas J. Harrison.
32d Indiana, Lieut.-Col. Francis Erdelmeyer.
15th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frank Askew.
89th Illinois, Col. Chas. Truman Hotchkiss, Lieut.-Col. Duncan J. Hall,** and Maj. Wm. D. Williams.

Second Brigade.—Col. JOSEPH B. DODGE, Commanding.

77th Pennsylvania, Col. Thomas E. Rose and Capt. Joseph J. Lawson.
29th Indiana, Lieut.-Col. David M. Dunn.
30th Indiana, Lieut.-Col. Orrin D. Hurd.
79th Illinois, Col. Allen Buckner.
34th Illinois, Lieut.-Col. Oscar VanTassell.

Third Brigade.—Cols. PHILEMON P. BALDWIN†† and WM. W. BERRY, Com'd'g.

6th Indiana, Lieut.-Col. Hagerman Tripp and Maj. Calvin D. Campbell.
1st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. E. Bassett Langdon.
93d Ohio, Col. Hiram Strong and Lieut.-Col. Wm. H. Martin.
5th Kentucky, Col. William W. Berry and Capt. John M. Huston.

Artillery.—1st Ohio Light, Battery A (1st brigade), Capt. Wilber F. Goodspeed.
Ohio Light, 20th Battery (2d brigade), Capt. John T. E. Grosskopff.
Indiana Light, 5th Battery (3d brigade), Capt. Peter Simonson.

* Superseded on the 19th by Maj. James E. Calloway of the 21st Illinois.
† Killed on the 19th; succeeded by Col. John A. Martin of the 8th Kansas.
‡ Was left at Stevens' gap with trains. On Sept. 20, acted with cavalry on the right.
§ Capt. Wm. A. Hotchkiss, chief of division artillery.
‖ Wounded on Sept. 20.
¶ Mounted and detached from the brigade.
** Killed on Sept. 20.
†† Killed on the 19th; Col. W. W. Berry of the 5th Kentucky succeeding.

Third Division.

Maj.-Gen. PHILIP HENRY SHERIDAN, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. WILLIAM H. LYTLE* and Col. SILAS MILLER.
88th Illinois, Lieut.-Col. Alex. S. Chadbourne.
36th Illinois, Col. Silas Miller and Lieut.-Col. Porter C. Olson.
24th Wisconsin, Lieut.-Col. Theodore S. West and Maj. Carl von Baumbach.
21st Michigan, Col. Wm. B. McCreery and Maj. Seymour Chase.

Second Brigade.—Col. BERNARD LAIBOLDT, Commanding.
2d Missouri, Lieut.-Col. Arnold Beck.
15th Missouri, Col. Joseph Conrad.
44th Illinois, Col. Wallace W. Barrett.
73d Illinois, Col. James F. Jaquess.

Third Brigade.—Cols. LUTHER P. BRADLEY† and NATHAN H. WALWORTH,
22d Illinois, Lieut.-Col. Francis Swanwick. Com'd'g
27th Illinois, Col. Jonathan R. Miles.
42d Illinois, Col. Nathan H. Walworth and Lieut.-Col. John A. Hottenstine.
51st Illinois, Lieut.-Col. Samuel B. Raymond.

Artillery.—Indiana Light, 11th Battery (1st brigade), Capt. Arnuld Sutermeister.
1st Missouri Light, Battery G‡ (2d brigade), Lieut. Gustavus Schueler.
1st Illinois Light, Battery C (3d brigade), Capt. Mark H. Prescott.

TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN, Commanding.

Escort, 15th Illinois Cavalry, Company K, Capt. Samuel B. Sherer.

First Division.

Brig.-Gen. THOMAS J. WOOD, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Col. GEORGE P. BUELL, Commanding.
26th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Wm. H. Young.
58th Indiana, Lieut.-Col. James T. Embree.
13th Michigan, Col. Joshua B. Culver and Maj. Willard G. Eaton.
100th Illinois, Col. Frederick A. Bartleson and Maj. Chas. M. Hammond.

Second Brigade.§—Brig.-Gen. GEORGE D. WAGNER, Commanding.
15th Indiana, Col. Gustavus A. Wood.
40th Indiana, Col. John W. Blake.
51st Indiana,‖ Col. Abel D. Streight.
57th Indiana, Lieut.-Col. Geo. W. Lennard.
97th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Milton Barnes.

* Killed on the 20th; Col. Silas Miller of the 36th Illinois succeeding.
† Wounded on the 19th; Col. Nathan H. Walworth of the 42d Illinois succeeding.
‡ Capt. Henry Hescock, chief of division artillery.
§ During the battle occupied Chattanooga. ‖ On duty in Nashville, Tenn.

Third Brigade.—Col. CHARLES G. HARKER, Commanding.

3d Kentucky, Col. Henry C. Dunlap.
64th Ohio, Col. Alex. McIlvane.
65th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Horatio N. Whitbeck, Maj. Samuel C. Brown, and Capt. Thomas Powell.
125th Ohio, Col. Emerson Opdycke.
73d Indiana,* Col. Ivin N. Walker.

Artillery.—Indiana Light, 8th Battery (1st brigade), Capt. George Estep.
Indiana Light, 10th Battery† (2d brigade), Lieut. Wm. A. Naylor.
Ohio Light, 6th Battery (3d brigade), Capt. Cullen S. Bradley.

Second Division.

Maj.-Gen. JOHN MCAULEY PALMER, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. CHARLES CRUFT, Commanding.

1st Kentucky,‡ Lieut.-Col. Alva R. Hadlock.
2d Kentucky, Col. Thomas D. Sedgewick.
31st Indiana, Col. John T. Smith.
90th Ohio, Col. Charles H. Ripley.

Second Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. WILLIAM B. HAZEN, Commanding.

41st Ohio, Col. Aquila Wiley.
124th Ohio, Col. Oliver H. Payne and Maj. James B. Hampson.
6th Kentucky, Col. Geo. T. Shackelford, Lieut. Richard Rockingham, and Maj. Richard T. Whitaker.
9th Indiana, Col. Isaac C. B. Suman.
110th Illinois§ (battalion), Lieut.-Col. Ebenezer H. Topping.

Third Brigade.—Col. WILLIAM GROSE, Commanding.

36th Indiana, Col. Oliver H. P. Carey and Maj. Gilbert Trusler.
24th Ohio, Col. David J. Higgins.
6th Ohio, Col. Nicholas L. Anderson and Maj. Samuel C. Erwin.
23d Kentucky, Lieut.-Col. James C. Foy.
84th Illinois, Col. Louis H. Waters.

Artillery.‖—1st Ohio Light, Battery B (1st brigade), Lieut. Norman A. Baldwin.
1st Ohio Light, Battery F (2d brigade), Lieut. Giles J. Cockerill, jr.
4th U.S., Battery H, (3d brigade), Lieut. Harry C. Cushing.
4th U.S., Battery M, (3d brigade), Lieut. Francis D. L. Russell.

Third Division.

Brig.-Gen. HORATIO P. VANCLEVE, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. SAMUEL BEATTY, Commanding.

9th Kentucky, Col. Geo. H. Cram.
17th Kentucky, Col. Alex. M. Stout.
19th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Henry G. Stratton.
79th Indiana, Col. Frederick Knefler.

* On duty in Nashville, Tenn. † During the battle occupied Chattanooga.
‡ Five companies attached as wagon-guard. § Unattached, not engaged.
‖ Capt. Wm. E. Standart, chief of artillery.

Second Brigade.—Col. GEO. F. DICK, Commanding.
44th Indiana, Lieut.-Col. Simeon C. Aldrich.
86th Indiana, Maj. Jacob C. Dick.
13th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Elkanan M. Mast and Capt. Horatio G. Cosgrove.
59th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Granville A. Frambes.

Third Brigade.—Col. SIDNEY M. BARNES, Commanding.
51st Ohio, Col. Richard W. McLain and Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Wood.
99th Ohio, Col. Peter T. Swaine.
35th Indiana, Maj. John P. Dufficy.
8th Kentucky, Lieut.-Col. James D. Mayhew and Maj. John S. Clark.
21st Kentucky,* Col. S. Woodson Price.

Artillery.—Indiana Light, 7th Battery, Capt. George R. Swallow.
Pennsylvania Light, 26th Battery, Capt. Alanson J. Stevens and Lieut. Samuel M. McDowell.
Wisconsin Light, 3d Battery, Lieut. Courtland Livingston.

RESERVE CORPS.†

MAJ.-GEN. GORDON GRANGER, Commanding.

Escort, 1st Missouri Cavalry, Company F.

First Division.

Brig.-Gen. JAMES BLAIR STEEDMAN, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. WALTER C. WHITTAKER, Commanding.
40th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William Jones.
89th Ohio,‡ Col. Caleb H. Carlton and Capt. Isaac C. Nelson.
84th Indiana, Col. Nelson Trusler.
96th Illinois, Col. Thomas E. Champion.
115th Illinois, Col. Jesse H. Moore.
22d Michigan,‡ Col. Heber Le Favour, Lieut.-Col. William Sanborn, and Capt. Alonzo M. Keeler.

Second Brigade.—Col. JOHN G. MITCHELL, Commanding.
98th Ohio, Capts. Moses A. Urquhart and Armstrong J. Thomas.
113th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Darius B. Warner.
121st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Henry B. Banning.
78th Illinois, Lieut.-Col. Carter VanVleck and Lieut. George Green.

Third Brigade.§—Col. JOHN COBURN, Commanding.
33d Indiana, Lieut.-Col. James M. Henderson.
85th Indiana, Col. John P. Baird.
22d Wisconsin, Lieut.-Col. Edward Bloodgood.
19th Michigan, Col. Henry C. Gilbert.

Artillery.—Ohio Light, 18th Battery, (1st brigade), Capt. Charles C. Aleshire.
1st Illinois Light, Battery M (2d brigade), Lieut. Thomas Burton.
Ohio Light, 9th Battery§ (3d brigade), Capt. Harrison B. York.

* Not engaged, stationed at Whitesides.

† The corps consisted of three divisions, but in the battle of Chickamauga only three brigades participated, the balance remained stationed at different points in the rear.

‡ Temporarily attached. § Not in battle.

Second Division.

Brig.-Gen. JAMES D. MORGAN, Commanding.

First Brigade.*—Col. ROBERT F. SMITH, Commanding.
- 10th Illinois, Col. John Tilson.
- 16th Illinois, Col. Robert F. Smith.
- 60th Illinois, Col. William B. Anderson.
- 10th Michigan, Lieut.-Col. Christopher J. Dickerson.
- 14th Michigan, Col. Henry R. Mizner.

Second Brigade.—Col. DANIEL M. MCCOOK, Commanding.
- 85th Illinois, Col. Caleb J. Dilworth.
- 86th Illinois, Lieut.-Col. David W. Magee.
- 125th Illinois, Col. Oscar F. Harmon.
- 52d Ohio, Maj. James T. Holmes.
- 69th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Brigham.

Third Brigade.*—Col. CHARLES C. DOOLITTLE, Commanding.
- 18th Michigan, Col. Charles C. Doolittle.
- 22d Michigan, Col. Heber LeFavour (with 1st division, 1st brigade).
- 106th Ohio, Col. Geo. B. Wright.
- 108th Ohio, Col. Geo. T. Limberg.
- 10th Tennessee (detached), Col. James W. Scully.

Artillery.—Wisconsin Light, 10th Battery,* Lieut. P. M. H. Groesbeck.
- 2d Illinois Light, Battery I (2d brigade), Capt. Chas. M. Barnett.
- 1st Ohio Light, Battery E,* Lieut. Andrew Berwick.

Third Division.*

Brig.-Gen. ROBERT S. GRANGER, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Col. S. D. BRUCE, Commanding.
- 83d Illinois, Col. Arthur A. Smith.
- 13th Wisconsin, Col. W. P. Lyon.
- 71st Ohio, Col. Henry K. McConnell.
- 102d Ohio, Col. Wm. Given.
- 28th Kentucky, Col. Wm. P. Boone.

Second Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. T. D. WARD, Commanding.
- 70th Indiana, Col. Benjamin Harrison.
- 79th Ohio, Col. Henry G. Kennett.
- 102d Illinois, Col. Franklin C. Smith.
- 105th Illinois, Col. Daniel Dustan.
- 129th Illinois, Col. Henry Case.

Third Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. J. G. SPEARS, Commanding.
- 3d Tennessee, Col. Wm. Cross.
- 5th Tennessee, Maj. Joseph D. Turner.
- 6th Tennessee, Col. Joseph A. Cooper.

Artillery.—Battery H, 2d Illinois Artillery, Capt. Henry C. Whitemore.
- 5th Michigan Battery, Capt. John G. Ely.
- 1st Tennessee Battery.

* Not in battle.

CAVALRY.*

BRIG.-GEN. ROBERT B. MITCHELL, Commanding.

First Division.

Col. EDWARD M. MCCOOK, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Col. ARCHIBALD P. CAMPBELL, Commanding.
2d Michigan, Maj. Leonidas S. Scranton.
9th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Roswell M. Russell.
1st Tennessee, Lieut.-Col. Jas. P. Brownlow.

Second Brigade.—Col. DANIEL M. RAY, Commanding.
2d Indiana, Maj. Joseph B. Presdee.
4th Indiana, Lieut.-Col. John T. Deweese.
2d Tennessee, Lieut.-Col. Wm. R. Cook.
1st Wisconsin, Col. Oscar H. LaGrange.

Third Brigade.—Col. LOUIS D. WATKINS, Commanding.
4th Kentucky, Col. Wickliffe Cooper.
5th Kentucky, Lieut.-Col. Wm. T. Hoblitzell.
6th Kentucky, Maj. Louis A. Gratz.

Artillery.—1st Ohio Light, Battery D, section (2d brigade), Lieut. Nathaniel M. Newell.

Second Division.

Brig.-Gen. GEORGE CROOK, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Col. ROBERT H. G. MINTY, Commanding.
7th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. James J. Seibert.
4th Michigan, Maj. Horace Gray.
4th United States, Capt. James B. McIntyre.
3d Indiana (detachment), Lieut.-Col. Robert Klein.

Second Brigade.—Col. ELI LONG, Commanding.
1st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Valentine Cupp and Maj. Thomas J. Patten.
3d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Seidel.
4th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Oliver P. Robie.
2d Kentucky, Col. Thomas P. Nicholas.

Third Brigade.†—Col. WILLIAM W. LOWE, Commanding.
5th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Matthewson T. Patrick.
10th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William E. Haynes.
5th Tennessee, Col. Wm. B. Stokes.

Artillery.—Chicago (Ill.) "Board-of-Trade" Battery, Capt. James H. Stokes.

Unassigned Troops.

Pioneer Brigade (Mich.)—Brig.-Gen. JAMES ST. CLAIR MORTON, Commanding.
(Three battalions.)

* Maj.-Gen. David S. Stanley, the chief of cavalry, was absent. † Not in battle.

Army of Tennessee, Organization of, at the Battle of Chickamauga, Ga., Sept. 19 and 20, 1863.*

GEN. BRAXTON BRAGG, C.-S. Army, Commanding.

RIGHT WING.

LIEUT.-GEN. LEONIDAS POLK, Commanding.

Cheatham's Division.†

Maj.-Gen. BENJAMIN F. CHEATHAM, Commanding.

Escort.—2d Georgia Cavalry, Company G, Capt. T. M. MERRITT.

Jackson's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. JOHN K. JACKSON, Commanding.
1st Georgia (Confederate), 2d Georgia Battalion, Maj. J. C. Gordon.
5th Georgia, Col. C. P. Daniel.
2d Georgia Battalion (S. S.), Maj. R. H. Whiteley.
5th Mississippi, Lieut.-Col. W. L. Sykes and Maj. J. B. Herring.
8th Mississippi, Col. J. C. Wilkinson.

Smith's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. PRESTON SMITH and Col. A. J. VAUGHAN, Jr., Commanding.
11th Tennessee, Col. G. W. Gordon.
12th and 47th Tennessee, Col. W. M. Watkins.
13th and 154th Tennessee, Col. A. J. Vaughan, jr., and Lt.-Col. R. W. Pitman.
29th Tennessee, Col. Horace Rice.
Dawson's Battalion‡ Sharpshooters, Maj. J. W. Dawson and Maj. Wm. Green.

Maney's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. GEORGE MANEY, Commanding.
1st and 27th Tennessee, Col. H. R. Feild.
4th§ Tennessee (Prov. Army), Col. J. A. McMurry, Lieut.-Col. R. N. Lewis, Maj. O. A. Bradshaw, and Capt. J. Bostick.
6th and 9th Tennessee, Col. George C. Porter.
24th Tennessee Battalion (S. S.), Maj. Frank Maney.

Wright's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. MARCUS J. WRIGHT, Commanding.
8th Tennessee, Col. John H. Anderson.
16th Tennessee, Col. D. M. Donnell.
28th Tennessee, Col. S. S. Stanton.
38th Tennessee and Murray's (Tennessee) Battalion, Col. J. C. Carter.
51st and 52d Tennessee, Lieut.-Col. John G. Hall.

Strahl's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. O. F. STRAHL, Commanding.
4th§ and 5th Tennessee, Col. J. J. Lamb.
19th Tennessee, Col. F. M. Walker.
24th Tennessee, Col. J. A. Wilson.
31st Tennessee, Col. E. E. Tansil.
33d Tennessee, ——— ———.

* Compiled from the reports when not otherwise indicated. † Of Polk's corps.

‡ Composed of two companies from the 11th Tennessee, two from the 12th and 47th Tennessee (consolidated), and one from the 154th Senior Tennessee.

§ Two regiments of same designation.

Artillery.—Maj. MELANCHTON SMITH, Commanding.

Jackson's brigade, Scogin's (Georgia) Battery, Capt. John Scogin.
Maney's brigade, Smith's (Mississippi) Battery, Lieut. William B. Turner.
Smith's brigade, Scott's (Tennessee) Battery, Lieuts. J. H. Marsh and A. T. Watson.
Strahl's brigade, Stanford's Battery, Capt. T. J. Stanford.
Wright's brigade, Carnes' (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. W. W. Carnes.

HILL'S CORPS.

LIEUT.-GEN. DANIEL HARVEY HILL, Commanding.

Cleburne's Division.

Maj.-Gen. P. R. CLEBURNE, Commanding.

Wood's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. S. A. M. WOOD, Commanding.

16th Alabama, Maj. J. H. McGaughy and Capt. F. A. Ashford.
33d Alabama, Col. Samuel Adams.
45th Alabama, Col. E. B. Breedlove.
18th Alabama Battalion, Maj. J. H. Gibson and Col. Samuel Adams.*
32d and 45th Mlssissippi, Col. M. P. Lowrey.
Sharpshooters, Maj. A. T. Hawkins and Capt. Daniel Coleman.

Polk's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. L. E. POLK, Commanding.

1st Arkansas, Col. J. W. Colquitt.
3d and 5th Confederate, Col. J. A. Smith.
2d Tennessee, Col. W. D. Robison.
35th Tennessee, Col. B. J. Hill.
48th Tennessee, Col. G. H. Nixon.

Deshler's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. JAMES DESHLER and Col. R. Q. MILLS, Com'd'g.

19th and 24th Arkansas, Lieut.-Col. A. S. Hutchinson.
6th, 10th, and 15th* Texas, Col. R. Q. Mills and Lt.-Col. T. Scott Anderson.
17th, 18th, 24th, and 25th Texas,† Col. F. C. Wilkes, Lieut.-Col. John T. Coit, and Maj. W. A. Taylor.

Artillery.—Maj. T. R. HOTCHKISS and Capt. H. C. SEMPLE, Commanding.

Deshler's brigade, Douglas' (Texas) Battery, Capt. J. P. Douglas.
Polk's brigade, Calvert's (Tennessee) Battery, Lieut. Thomas J. Key.
Wood's brigade, Semple's (Alabama) Battery, Capt. H. C. Semple and Lieut. R. W. Goldthwaite.

Breckinridge's Division.

Maj.-Gen. JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, Commanding.

Helm's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. BENJ. HARDIN HELM and Col. J. H. LEWIS, Cmdg.

41st Alabama, Col. M. L. Stansel.
2d Kentucky, Col. J. W. Hewitt and Lieut. J. W. Moss.
4th Kentucky, Col. Joseph P. Nuckols, jr., and Maj. T. W. Thompson.
6th Kentucky, Col. J. H. Lewis and Lieut.-Col. M. H. Cofer.
9th Kentucky, Col. J. W. Caldwell and Lieut.-Col. J. C. Wickliffe.

* 33d Alabama. † Dismounted cavalry.

Adams' Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. DANIEL W. ADAMS and Col. R. L. GIBSON, Commanding.

32d Alabama, Maj. J. C. Kimbell.

13th and 20th Louisiana, Cols. R. L. Gibson and Leon von Zinken and Capt. E. M. Dubroca.

16th and 25th Louisiana, Col. D. Gober.

19th Louisiana, Lieut.-Col. R. W. Turner, Maj. L. Butler, and Capt. H. A. Kennedy.

14th Louisiana (Sharpshooters) Battalion, Maj. J. E. Austin.

Stovall's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. M. A. STOVALL, Commanding.

1st and 3d Florida, Col. W. S. Dilworth.

4th Florida, Col. W. L. L. Bowen.

47th Georgia, Capts. William S. Phillips and Joseph S. Cone.

60th North Carolina, Lieut.-Col. J. M. Ray and Capt. J. T. Weaver.

Artillery.—Maj. R. E. GRAVES, Commanding.

Adams' brigade, Slocomb's (Louisiana) Battery, Capt. C. H. Slocomb.

Helm's brigade, Cobb's (Kentucky) Battery, Capt. Robert Cobb.

Stovall's brigade, Mebane's (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. John W. Mebane.

RESERVE CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. W. H. T. WALKER, Commanding.

Walker's Division.*

Brig.-Gen. S. R. GIST, Commanding.

Gist's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. S. R. GIST, Col. P. H. COLQUITT, and Lieut.-Col. L. NAPIER, Commanding.

46th Georgia, Col. P. H. Colquitt and Maj. A. M. Speer.

8th Georgia Battalion, Lieut.-Col. L. Napier.

16th South Carolina,† Col. J. McCullough.

24th South Carolina, Col. C. H. Stevens and Lieut.-Col. E. Capers.

Wilson's Brigade.—Col. C. C. WILSON, Commanding.

25th Georgia, Lieut.-Col. A. J. Williams.

29th Georgia, Lieut. G. R. McRae.

30th Georgia, Lieut.-Col. J. S. Boynton.

1st Georgia Battalion (S. S.), ——— ———.

4th Louisiana Battalion, ——— ———.

Ector's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. M. D. ECTOR, Commanding.

Stone's Alabama Battalion.

Pound's Mississippi Battalion.

29th North Carolina.

9th Texas.

10th, 14th, and 32d Texas Cavalry.‡

Artillery.§—Gist's brigade, Ferguson's (S. C.) Battery, Lieut. R. T. Beauregard.

Martin's Battery, ——— ———.

* Walker's and Liddell's divisions constituted a "Reserve Corps" under Walker's command, Gist commanding meanwhile Walker's division.

† Not engaged; at Rome.

‡ Serving as infantry.

§ Walker reports five batteries in the "Reserve Corps," but those with Ector's and Wilson's brigades are not named in the reports.

Liddell's Division.*

Brig.-Gen. ST. JOHN R. LIDDELL, Commanding.

Liddell's Brigade.—Col. D. C. GOVAN, Commanding.

2d and 15th Arkansas, Lieut.-Col. R. T. Harvey and Capt. A. T. Meek.
5th and 13th Arkansas, Col. L. Featherston and Lieut.-Col. John E. Murray.
6th and 7th Arkansas, Col. D. A. Gillespie and Lieut.-Col. P. Snyder.
8th Arkansas, Lieut.-Col. G. F. Baucum and Maj. A. Watkins.
1st Louisiana, Lieut.-Col. G. F. Baucum and Maj. A. Watkins.

Walthall's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. E. C. WALTHALL, Commanding.

24th Mississippi, Lieut.-Col. R. P. McKelvaine, Maj. W. C. Staples, and Capts. B. F. Toomer and J. D. Smith.
27th Mississippi, Col. James A. Campbell.
29th Mississippi, Col. W. F. Brantly.
30th Mississippi, Col. Junius I. Scales, Lieut.-Col. Hugh A. Reynolds, and Maj. J. M. Johnson.
34th Mississippi,† Maj. W. G. Pegram, Capt. H. J. Bowen, Lieut.-Col. H. A. Reynolds,‡ and ——— ———. (?)

Artillery.—Capt. CHARLES SWETT, Commanding.

Walthall's brigade, Fowler's (Alabama) Battery, Capt. W. H. Fowler.
Warren Light Artillery, Lieut. H. Shannon.
Liddell's brigade, Swett's (Mississippi) Battery.

LEFT WING.

LIEUT.-GEN. JAMES LONGSTREET, Commanding.

McLaws' Division.§

Brig.-Gen. J. B. KERSHAW and Maj.-Gen. LAFAYETTE MCLAWS, Commanding.

Kershaw's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. J. B. KERSHAW, Commanding.

2d South Carolina, Lieut.-Col. F. Gaillard.
3d South Carolina, Col. J. D. Nance.
7th South Carolina, Lieut.-Col. Elbert Bland, Maj. J. S. Hard, and Capt. E. J. Goggans.
8th South Carolina, Col. J. W. Henagan.
15th South Carolina, Col. Joseph F. Gist.
3d South Carolina Battalion, Capt. J. M. Townsend.

Humphreys' Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. B. G. HUMPHREYS, Commanding.

13th Mississippi.
17th Mississippi.
18th Mississippi.
21st Mississippi.

Wofford's Brigade.‖—Brig.-Gen. W. T. WOFFORD, Commanding.

16th Georgia.
18th Georgia.
24th Georgia.
3d Georgia Battalion (sharpshooters).
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion.
Phillips' (Georgia) Legion.

* Walker's and Liddell's divisions constituted a "Reserve Corps" under Walker's command, Gist commanding meanwhile Walker's division.

† 34th Mississippi had four commanders at Chickamauga. ‡ 30th Mississippi.

§ Of Longstreet's corps. Army of Northern Virginia. Organization taken from return of that army for Aug. 31, 1863. Pickett's division was left in Virginia.

‖ Longstreet's report indicates that this brigade did not arrive in time to take part in the battle.

Bryan's Brigade.*—Brig.-Gen. GOODE BRYAN, Commanding.

10th Georgia. 50th Georgia. 51st Georgia. 53d Georgia.

Hood's Division.†

Maj.-Gen. JOHN B. HOOD and Brig.-Gen. E. M. LAW, Commanding.

Jenkins' Brigade.‡—Brig.-Gen. M. JENKINS, Commanding.

1st South Carolina. 6th South Carolina.
2d South Carolina Rifles. Hampton Legion.
5th South Carolina. Palmetto Sharpshooters.

Robertson's Brigade.§—Brig.-Gen. J. B. ROBERTSON and Col. VAN H. MANNING, Commanding.

3d Arkansas, Col. Van H. Manning.
1st Texas, Capt. R. J. Harding.
4th Texas, Col. John P. Bane and Capt. R. H. Bassett.
5th Texas, Maj. J. C. Rogers and Capts. J. S. Cleveland and T. T. Clay.

Law's Brigade.§—Brig.-Gen. E. M. LAW and Col. J. L. SHEFFIELD, Com'ding.

4th Alabama. 47th Alabama.
15th Alabama, Col. W. C. Oates. 48th Alabama.
44th Alabama.

Anderson's Brigade.‡—Brig.-Gen. GEORGE T. ANDERSON, Commanding.

7th Georgia. 11th Georgia.
8th Georgia. 9th Georgia. 59th Georgia.

Benning's Brigade.§—Brig.-Gen. H. L. BENNING, Commanding.

2d Georgia, Lieut.-Col. Wm. S. Shepherd and Maj. W. W. Charlton.
15th Georgia, Col. D. M. DuBose and Maj. P. J. Shannon.
17th Georgia, Lieut.-Col. Charles W. Matthews.
20th Georgia, Col. J. D. Waddell.

Artillery, Longstreet's Corps.‖—Col. E. PORTER ALEXANDER and Maj. FRANK HUGER, Commanding.

Fickling's (South Carolina) Battery. Parker's (Virginia) Battery.
Jordan's (Virginia) Battery. Taylor's (Virginia) Battery.
Moody's (Louisiana) Battery. Woolfolk's (Virginia) Battery.

Hindman's Division.¶

Maj.-Gen. THOS. C. HINDMAN and Brig.-Gen. JAMES PATTON ANDERSON, Comdg.

Anderson's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. J. PATTON ANDERSON and Col. J. H. SHARP, Commanding.

7th Mississippi, Col. W. H. Bishop.
9th Mississippi, Maj. T. H. Lynam.
10th Mississippi, Lieut.-Col. James Barr.
41st Mississippi, Col. W. F. Tucker.
44th Mississippi, Col. J. H. Sharp and Lieut.-Col. R. G. Kelsey.
9th Mississippi Battalion (S. S.), Maj. W. C. Richards.
Garrity's (Alabama) Battery, Capt. J. Garrity.

* Longstreet's report indicates that this brigade did not arrive in time to take part in the battle.

† Of Longstreet's corps. Organ'tion taken from Army of North. Virginia returns, Aug. 31, 1863.

‡ Did not arrive in time to take part in the battle. Jenkins' brigade assigned to the division Sept. 11, 1863.

§ Served part of the time in Johnson's provisional division.

‖ As organized Aug. 31, 1863. Not mentioned in reports of the battle. ¶ Of Polk's corps.

Deas' Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. ZAC. C. DEAS, Commanding.
19th Alabama, Col. S. K. McSpadden.
22d Alabama, Lieut.-Col. John Weedon and Capt. H. T. Toulmin.
25th Alabama, Col. Geo. D. Johnston.
39th Alabama, Col. W. Clark.
50th Alabama, Col. J. G. Coltart.
17th Alabama Battalion (S. S.), Capt. Jas. F. Nabers.
Robertson's (Alabama) Battery, Lieut. S. H. Dent.

Manigault's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. A. M. MANIGAULT, Commanding.
24th Alabama, Col. N. N. Davis.
28th Alabama, Col. John C. Reid.
34th Alabama, Maj. J. N. Slaughter.
10th and 19th South Carolina, Col. James F. Pressley.
Water's (Alabama) Battery, Lieuts. Chas. W. Watkins and Geo. D. Turner.

BUCKNER'S CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. SIMON BOLIVAR BUCKNER, Commanding.

Stewart's Division.

Maj.-Gen. ALEXANDER P. STEWART, Commanding.

Johnson's Brigade.*—Brig.-Gen. BUSHROD R. JOHNSON and Col. J. S. FULTON.
17th Tennessee, Lieut.-Col. Watt W. Floyd.
23d Tennessee, Col. R. H. Keeble.
25th Tennessee, Lieut.-Col. R. B. Snowden.
44th Tennessee, Lieut.-Col. J. L. McEwen, jr., and Maj. G. M. Crawford.

Brown's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. J. C. BROWN and Col. E. C. COOK, Commanding.
18th Tennessee, Col. J. B. Palmer, Lieut.-Col. W. R. Butler, and Capt. Gideon H. Lowe.
26th Tennessee, Col. J. M. Lillard and Maj. R. M. Saffell.
32d Tennessee, Col. Edmund C. Cook and Capt. C. G. Tucker.
45th Tennessee, Col. A. Searcy.
23d Tennessee Battalion, Maj. T. W. Newman and Capt. W. P. Simpson.

Bate's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. W. B. BATE, Commanding.
58th Alabama, Col. Bushrod Jones.
37th Georgia, Col. A. F. Rudler and Lieut.-Col. J. T. Smith.
4th Georgia Battalion (sharpshooters), Maj. T. D. Caswell, Capt. B. M. Turner, and Lieut. Joel Towers..
15th and 37th Tennessee, Col. R. C. Tyler, Lieut.-Col. R. D. Frayser, and Capt. R. M. Tankesley.
20th Tennessee, Col. T. B. Smith and Maj. W. M. Shy.

Clayton's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. H. D. CLAYTON, Commanding.
18th Alabama, Col. J. T. Holtzclaw, Lieut.-Col. R. F. Inge, and Maj. P. F. Hunley.
36th Alabama, Col. L. T. Woodruff.
38th Alabama, Lieut.-Col. A. R. Lankford.

* Part of Johnson's provisional division.

Artillery.—Maj. J. W. ELDRIDGE, Commanding.

Bates' brigade, 9th Georgia Artillery Battal'n, Battery E, Lieut. W. S. Everett.
Brown's brigade, T. H. Dawson's (Georgia) Battery, Lieut. R. W. Anderson.
Clayton's brigade, 1st Arkansas Battery, Capt. J. T. Humphreys.
Johnson's brigade, Eufaula (Alabama) Artillery, Capt. McD. Oliver.

Preston's Division.

Brig.-Gen. WILLIAM PRESTON, Commanding.

Gracie's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. A. GRACIE, Jr., Commanding.

43d Alabama, Col. Y. M. Moody.
1st Alabama Battalion,* Lieut.-Col. J. H. Holt and Capt. G. W. Huguley.
2d Alabama Battalion,* Lieut.-Col. B. Hall, jr., and Capt. W. D. Walden.
3d Alabama Battalion,* Maj. J. W. A. Sanford.
4th Alabama Battalion,† Maj. J. D. McLennan.
63d Tennessee, Lieut.-Col. A. Fulkerson and Maj. John A. Aiken.

Trigg's Brigade.—Col. R. C. TRIGG, Commanding.

1st Florida Cavalry,‡ Col. G. T. Maxwell.
6th Florida, Col. J. J. Finley.
7th Florida, Col. R. Bullock.
54th Virginia, Lieut.-Col. John J. Wade.

Third (Kelley's) Brigade.—Col. J. H. KELLY, Commanding.

65th Georgia, Col. R. H. Moore.
5th Kentucky, Col. H. Hawkins.
58th North Carolina, Col. J. B. Palmer.
63d Virginia, Maj. J. M. French.

Leyden's Artillery Battalion.—Maj. A. LEYDEN, Commanding.

Jeffress' (Virginia) Battery.
Peeples' (Georgia) Battery.
Wolihin's (Georgia) Battery.
York's Battery.

Reserve Corps Artillery.—Maj. S. C. WILLIAMS, Commanding.

Baxter's (Tennessee) Battery.§
Darden's Battery.
Kolb's Battery.
McCants' (Florida) Battery.§

Johnson's Division.‖

Brig.-Gen. BUSHROD R. JOHNSON, Commanding.

McNair's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. E. MCNAIR and Col. D. COLEMAN, Commanding.

1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles, Col. Robert W. Harper.
2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles, Col. James A. Williamson.
25 Arkansas, Lieut.-Col. Eli Hufstedler.
4th and 31st Arkansas Infantry and 4th Arkansas Battery (consolidated), Maj. J. A. Ross.
39th North Carolina, Col. D. Coleman.
Culpeper's (S. C.) Battery, Capt. J. F. Culpeper.

* Hilliard's legion. † Artillery battalion, Hilliard's legion. ‡ Dismounted.
§ Williams' battalion.
‖ A provisional organization, embracing Johnson's and part of the time Robertson's brigades, as well as Gregg's and McNair's. Sept. 19th attached to Longstreet's corps, under Maj.-Gen. Hood.

Gregg's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. JOHN GREGG and Col. C. A. SUGG, Commanding.

3d Tennessee, Col. C. H. Walker.
10th Tennessee, Col. William Grace.
30th Tennessee.
41st Tennessee, Lieut.-Col. J. E. Tillman.
50th Tennessee, Col. C. A. Sugg, Lieut.-Col. T. W. Beaumont, Maj. C. W. Robertson, and Col. C. H. Walker.*
1st Tennessee Battalion, Majs. S. H. Colms and C. W. Robertson.†
7th Texas, Maj. K. M. Vanzandt.
Bledsoe's (Missouri) Battery, Lieut. R. L. Wood.

CAVALRY.‡

MAJ.-GEN. JOSEPH WHEELER, Commanding.

Wharton's Division.

Brig.-Gen. JOHN A. WHARTON, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Col. C. C. CREWS, Commanding.

7th Alabama.
2d Georgia.
3d Georgia.
4th Georgia, Col. I. W. Avery.

Second Brigade.—Col. T. HARRISON, Commanding.

3d Confederate, Col. W. N. Estes.
1st Kentucky, Lt.-Col. J. W. Griffith.
4th Tennessee, Col. Paul F. Anderson.
8th Texas.
11th Texas.
White's (Georgia) Battery.

Martin's Division.

Brig.-Gen. WM. T. MARTIN, Commanding.

First Brigade.—Col. J. T. MORGAN, Commanding.

1st Alabama.
3d Alabama, Lt.-Col. T. H. Mauldin.
51st Alabama.
8th Confederate.

Second Brigade.—Col. A. A. RUSSELL, Commanding.

4th Alabama.§
1st Confederate, Col. W. B. Wade.
Wiggins' (Arkansas) Battery.

Roddey's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. P. D. RODDEY, Commanding.

4th Alabama,§ Lieut.-Col. William A. Johnson.
5th Alabama.
53d Alabama.
Forrest's (Tennessee) Regiment.
Ferrell's (Georgia) Battery.

* 3d Tennessee. † 50th Tennessee.

‡ From return of Aug. 31, 1863, and reports.

§ Two regiments of the same designation. Lieut.-Col. Johnson commanded that in Roddey's brigade.

FORREST'S CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. NATHAN BEDFORD FORREST, Commanding.

Armstrong's Division.*

Brig.-Gen. FRANCIS C. ARMSTRONG, Commanding.

Armstrong's Brigade.—Col. J. T. WHEELER, Commanding.

3d Arkansas. 1st Tennessee. 2d Tennessee.
18th Tennessee Battalion, Maj. Charles McDonald.

Forrest's Brigade.—Col. G. G. DIBRELL, Commanding.

4th Tennessee, Col. W. S. McLemore.
8th Tennessee, Capt. Hamilton McGinnis.
9th Tennessee, Col. J. B. Biffle.
10th Tennessee, Col. N. N. Cox.
11th Tennessee, Col. D. W. Holman.
Shaw's (or Hamilton's) Battalion (?), Maj. J. Shaw.
Freeman's (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. A. L. Huggins.
Marion's (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. John W. Morton.

Pegram's Division.†

Brig.-Gen. JOHN PEGRAM, Commanding.

Davidson's Brigade.—Brig.-Gen. H. B. DAVIDSON, Commanding.

1st Georgia. Rucker's Legion.
6th Georgia, Col. John R. Hart. Huwald's (Tennessee) Battery.
6th North Carolina.

Scott's Brigade.—Col. J. S. SCOTT, Commanding.

10th Confederate, Col. C. T. Goode.
Detachment of Morgan's command, Lieut.-Col. R. M. Martin.
1st Louisiana.
5th Tennessee.
12th Tennessee Battalion.
16th Tennessee Battalion, Capt. J. Q. Arnold.
Louisiana Battery (1 section).

RESERVE ARTILLERY.‡—MAJ. FELIX H. ROBERTSON, Commanding.

Barrett's (Missouri) Battery. Lumsden's (Alabama) Battery.
LeGardeur's (Louisiana) Battery.§ Massenburg's (Georgia) Battery.
Havis' (Alabama) Battery. Darden's (Mississippi) Battery.‖

* From return for Aug. 31, 1863, and reports.

† Taken from Pegram's and Scott's reports and assignments, but the composition of this division is uncertain.

‡ With exception of Darden's battery taken from return for Aug. 31, 1863. On that return this battery appears as of Johnson's brigade.

§ Not mentioned in the reports, but in Reserve Artillery, Aug. 31st, and Capt. LeGardeur, &c., relieved from duty in Army of Tennessee, Nov. 1, 1863.

‖ Williams' battalion.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Wm. S. Roscrans, at the Battle of Chickamauga, Ga., Sept. 19 and 20. 1863:*

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	
General Headquarters: 10th Ohio Infantry	----	------	----	------	----	1	1
General Headquarters: 15th Penn. Cavalry	----	------	----	2	----	3	5
Total General Headquarters	----	------	----	2	----	4	6
14th Corps:—THOMAS': Staff	----	------	----	------	1	------	1
1ST DIVISION—Baird's:							
1st Brigade—Scribner's:							
38th Indiana	1	12	3	54	----	39	109
2d Ohio	1	8	3	47	6	116	181
33d Ohio	2	12	4	59	4	79	160
94th Ohio	----	2	1	21	1	21	46
10th Wisconsin	2	9	3	52	13	132	211
Artillery, 1st Mich. Light, Battery A	1	5	----	7	----	12	25
Total 1st Brigade	7	48	14	240	24	399	732
2d Brigade—Starkweather's: Staff	----	------	1	------	----	------	1
24th Illinois	1	18	9	67	3	53	151
79th Pennsylvania	1	15	5	62	1	41	125
1st Wisconsin	4	23	5	79	4	73	188
21st Wisconsin	----	2	4	39	9	67	121
Artillery, Indiana Light, 4th Battery	----	1	----	14	1	4	20
Total 2d Brigade	6	59	24	261	18	238	606
3d Brigade—King's:							
15th U.-S., A, C, E, F, G, and H, 1st Battalion, and E, 2d Battalion.	----	9	2	47	6	96	160
16th U.-S., A, B, D, F, and H, 1st Batt., and B, C, and D, 2d Batt.	1	2	3	16	10	164	196
18th U.-S., B, D, E, F, G, and H, 1st Batt., and G and H, 3d Batt.	----	19	4	67	2	66	158
18th U.-S., 2d Battalion	1	13	3	78	2	48	145
19th U.-S., A, B, C, E, F, G, and H, 1st Batt., and A, 2d Batt.	1	2	4	13	6	110	136
Artillery, 5th U.-S., Battery H	1	12	2	16	----	13	44
Total 3d Brigade	4	57	15	237	26	497	839
Total 1st Division	17	164	56	738	68	1134	2177
2D DIVISION—Negley's:							
1st Brigade—Beatty's:							
104th Illinois	----	2	6	40	----	16	64
42d Indiana	----	1	3	49	3	50	106
88th Indiana	----	3	4	29	2	14	52
15th Kentucky	----	5	----	42	1	14	62
Artillery, Bridges' Illinois Battery	1	5	----	16	----	3	26
Total 1st Brigade	1	16	13	176	6	98	310

* Losses sustained by the troops engaged at Chickamauga in the skirmishes at Rossville, Lookout Church, and Dry Valley, Georgia, Sept. 21st, and at Missionary Ridge and Shallow-Ford Gap, Tennessee, Sept. 22d, are also included.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	
2d Brigade—Stanley and Stoughton:							
19th Illinois	----	10	4	41	1	15	71
11th Michigan	1	4	4	38	----	19	66
18th Ohio	----	5	6	49	----	14	74
Artillery, 1st Ohio Light, Battery M	----	------	----	4	----	------	4
Total 2d Brigade	1	19	14	132	1	48	215
3d Brigade—Sirwell's:							
37th Indiana	----	------	----	7	----	2	9
21st Ohio	----	28	4	80	11	120	243
74th Ohio	----	1	----	2	----	6	9
78th Pennsylvania	----	------	----	2	----	3	5
Total 3d Brigade	----	29	4	91	11	131	266
Total 2d Division	2	64	31	399	18	277	791
3d Division—Brannan's: Staff	----	------	----	1	----	------	1
1st Brigade—Connell's:							
82d Indiana	1	19	1	67	2	21	111
17th Ohio	1	15	11	103	3	18	151
31st Ohio	----	13	7	127	----	22	169
Artillery, 1st Mich. Light, Batt'y D	----	------	1	6	----	4	11
Total 1st Brigade	2	47	20	303	5	65	442
2d Brigade—Croxton and Hays:							
10th Indiana	2	22	6	130	1	5	166
74th Indiana	2	20	11	114	----	10	157
4th Kentucky	----	25	13	144	----	9	191
10th Kentucky	1	20	9	125	1	10	166
14th Ohio	----	35	8	159	----	43	245
Artillery, 1st Ohio Light, Battery C	----	4	----	9	----	------	13
Total 2d Brigade	5	126	47	681	2	77	938
3d Brigade—Vanderveer's:							
87th Indiana	7	33	4	138	----	8	190
2d Minnesota	----	34	6	101	2	49	192
9th Ohio	2	46	9	176	1	15	249
35th Ohio	2	19	7	132	1	26	187
Artillery, 4th U.-S., Battery I	----	1	1	20	----	------	22
Total 3d Brigade	11	133	27	567	4	98	840
Total 3d Division	18	306	94	1552	11	240	2221
4th Division—Reynolds': Staff	----	------	1	------	1	------	2
1st Brigade—Wilder's:							
92d Illinois	----	2	2	20	----	2	26
98th Illinois	----	2	2	29	----	2	35
123d Illinois	----	1	2	11	1	9	24
17th Indiana	----	4	2	8	----	2	16
72d Indiana	----	3	1	15	----	2	21
Artillery, Indiana Light, 18th Batt'y	----	1	----	2	----	------	3
Total 1st Brigade	----	13	9	85	1	17	125
2d Brigade—King and Robinson:							
68th Indiana	2	15	5	103	1	11	137
75th Indiana	----	17	4	104	2	11	138
101st Indiana	----	11	5	85	1	17	119
105th Ohio	----	3	4	37	2	24	70
Artillery, Indiana Light, 19th Batt'y	----	2	1	15	----	2	20
Total 2d Brigade	2	48	19	344	6	65	484

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	
3d Brigade—Turchin's:							
18th Kentucky	----	7	8	38	4	29	86
11th Ohio	----	5	1	35	2	20	63
36th Ohio	1	11	3	62	----	14	91
92d Ohio	----	6	6	62	----	17	91
Artillery, Indiana Light, 21st Batt'y	----	------	----	12	----	------	12
Total 3d Brigade	1	29	18	209	6	80	343
Total 4th Division	3	90	47	638	14	162	954
Total 14th Army Corps	40	624	228	3327	112	1813	6144
20th Corps—McCook's:							
1st Division—Davis':							
*2d Brigade**—Carlin's:							
21st Illinois	2	20	6	64	8	138	238
38th Illinois	2	13	8	79	2	76	180
81st Indiana	----	4	4	56	2	21	87
101st Ohio	3	10	6	76	----	51	146
Artillery, Minn. Light, 2d Battery	----	------	1	1	----	------	2
Total 2d Brigade	7	47	25	276	12	286	653
3d Brigade—Heg and Martin:							
25th Illinois	----	10	11	160	1	23	205
35th Illinois	3	14	5	125	----	13	160
8th Kansas	2	28	9	156	----	25	220
15th Wisconsin	4	9	6	47	2	43	111
Total 3d Brigade	9	61	31	488	3	104	696
Total 1st Division	16	108	56	764	15	390	1349
2d Division—Johnson's: Staff	1	------	----	------	----	2	3
1st Brigade—Willich's: Staff	1	------	----	1	----	------	2
89th Illinois	4	10	5	83	2	28	132
32d Indiana	1	20	4	77	----	20	122
39th Indiana (detached and mounted)	----	5	3	32	----	------	40
15th Ohio	1	9	2	75	----	33	120
49th Ohio	----	10	2	57	2	28	99
Artillery, 1st Ohio Light, Battery A	----	2	1	13	----	4	20
Total 1st Brigade	7	56	17	338	4	113	535
2d Brigade—Dodge's: Staff	----	------	1	1	2	5	9
79th Illinois	----	3	1	20	6	91	121
29th Indiana	2	9	5	87	7	62	172
30th Indiana	2	8	5	50	4	57	126
77th Pennsylvania	----	3	4	24	9	64	104
Artillery, Ohio Light, 20th Battery	----	------	----	2	----	2	4
Total 2d Brigade	4	23	16	184	28	281	536
3d Brigade—Baldwin and Berry:							
Staff	----	1	1	------	----	------	2
6th Indiana	2	11	6	110	----	31	160
5th Kentucky	2	12	6	73	2	30	125
1st Ohio	1	12	3	93	----	33	142
93d Ohio	----	15	3	83	2	27	130
Artillery, Indiana Light, 5th Battery	----	1	1	6	----	1	9
Total 3d Brigade	5	52	20	365	4	122	568
Total 2d Division	17	131	53	887	36	518	1642

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	
3D DIVISION—Sheridan's:							
1st Brigade—Lytle and Miller:							
Staff	1	----	----	----	----	----	1
36th Illinois	3	17	6	95	----	20	141
88th Illinois	----	12	7	55	----	14	88
21st Michigan	1	15	4	69	2	15	106
24th Wisconsin	----	3	4	69	----	29	105
Artillery, Indiana Light, 11th Batt'y	----	3	1	11	----	4	19
Total 1st Brigade	5	50	22	299	2	82	460
2d Brigade—Laiboldt's:							
44th Illinois	----	6	5	55	1	33	100
73d Illinois	2	11	4	53	3	19	92
2d Missouri	1	6	2	54	1	28	92
15th Missouri	2	9	5	62	----	22	100
Artillery, 1st Mo. Light, Battery G	----	1	----	3	1	----	5
Total 2d Brigade	5	33	16	227	6	102	389
3d Brigade—Bradley and Walworth:							
22d Illinois	----	23	5	71	2	29	130
27th Illinois	1	1	4	75	----	10	91
42d Illinois	3	12	4	119	1	4	143
51st Illinois	2	16	3	89	2	16	128
Artillery, 1st Illinois Light, Batt'y C	----	----	----	4	----	----	4
Total 3d Brigade	6	52	16	358	5	59	496
Total 3d Division	16	135	54	884	13	243	1345
Total 20th Army Corps	49	374	163	2535	64	1151	4336
21st Corps—CRITTENDEN'S: Escort	----	----	----	3	----	----	3
1ST DIVISION—Wood's: Staff	----	----	1	----	----	----	1
1st Brigade—Buell's:							
100th Illinois	----	23	6	111	2	22	164
58th Indiana	2	14	5	114	3	31	169
26th Ohio	4	23	6	134	2	43	212
13th Michigan	2	11	6	61	2	24	106
Artillery, Indiana Light, 8th Battery	----	1	----	9	----	7	17
Total 1st Brigade	8	72	23	429	9	127	668
3d Brigade—Harker's:							
3d Kentucky	1	12	8	70	----	22	113
64th Ohio	1	7	2	48	----	13	71
65th Ohio	2	12	6	65	----	18	103
125th Ohio	----	16	3	81	----	5	105
Artillery, Ohio Light, 6th Battery	----	1	1	7	----	----	9
Total 3d Brigade	4	48	20	271	----	58	401
Total 1st Division	12	120	44	700	9	185	1070
2D DIVISION—Palmer's: Staff	----	1	2	----	2	1	6
1st Brigade—Cruft's:							
31st Indiana	1	4	2	59	----	17	83
1st Kentucky (battalion)	----	2	1	25	----	3	31
2d Kentucky	1	9	5	59	----	18	92
90th Ohio	2	5	2	60	1	14	84
Artillery, 1st Ohio Light, Battery B	----	1	----	8	----	4	13
Total 1st Brigade	4	21	10	211	1	56	303

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	
2d Brigade—Hazen's:							
9th Indiana	2	11	8	83	1	21	126
6th Kentucky	3	9	7	88	1	10	118
41st Ohio	----	6	5	95	----	9	115
124th Ohio	----	15	5	87	----	34	141
Artillery, 1st Ohio Light, Battery F	1	1	----	8	----	2	12
Total 2d Brigade	6	42	25	361	2	76	512
3d Brigade—Grose's: Staff	----	------	----	3	----	------	3
84th Illinois	1	12	2	81	----	9	105
36th Indiana	----	13	10	89	----	17	129
23d Kentucky	1	10	3	49	----	6	69
6th Ohio	----	13	8	94	1	16	132
24th Ohio	----	3	3	57	----	16	79
Artillery, 4th U.-S., Battery H	----	5	1	16	----	------	22
Artillery, 4th U.-S., Battery M	----	2	----	6	----	------	8
Total 3d Brigade	2	58	27	395	1	64	547
Total 2d Division	12	122	64	967	6	197	1368
3d Division—VanCleve's: Staff	----	------	----	------	1	------	1
1st Brigade—Beatty's: 79th Indiana	----	1	2	42	1	9	55
9th Kentucky	----	2	4	41	1	12	60
17th Kentucky	1	5	2	103	----	15	126
19th Ohio	----	7	2	58	----	23	90
Total 1st Brigade	1	15	10	244	2	59	331
2d Brigade—Dick's: 44th Indiana	1	2	9	52	----	10	74
86th Indiana	----	1	3	28	----	21	53
13th Ohio	2	3	4	43	----	22	74
59th Ohio	2	5	1	40	2	28	78
Total 2d Brigade	5	11	17	163	2	81	279
3d Brigade—Barnes': 35th Indiana	----	5	3	20	2	35	65
8th Kentucky	----	4	2	45	1	27	79
51st Ohio	----	8	1	34	4	51	98
99th Ohio	----	3	2	28	----	24	57
Total 3d Brigade	----	20	8	127	7	137	299
Artillery—Indiana Light, 7th Battery	----	------	----	8	1	------	9
Pennsylvania Light, 26th Battery	1	1	1	13	----	1	17
Wisconsin Light, 3d Battery	----	2	----	13	----	11	26
Total Artillery	1	3	1	34	1	12	52
Total 3d Division	7	49	36	568	13	289	962
Total 21st Army Corps	31	291	144	2238	28	671	3403
Reserve Corps—Granger's: Staff	1	------	----	------	----	------	1
1st Division—Steedman's:							
1st Brigade—Whitaker's: Staff	----	------	1	------	----	------	1
96th Illinois	----	39	9	125	2	50	225
115th Illinois	2	20	9	142	1	9	183
84th Indiana	3	20	6	91	----	13	133
22d Michigan (temporarily attached)	----	32	3	93	14	247	389
40th Ohio	2	17	8	94	----	11	132
89th Ohio (temporarily attached)	2	17	2	61	13	158	253
Artillery, Ohio Light, 18th Battery	----	------	2	8	----	------	10
Total 1st Brigade	9	145	40	614	30	488	1326

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	
2d Brigade—Mitchell's:							
78th Illinois	1	16	8	69	4	58	156
98th Ohio	2	7	3	38	1	12	63
113th Ohio	1	20	8	90	----	12	131
121st Ohio	2	7	7	76	----	7	99
Artillery, 1st Illinois Light, Batt'y M	----	2	----	9	----	1	12
Total 2d Brigade	6	52	26	282	5	90	461
Total 1st Division	15	197	66	896	35	578	1787
2D DIVISION—Morgan's:							
2d Brigade—McCook's:							
85th Illinois	----	------	----	------	----	------	------
86th Illinois	----	------	----	------	----	------	------
125th Illinois	----	------	----	------	----	------	------
52d Ohio	----	------	----	------	----	------	------
69th Ohio	----	------	----	------	----	------	------
Artillery, 2d Illinois Light, Batt'y I	----	------	----	------	----	------	------
Total 2d Brig. (detailed losses not filed)	----	2	----	14	----	18	34
Total Reserve Corps	16	199	66	910	35	596	1822
Cavalry Corps—MITCHELL'S:							
1ST DIVISION—McCook's:							
1st Brigade—Campbell's:							
2d Michigan	1	1	----	6	1	2	11
9th Pennsylvania	----	------	----	------	----	3	3
1st Tennessee	----	------	----	------	----	1	1
Total 1st Brigade	1	1	----	6	1	6	15
2d Brigade—Ray's: 2d Indiana	----	1	----	4	----	------	5
4th Indiana	----	------	----	2	----	7	9
2d Tennessee	----	1	----	2	----	------	3
1st Wisconsin	----	------	----	2	----	4	6
Total 2d Brigade	----	2	----	10	----	11	23
3d Brigade—Watkin's: 4th Kentucky	----	------	----	1	4	90	95
5th Kentucky	----	------	----	------	2	18	20
6th Kentucky	----	2	1	6	2	120	131
Total 3d Brigade	----	2	1	7	8	228	246
Total 1st Division	1	5	1	23	9	245	284
2D DIVISION—Crook's:							
1st Brigade—Minty's:							
3d Indiana (detachment)	----	------	----	3	----	------	3
4th Michigan	----	1	1	11	----	6	19
7th Pennsylvania	1	4	----	13	----	1	19
4th United States	----	1	----	5	----	1	7
Total 1st Brigade	1	6	1	32	----	8	48
2d Brigade—Long's: 2d Kentucky	----	11	5	45	----	2	63
1st Ohio	1	1	----	13	----	7	22
3d Ohio	----	2	----	7	----	8	17
4th Ohio	1	3	----	9	2	19	34
Total 2d Brigade	2	17	5	74	2	36	136
Total 2d Division	3	23	6	106	2	44	184
Total Cavalry Corps	4	28	7	129	11	289	468

Detail aggregate Strength and Loss of the various Corps of the Army of the Cumberland:

Command.	Aggregate Str'gth.		Aggregate Loss.	
14th Corps—Thomas':				
1st Division—Baird's	*5541		2177	
2d " Negley's	2755		791	
3d " Brannan's	†5400		2221	
4th " Reynolds'	‡6461	20,157	954	6144
20th Corps—McCook's:				
1st Division—Davis'—about	§3900		1349	
2d " Johnson's	‖4200		1642	
3d " Sheridan's	¶4200	12,300	1345	4336
21st Corps—Crittenden's:				
1st Division—Wood's	**2965		1070	
2d " Palmer's	5005		1368	
3d " VanCleve's	††4000	11,970	962	3403
Reserve Corps—Granger's:				
1st Division—Steedman's	‡‡3913		1780	
2d " Morgan's	§§1500	5,413	34	1822
Cavalry Corps—Mitchell's:				
1st Division—McCook's	}	‖‖8,000 }	284	
2d " Crook's	}		184	468
Total Army of the Cumberland		57,840		16,173

Aggregate Strength and Loss of the Army of the Cumberland—Recapitulation:

Command.	Aggregate strength	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate loss.
		Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	Off.	Men.	
General Headquarters					2		4	6
14th Corps, Thomas'	20,157	40	624	288	3327	112	1813	6144
20th Corps, McCook's	12,300	49	374	163	2535	64	1151	4336
21st Corps, Crittenden's	11,970	31	291	144	2238	28	671	3403
Reserve, Granger	5,413	16	199	66	910	35	596	1822
Cavalry, Mitchell—about	8,000	4	28	7	129	11	289	468
Total Army of Cumberland	57,840	140	1516	608	9141	250	4524	16,179

Artillery, 192 guns.

* Letter from Gen. Baird, dated June 25, 1887; figures from records of Sept. 15, 1863.

† Brannan's report, war records.

‡ Including Wilder's mounted-infantry brigade, without 3040; letter of T. T. Knox, in charge of war-records office, August 4, 1887.

§ Including Post's brigade; Carlin and Heg's aggregate 2433.

‖ Letter from Gen. Johnson, dated June 29, 1887.

¶ Sheridan reports "4000 bayonets," war records, adding say 200 officers.

** Wood's report—two brigades, war records.

†† Approximate; Dick's and S. Beatty's strength 2506, from war records, and Barnes' brigade assumed.

‡‡ Granger's report—two brigades of Steedman's division, including LeFavor's demi-brigade, temporarily attached.

§§ Dan. McCook's brigade, Morgan's division, approximate.

‖‖ Estimated.

Aggregate Strength and Loss of the Army of the Tennessee:

From Reports, except as stated below.

Command.	Aggregate Strength.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate Loss.
Right Wing:—Polk.					
Hill's Corps:—Breckinridge's Division	3769	166	909	165	1450
Cleburne's Division	5115	204	1539	6	1749
Walker's* and Liddell's div.	6534	341	1949	733	3023
Polk's Corps:—Cheatham's Division†	6454	218	1624	118	1973
Total Right Wing	21,872	929	6021	1022	8195
Left Wing:—Longstreet.					
Stewart's Division	4358	205	1499	29	1707
Hood's‡ "	5500	------	--------	------	2919
McLaw's§ "	2500	------	--------	------	640
Johnson's "	3428	188	1081	180	1449
Hindman's "	6122	272	1480	98	1850
Preston's "	4809	198	1077	61	1336
Total Left Wing	26,717	861	5137	368	9901
Cavalry, Wheeler ---------- about	‖ 12,000	------	--------	------	--------
Total Army of Tennessee	60,589	1790	11,158	1380	18,096

Artillery, 200 guns.

* On the 20th September, Gen. Gist commanded Walker's division.

† Gen. Cheatham's report does not state the strength of his division. The strength of Preston Smith's brigade is assumed; the strength of other brigades are taken from the ordnance report.

‡ Gen. Longstreet states that the loss on September 20, of Hood's brigades—Robertson's, Benning's, and Law's—was 1448 men; now, assuming this to be one-third, on the morning of the 20th the division had 4344; again assuming that its loss on the 19th was one-quarter, its strength on that morning would be 5815. Gen. Bragg, in one of his reports, incidentally mentions it as being about 5000 strong; so we may safely place its strength at 5500.

§ Gen. Kershaw, who commanded his own and Humphrey's brigades, on Sept. 20, reports the loss of his brigade as 448 and Humphrey's as 152; but does not mention their strength. Assuming that the loss of Kershaw's brigade was the same as that of Gracie's—thirty per cent, its strength would be 1680; and as Humphrey's did not do much fighting, we will assume that its loss was twenty per cent, then its strength would be 760, or say 2500 for the two brigades.

‖ Gen. Bragg, Oct. 7, 1863, reports as present for duty:

Infantry	Officers,	4664	Men,	46,447	= 51,111
Artillery	"	157	"	3480	= 3,637
Cavalry (returns imperfect)	"	and	"		13,620
					68,368

Hence we may safely assume the aggregate strength of rebel cavalry in the Battle of Chickamauga was about 12,000.

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